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GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
INTRODUCTION
This article provides a detailed statistical analysis of all
GATT dispute settlement complaints filed from the beginning of
GATT operations in 1948 until the end of 1989. This analysis has
two primary objectives: First, it seeks to provide a quantitative
description of what happened in the first forty-two years of the
GATT dispute settlement process - who the parties were, what
they complained about, how the process worked, and what it
achieved. Second, it seeks to measure and evaluate the various
factors which appear to contribute to the relative success, or fail-
ure, of the GATT dispute settlement system in enforcing GATT
rules.
The analysis rests on a database prepared by the authors
which consists of 207 complaints filed during the forty-two year
period that is the subject of this investigation.' A "complaint" is
defined as any public invocation of GATT procedures for issuing
legal rulings in a dispute between governments. 2 For each com-
plaint, the database contains the date of the complaint, the par-
ticular GATT agreement invoked, the complainant(s) and
defendant(s) involved, the developed or developing country sta-
tus of the parties, the trade measure involved, the type of prod-
uct involved, how far the case progressed in the dispute
resolution mechanism, what the GATT finally did with the case,
and the eventual outcome with regard to the measure com-
plained of. The data entry form used to compile the database is
provided in Appendix I, and a list of the 207 cases is provided in
Appendix II.
The analysis first presents an overview of the performance
of the dispute settlement procedure over the entire forty-two
year period. Then it examines and compares outcomes accord-
ing to the date of the complaint, the parties involved, the prod-
uct involved, and the type of trade measure involved.
1. Of these 207 complaints, 172 were brought under the General Agree-
ment itself, 33 were brought under one of the MTN Codes adopted in 1979, and
two were brought under both the General Agreement and an MTN Code.
2. The first public invocation of GATT adjudication procedures is usually
a public request for consultations. Under the General Agreement, requests for
consultations under Article XXIII:1 (the GATT's adjudication provision) would
constitute a complaint, whereas requests under Article XXII (the provision
which authorizes a separate, non-adjudicatory consulting procedure) would not.
The same distinction exists for consultation requests under the adjudication
and consultation procedures in the Tokyo Round Codes.
Requests for legal rulings at large are not counted as complaints in this
survey.
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Two reservations about the study must be noted. First, dis-
pute settlement is only the tip of the GATT legal system. GATT
law applies to a very wide range of day-to-day government be-
havior, very little of which ever comes before a GATT legal pro-
ceeding. An analysis of the relative success of formal legal
proceedings is manifestly not a description of this larger whole.
Such an analysis can tell us how well the legal enforcement
mechanism serves those who invoke it. It can identify patterns
of behavior - by country, by product, by trade measure, by time
period - that have likely been replicated in behavior outside the
dispute settlement mechanism. For those seeking a description
of the larger picture, however, it is just one of many tools that
the legal historian would have to use.
Second, in order to present a coherent picture of the data
presented and to offer plausible hypotheses about what they
may mean, this study frequently finds it necessary to describe
background conditions, supply brief accounts of government
goals and policies, and summarize rather complicated events in
GATT legal history. To present this supplementary information
in proper scholarly fashion, in sufficient detail, and with suffi-
cient documentation would require a long book or two. That is
obviously not possible in a work of this length, nor is it our pur-
pose here. Our goal here is to present the data. While the sup-
plementary information we offer is based upon our best
judgment, we would ask the reader to treat it as unsupported
assertion offered to supply one or more organizing hypotheses
that will stimulate further thinking, and hopefully further re-
search, about the data itself.
A. THE ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
1. IDENTIFYING LEGALLY VALID COMPLAINTS
The primary test of a legal system is the extent to which the
system can elicit compliance when a valid legal claim is asserted.
The first step in measuring such compliance is to identify those
complaints that do in fact assert valid legal claims. Legal valid-
ity can be identified in three basic ways, depending upon the pro-
cedural outcome of the complaint proceeding.
* Rulings. In eighty-eight of the 207 complaints, a GATT
panel and/or the plenary assembly of member countries has
ruled on the legal validity of the complaint. 3 Such a ruling is the
3. The term "plenary assembly," or "plenary" for short, refers to the ulti-
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most authoritative determination of legal validity, and in this
study the highest such ruling in the case is treated as
determinative. 4
Rulings are classified as "Violation" and "No-Violation."
The Violation category includes both ordinary legal violations
and rulings that a trade measure constitutes "nonviolation nulli-
fication and impairment" under GATT Article XXIII:I(b) - the
GATT's rather distinctive equitable remedy for situations in
which a GATT-consistent measure upsets the balance of reci-
procity in an unexpected (and to some degree culpable) manner.
The No-Violations category includes cases in which the decision-
making body states it is unable to rule - for our purposes, the
equivalent of a ruling that the complainant has failed to estab-
lish its case.
mate governing body under any particular agreement. The GATT agreement
itself is governed by a plenary assembly called the CONTRACTING PARTIES,
consisting of all signatories. The GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES generally
act through a somewhat smaller body called the GATT Council; both the Coun-
cil and the CONTRACTING PARTIES will be treated as GATT's plenary body.
The GATT legal system also contains several side agreements, called MTN
Codes, each with its own distinctive membership and its own separate dispute
settlement procedure. These agreements are governed by a plenary assembly
of all signatories, usually referred to as the Committee of Signatories.
GATT panels (short for panel of experts) are tribunals of three or five
GATT experts, appointed by the plenary body with the consent of the parties.
Panel rulings are written like judicial opinions. Technically, they are a report
to the plenary, which makes the final determination.
4. In 63 of the 88 cases, there is both a panel ruling and a second ruling by
the CONTRACTING PARTIES or other plenary body. In 58 of the 63 cases,
the panel ruling is affirmed. In three of the remaining cases the plenary body
reversed a panel finding of violation and issued a decision essentially ruling no-
violation. France: Income Tax Practices, BISD 23d Supp. 114 (1977) (GATT
panel report) (Case #70) [hereinafter France: Income Tax Practices]; Belgium:
Income Tax Practices, BISD 23d Supp. 127 (1977) (GATT panel report) (Case
#71) [hereinafter Belgium: Income Tax Practices]; Netherlands: Income Tax
Practices, BISD 23d Supp. 137 (1977) (GATT panel report) (Case #72) [herein-
after Netherlands: Income Tax Practices]. These three reports were "adopted"
subject to an Understanding on December 7-8, 1981. BISD 28th Supp. 114
(1982). In two other cases, Spain: Measures Concerning Domestic Sale of Soy-
bean Oil, GATT Doc. L/5142 (June 1, 1981) (GATT panel report) (Case #91)
[hereinafter Spain: Soybean Oil]; United States: Imports of Certain Automo-
tive Spring Assemblies [Section 337], BISD 30th Supp. 107 (1983) (GATT panel
report) (Case #102) [hereinafter United States: Spring Assemblies], the ple-
nary in effect set aside a panel ruling of no-violation but issued no contrary
ruling.
Of the 25 cases in which only one ruling was made, there were eight in-
stances in which the plenary body ruled directly, without the aid of a prior
panel ruling and 17 cases where a panel ruling was never acted upon by the
plenary body, usually because the case had been settled after the panel report.
1993]
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0 Settled, or Validity Otherwise Conceded. In sixty-four of
the 207 complaints, the defendant settled or otherwise conceded
the validity of the claim against it without any legal ruling hav-
ing been issued.5 For the purposes of this study, all cases that
fall into this category are deemed to rest on legally valid
complaints.
Cases involving an express concession of legal validity by
the defendant must obviously be categorized as involving valid
claims. They account for only one-fifth of this category, how-
ever. The remaining four-fifths involve what might be called an
implicit concession of validity. The concession is implied when a
party agrees to a settlement in which it will either partially or
completely remove the measure complained of. Although it is
true that settlements are sometimes brought about as much by
practical considerations as by recognition of legal obligation, ex-
perience indicates that most settlements rest on an implicit ac-
knowledgement that the complaint has merit - at least the
equitable merit recognized in the GATT's equity concept of
"nonviolation nullification and impairment."'6
0 Withdrawn or Abandoned. In fifty-five of the 207 com-
plaints, complaints were withdrawn or abandoned without any
ruling having been made, or without any settlement or conces-
sion having been achieved. In nine of these cases, sufficient in-
formation exists to permit a dual conclusion: (a) that the
complaint was legally valid, and (b) that the complaint was
abandoned because the complainant believed that the GATT dis-
pute settlement procedure would not respond effectively to the
complaint. These nine cases must be considered legal failures,
and they must be counted in order to present a complete picture
of GATT's legal effectiveness.
2. CATEGORIES OF SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES
Once the cases with legally valid complaints are identified,
the next step is to categorize the substantive outcome of those
cases - success, failure, or result unknown. The following four
main categories are used in describing substantive outcomes:
* Result Unknown. "Result unknown" cases are those in
5. Cases in which the parties settle after a panel ruling without taking the
ruling to the plenary body are categorized as cases involving a legal ruling and
are counted in that category.
6. GATT, art. XXIII:I(b).
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which the final results were not recorded in GATT records, and
so far have not been discovered through alternative lines of in-
quiry. Most are older cases where the personnel involved are no
longer available. "Result unknown" cases are set aside and not
counted in the percentage analysis.
* Full Satisfaction. "Full satisfaction" describes cases where
the legal claim has been fully (or almost fully) vindicated, usu-
ally by removing a measure found to be in violation of GATT.7
Two types of "full satisfaction" can be distinguished:
* Direct Compliance (Data Code 6.2.3). Cases in which
the measure complained of is removed in direct response to
the GATT legal claim. This is the clearest sort of legal
success.
* Indirect Compliance (Data Code 6.2.4). Cases in which
the measure complained of is removed, but for reasons that
are more or less independent of the GATT legal claim -
either a separate internal legal decision by the defendant
government, or because the measure simply expired accord-
ing to the terms under which it was adopted.
These two types of full satisfaction will be distinguished when
dealing with the database as a whole. They will not be distin-
guished in some of the more detailed analysis that follows.
* Partial Satisfaction (Data Code 6.2.2). "Partial satisfaction"
cases are those in which some significant remedial action was
taken by the defendant - short of complete removal but suffi-
cient to justify treating the legal claim as having been successful.
0 Negative Outcome. "Negative Outcome" describes cases in
which the legal system has failed to enforce a valid claim. There
are two types of negative outcome:
0 Impasse (Date Code 6.2.1). Cases where the result is im-
7. In cases involving a ruling of nonviolation nullification and impairment
(GATT Article XXIII:l(b)), the only legal right established is the complainant's
right to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions if the balance of reci-
procity is not restored. Vindication can involve restoring the balance through
compensation, restoring the balance by an actual withdrawal, or, as in Euro-
pean Community: Payments and Subsidies on Oilseeds and Animal-Feed Pro-
teins, GATT Doc. L/6627 (Dec. 14, 1989) (GATT panel report) (Case #179)
[hereinafter European Community: Oilseeds], restoring the balance by with-
drawing the nullified tariff concession under Article XXVIII and thereby as-
suming the obligation to pay the compensation required by that article.
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passe - where no remedial action at all is taken by the de-
fendant in response to the valid legal claim.
* Surrender to Arm-Twisting (Data Code 6.2.5). Cases in
which the defendant had imposed a GATT-illegal trade re-
striction to induce compliance with bilateral demands (re-
ferred to as "arm-twisting"), and where, despite a GATT
complaint, the arm-twisting restriction was removed only
after the complainant-victim acceded to the bilateral
demands.8
These two types of negative outcome will be distinguished when
dealing with the database as a whole. They will not be distin-
guished in some of the more detailed analysis that follows.
B. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS IN ALL 207
COMPLAINTS
1. PROCEDURAL OUTCOMES
The following table summarizes the breakdown of the 207
GATT legal complaints into the three general types of proce-
dural outcomes described earlier.
TABLE Gen 1
PROCEDURAL OUTCOMES
Total Rulin I Settled-Conceded by Def. Withdrawn or Abandoned
Complaints Number % of total Number % of total Number % of total
207 88 43% 64 31% 55 27%
The breakdown of procedural outcomes suggests two inter-
esting structural points about GATT litigation. First, the per-
centage of cases that reach the stage of a legal ruling is quite
high. Of the 207 complaints during the 1948-1989 period, eighty-
eight complaints, or 43%, led to a ruling of some sort.9 Two pos-
sible explanations for this rather high rate of actual litigation
suggest themselves. On the one hand, it may be that com-
plaining governments wait longer before taking the public step
of filing a GATT complaint, thereby limiting the sample to only
the more intractable cases. On the other hand, it may also be
that defendant governments find it difficult to settle once the
complaint is launched. The political costs of agreeing to modify
8. Typically, the bilateral demands are either demands for export-limiting
voluntary export restraints (VERs), demands for market access, or demands on
non-trade issues.
9. For a breakdown of the types of rulings, see supra note 4.
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or remove a trade barrier can be quite high. It may be better to
fight and lose a lawsuit definitively, because then the unpleasant
corrective action can be blamed squarely on GATT law.
Second, it is worth calling attention to the category of with-
drawn-abandoned cases as a possible source of weakness in the
process. Granting that the category contains many complaints
withdrawn for innocent reasons, it also contains other com-
plaints withdrawn because the dispute settlement procedure ap-
peared unlikely to succeed. In following sections, the study will
pay particular attention to withdrawn and abandoned com-
plaints as a potential source of legal failure.
2. SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES
* Cases with Legal Rulings. The following table reports the
distribution of violation and no-violation rulings in the eighty-
eight complaints in which rulings were made.
TABLE Gm 2
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: RUUNGS - VIOLATION v. NO-VIOLATION
Total ToWal As ofal No I Violation A. % of all As % ofall
Complaintl Rulingsl complaints Violation Vilain iing complaints
207 1 88 43% 20 68 77% 33%
The high percentage of rulings in favor of the complainant
is worth noting. In sixty-eight of the eighty-eight rulings, or
77%, the panel concluded that the complaint was well-founded.10
Governments seem to have been reasonably selective about the
complaints they pressed forward to a formal ruling.
Taking the sixty-eight cases where the complaint was ruled
valid, the following table reports on how well the rulings were
followed.
10. The 20 cases in which no violation was found include a number of cases
in which the panel declared itself unable to reach a conclusion, or vaguely sug-
gested as much. Since the complainant has the burden of proof, failure to sus-
tain that burden is tantamount to rejection.
It is very difficult to separate decisions ruling a measure legal from deci-
sions in which a panel is genuinely unable to decide. GATT panels have a ten-
dency to frame negative decisions in vague terms, as if reluctant to issue a clean
bill of legal health to any restrictive measure.
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TABLE Gea 3
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: RULINGS - RESULTS OF VIOLATION RULINGS
Total Result Full Satisfaction Part Satis. Negaie Outcome
Violation Unknown 6.2.3 6.2.4 1 Total I % 6.2.2 1 % 1 6.2.1 6.2.5 To5al i
1 68 1 _1 37 1 8 1 45 167% IS 22% 1 5 2 7 10%1
Note: All percentages an computed using known results.
6.2.3: Ruling or claim fully satisfied.
6.2.4: Ruling or claim fully satisfied due to internal legal decision or expiration of measure.
6.2.2: Ruling or claim partly satisfied.
6.2.1: No action taken.
6.2.5: Claim fully satisfied after complainant acceded to bilateral demands.
The most significant datum is that, of the sixty-seven rul-
ings with known results, sixty rulings, or 90%, ended with a posi-
tive outcome. Not all of these positive outcomes were total legal
victories, of course. Breaking down the sixty positive outcomes,
we find three categories of results. We find that thirty-seven
complaints, 55% of all those ruled valid, did achieve the best re-
sult - full satisfaction of the legal claim as a direct response to
the GATT ruling. In another eight complaints, 12% of all com-
plaints ruled valid, the measure was also fully removed, but for
reasons independent of the GATT legal ruling. And finally, in
fifteen complaints, or 22% of all those ruled valid, the complain-
ant achieved partial satisfaction of the legal claim. Stated differ-
ently, just over half of the violation rulings achieved full
compliance directly, two-thirds resulted in full compliance
somehow, and nine out of ten produced a worthwhile positive
result.
Of the seven negative outcomes that occurred after a ruling
of violation, we find that five were cases in which the ruling was
followed by impasse, and two were cases in which an arm-twist-
ing restriction achieved its intended result, the ruling
notwithstanding."'
11. The seven cases with negative outcomes after rulings of violation were:
United States: Prohibition on Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Can-
ada, BISD 29th Supp. 91 (1983) (GATT panel report) (Case #93) [hereinafter
United States: Tuna from Canada]; United States: Imports of Sugar from Nica-
ragua, BISD 31st Supp. 67 (1985) (GATT panel report) (Case #125) [hereinaf-
ter United States: Sugar from Nicaragua]; Canada: Countervailing Duty on
Boneless Manufacturing Beef, GATT Doc. SCM/85 (Oct. 13,1987) (GATT panel
report) (Case #149) [hereinafter Canada: Boneless Beef]; United States: Sec-
tion 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, BISD 36th Supp. 345 (1990) (GAIT panel
report) (Case #162) [hereinafter United States: Section 337]; European Com-
munity: Antidumping Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, BISD
37th Supp. 132 (1991) (GATT panel report) (Case #188) [hereinafter Screw-
driver Assembly]; United States: Antidumping Duties on Stainless Pipes and
[Vol. 2:1
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* Cases in Which Defendant Settles or Otherwise Concedes
Legal Validity. The following table summarizes the outcomes
of complaints that were settled by the parties or in which the
defendant otherwise conceded the legal validity of the
complaint.
TAB=E Gea 4
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: COMPLAINTS SETTLED OR CONCEDED
Total Settled Result Full Satisfaction Partial Satisfaction
or Conceded Unknown 6.2.3 6.2.4 Total % 6.2.2 %
64 1 37 1 38 60% 25 40%
Note: All percentages are computed using known results.
6.2.3: Ruin or claim fidly satisfied.
6.2.4: Ruling or claim fully satisfied due to internal legal decison or expiration of mesure.
6.2.2: Ruling or claim partly atisfied.
In GATT tradition, the positive outcomes achieved through
settlement or other kinds of concessions are just as valuable as
those achieved through formal ruling. GATT governments have
always expressed considerable pride in the GATT's pragmatic
approach to disputes, stressing that agreed solutions are always
the most durable and also produce the best long-term relations
between members. Such pragmatism, they say, has made GATT
more effective than other, more legalistic organizations.
The most important datum in connection with this second
category is simply the total number of complaints it contains.
Subtracting the one case where the result is unknown, another
sixty-three cases are added to the success column.
The only other datum bearing on legal effectiveness for
cases in this category is the issue of "full" versus "partial" satis-
faction of the legal claims involved. The "full-partial" distinc-
tion does not have quite the same meaning in relation to settled
or conceded cases as it does in relation to cases with rulings.
When a defendant government agrees to remove only part of a
measure complained of, the only claim of legal obligation it is
conceding, usually, is the claim pertaining to that part of the
complaint it is agreeing to satisfy.12 It cannot be assumed, there-
Tubes from Sweden, GATT Doc. ADP/47 (Aug. 20, 1990) (GATT panel report)
(Case #191) [hereinafter United States: Stainless Pipes from Sweden]; and
Canada.- Restriction on Imports of Ice Cream and Yoghurt, BISD 36th Supp. 68
(1990) (GATT panel report) (Case #195) [hereinafter Canadax Ice Cream and
Yoghurt]. For a brief description of cases with rulings categorized as negative
outcomes, see irfra Appendix III.
12. Some partial settlements, to be sure, do imply the legal validity of the
1993]
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fore, that partial satisfaction in these cases involves a partial fail-
ure to satisfy an admittedly valid claim.
Despite that qualification, the data on full and partial satis-
faction are still informative in a descriptive sense. At a mini-
mum, the "full satisfaction" results still provide an accurate
description of that fact alone. We find that thirty-eight of the
sixty-three settled or conceded cases with known results, or
60%, ended with full satisfaction of the legal claim. Only one of
these thirty-eight cases involved removal of the measure for rea-
sons independent of, or apart from, GATT obligations.
* Cases in Which the Complaint Was Withdrawn or Aban-
doned. The final category of complaints to be considered are
those withdrawn or abandoned before any ruling or settlement
was made. Many of the cases in this category do not provide a
relevant test of GATT's legal effectiveness. This is true when-
ever the case was terminated for a "neutral" reason which did
not indicate any failure of GATT law. Such neutral reasons in-
clude the complainant government's conclusion that the mea-
sure complained of:
(a) is GATT-legal after all, or
(b) is not causing harm, or
(c) can be dealt with by other means, or
(d) has expired or been terminated for internal legal
reasons.
13
Cases withdrawn for such neutral reasons must be excluded
from the statistical analysis.
Conversely, we have a case of potential legal failure if the
complaint has been abandoned under circumstances which indi-
cate that the complainant government gave up because it did not
believe that GATT law would be able to enforce the claim. Basi-
cally, two withdrawal situations fit this description, correspond-
ing to the two kinds of "negative outcome" described in the
previous section. The first situation is the case that simply ends
in impasse; that is, the defendant refuses to change the measure
in question, and after awhile the complainant just gives up with-
out seeking to move the procedure forward to a legal ruling.
entire complaint. This would usually be true, for example, where a defendant
agrees to enlarge an unjustified quota.
13. Characterizing this final type of reason as "neutral" does tend to ignore
GATT's problems with the so-called "hit-and-run" trade restriction, typically
an end-of-season restriction on agricultural imports after a heavy harvest. The
GATT dispute settlement procedure does not act rapidly enough to deal with
such measures before they expire.
[Vol. 2:1
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The second situation involves complaints directed at an arm-
twisting trade restriction; the potentially negative outcome oc-
curs when, after filing the GATT complaint, the complaining
government subsequently gives in to the arm-twisting, accedes
to the demand, and then withdraws the GATT complaint be-
cause the arm-twisting restriction, having served its purpose, has
been terminated by the defendant government.14
The number of complaints withdrawn for such "negative"
reasons is a meaningful datum in itself, because it gives a rough
measure of the degree of effective resistance that certain types
of complaints are encountering. Such withdrawals cannot be
equated with "negative outcomes" - that is, failure to enforce a
legally valid claim - unless one can also conclude that the origi-
nal complaint was in fact legally valid. If the legal claim was not
valid - if the measure complained of was in fact GATT-legal -
then the defendant would have had every right to refuse to
change the measure. Although the complainant may not have
had its day in court, the outcome could not be called a legal fail-
ure. A complete analysis of withdrawn or abandoned complaints
must, therefore, include a final step - analysis of the legal valid-
ity of complaints withdrawn for negative reasons.
The following table gives the breakdown of the fifty-five
withdrawn or abandoned cases according to the "neutral" or
"negative" reasons for withdrawal, and further subdivides nega-
tive withdrawals to separate out those cases with a valid legal
claim.
TABLE Gen 5
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: COMPLAINTS WITHDRAWN OR ABANDONED
Remit Neutrl: W/ for Negative: Withdrawn after imp au oplainant
=nnw = =Iat e o acceded to bilateral demands
CM OM d Number Number Number complaints Num-er "11 A , pit
20 1 139 5 8 20 27 1 13% 9 6%
Initially, we find a rather high percentage of cases which
cannot be evaluated because the result is unknown - eight of
fifty-five, or almost 15%. This high percentage is due to the fact
that many cases in this category were withdrawn after having
made only the barest of records in GATT. Governments seldom
14. Calling such cases a potential legal failure assumes that the complain-
ant government made its decision with no less courage than the legal system
can reasonably expect of its members. That assumption should be valid in most
cases.
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want to say very much about such withdrawn complaints, and
many happened so long ago that it is no longer possible to inter-
view participants. Subtracting these eight complaints, we have
forty-seven withdrawn or abandoned complaints that can be
evaluated.
Next, we examine these forty-seven complaints to eliminate
complaints that have been withdrawn or abandoned for neutral
reasons. We find that twenty of the remaining forty-seven com-
plaints fall into this category.
This leaves only twenty-seven complaints that have been
terminated for negative reasons. As noted above, these twenty-
seven complaints are a meaningful datum in themselves, telling
us that some 13% of the 207 GATT complaints filed during this
period came to an end in this potentially unsatisfactory manner.
The final step is to determine which of these twenty-seven
complaints rested on a valid legal claim. There is no authorita-
tive means of doing so. None of the cases has a GATT ruling,
nor has there been any direct or indirect concession by the de-
fendant. For many there simply is no basis on which to judge at
all, because complaints were withdrawn so early in the process
that there is either no factual record, or no coherent legal the-
ory. But there are some cases where the record and the collat-
eral information are reasonably good, and where it is possible to
render a reasonably secure judgment about legal validity.1 5
Although this ad hoc method is obviously subject to error in
both directions, the authors are persuaded that a significant
number of legal failures of this kind have occurred, and that
there is no better way to take account of this important segment
of GATT legal experience.
The authors' ad hoc analysis has led to the conclusion that
nine of the twenty-seven complaints in this "negative" group can
be counted as resting on a valid legal claim. 16 The results in all
15. Judgments about legal invalidity are extremely difficult, because on
these incomplete records, it is almost impossible to know what other informa-
tion might have supported the complaint.
16. The nine cases are France: Auto Taxes, GATT Doc. L/520 (Sept. 12,
1956) (U.S. complaint) (Case #40) [hereinafter France: Auto Taxes]; European
Community: Article XIX Action on Imports into the UK of Television Sets
from Korea, GATT Doc. C/M/124 (Council meeting of Mar. 14, 1978) (complaint
by Korea) (Case # 83) [hereinafter European Community: TVs from Korea];
European Community: Import Restrictive Measures on Video Tape Recorders,
GA'T' Doec. L/5427 (Dec. 21, 1982) (complaint by Japan) (Case #119) [hereinaf-
ter Poitiers Customs House]; United States: Ban on Imports of Steel Pipe and
Tube from the European Community, GATT Doc. L/5747 (Dec. 10, 1984) (EC
complaint) (Case #138) [hereinafter United States: Steel Pipe from ECq; United
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nine of the valid-claim cases must be classified as negative out-
comes. A valid legal complaint was abandoned in circumstances
which indicate that the complainant did not believe further
prosecution would be worthwhile. 17 Taken as a percentage,
these nine cases account for 6% of all valid complaints.
In three of the nine cases with a negative outcome, the le-
gally valid complaint was withdrawn at a point of impasse. The
other six involved legally valid complaints withdrawn after ac-
ceding to an arm-twisting demand.
3. THE COMBINED RESULTS
In this final part of the overview section, we consider the
combined results from all three categories. The data is limited
to the 139 dispute settlement complaints which presented a
meaningful test for the GATT legal system: (a) the sixty-seven
cases with known results in which the complaint was ruled le-
gally valid, (b) the sixty-three cases with known results where
the defendant settled or otherwise conceded the legal validity of
the complaint, and (c) the nine withdrawn or abandoned cases
with known results where a valid claim, identified by the au-
thors, was withdrawn for negative reasons. The following table
gives a three-part breakdown of that combined data.
States: Restrictions on Imports of Cotton Pillowcases and Bedsheets, GAT
Doc. L/5859 (Sept. 2, 1985) (complaint by Portugal) (Case #144) [hereinafter
United States: Cotton Pillowcases]; European Community: Ban on Importation
of Skins of Certain Seal Pups and Related Products, GA'IT Doc. L/5940 (Dec.
19, 1985) (complaint by Canada) (Case #145) [hereinafter European Commu-
nity: Seal Skins]; United States: Unilateral Measures on Imports of Certain
Japanese Products, GATT Doc. L/6159 (Apr. 21, 1987) (complaint by Japan)
(Case #161) [hereinafter Semiconductor Retaliation]; United States: Import
Restrictions on Certain Products from Brazil, GATT Doc. L/6386 (Aug. 24,
1988) (complaint by Brazil) (Case #189) [hereinafter Pharmaceutical Retalia-
tion]; and United States: Increase in Rates of Duty on Certain Products of the
European Community, GATT Doc. L/6438 (Nov. 28, 1988) (EC complaint)
(Case #193) [hereinafter Hormones Retaliation]. For a brief description of
withdrawn or abandoned of cases categorized as negative outcomes, see Appen-
dix III, infra
In each of the remaining 18 cases, there was at least one missing element of
information which precluded finding that the complaint was legally valid. It is
reasonable to assume that better information would have yielded some addi-
tional valid claims.
No attempt was made to analyze the legal merits of complaints withdrawn
for "neutral" reasons. Whatever their merits, the GATT was not at fault for
failing to prosecute them.
17. Conclusions about the "worth" of going forward are not limited to ex-
pectations about GATT's ability to rule. They also include fears of retaliation
by the defendant, for a legal system also fails if it does not offer the complainant
of average courage protection against such fears.
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TABLE Gem 6
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: COMBINED DATA
(Includes only cases with known results)
Cases where ruling of violation. settled, or conceded valid
Total Full Satisfaction I Partial Satisfaction Ne ative Otcome
Complaints Number % Number I % Number %
130 83 64% I 40 L 31% 7 5%
Casea where ruling of violation, settled, conceded valid, or withdrawn and probably validTotal Full Satisfaction [ Partia Stisfaction NeaieOIcm
Complaints Number % Numbe Number
139 83 60% 40 29% 16 1 12%
Detailed Breakdown of Substantive Outcome by Procedural Outcome
Procedural Outcomes
Substantive Ruling of Violation Settled or Conceded W/d, Neg. reason, Prob. valid
Outcomes Number % Number % Number % Total %
Full Satisfaction 45 67% 38 60% 0 0% 83 60%6.2.3 37 55% 37 59% 0 0% 74 53%
6.2.4 8 12% 1 2% 0 0% 9 6%
Part Satis. (6.2.2) 15 22% 25 40% 0 0% 40 29%
Neg. Outcome 7 10% 0 0% 9 100% 16 12%6.2. 5 7% 0 0% 3 33% 8 6%
.... _ 616 0 0 0 o 4 44% 4 3%
6.-.5(5.1.7) 2 3% 0 0% 2 22% 4 3%
Total 67 63 1 139
6.2.3: Ruling or claim full satisfied.
6.2.4: Ruling or claim fully satisfied due to internal legal decision or
expiration of measure.
6.2.2: Ruling or claim partly satisfied.
6.2.1: No action taken.
6.*.5 (5.1.6): Measure removed when complainant agreed to VER.
6.*.5 (5.1.7): Claim fully satisfied after complainant acceded to bilateral demands.
The first part of the table reports on only the 130 cases in
which there is some "objective" determination of legal validity
- the sixty-seven "ruling" and the sixty-three "conceded" cases.
The results for this smaller 130-case sample are quite flattering.
Some 123 of the 130 valid complaints in these two categories, or
95%, end with positive outcomes. Approximately two-thirds of
the 123 positive results, or eighty-three cases, ended with full
satisfaction of the complaint. Of the eighty-three full satisfac-
tion cases, seventy-four involved direct compliance, while nine
involved compliance due to independent internal decisions.
The present study does not accept this 130-case sample as an
accurate portrayal of the effectiveness of GATT's dispute settle-
ment system. Subjective though the analysis may be, the nine
(more or less) legal failures found in the withdrawn-abandoned
category are an important datum in assessing how well the sys-
tem enforces valid claims. Here and in all subsequent tables re-
GA YT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
porting combined data, the third category of withdrawn-
abandoned cases will be included.
The combined data for the full 139-complaint sample is
presented in the second part of Table Gen 6 above. Once again,
the most significant datum is the rate of positive results. The
rate for this larger sample is only 88%. Although any legal sys-
tem, including GATT's, will want to aim higher than 88%, most
governments would be quite encouraged if a relatively new in-
ternational legal system had managed to produce positive results
in almost nine out of ten cases.
The breakdown of positive results according to degrees of
satisfaction yields no surprises. From the 88% of all complaints
that produced positive results, we find 53% where full satisfac-
tion occurred in response to the GATT claim, 6% where full sat-
isfaction occurred for independent reasons, and 29% where
partial satisfaction occurred. Stated more simply, about two-
thirds of all positive results involved optimal or almost optimal
results.
The breakdown of negative results into specific subcatego-
ries shows that the type of legal failure tends to vary according
to the procedural setting. In cases disposed of by ruling, the
seven legal failures consisted of five cases of impasse and two in
which arm-twisting restrictions prevailed. For complaints with-
drawn or abandoned, the nine legal failures broke down into
three impasse and six arm-twisting. The lesson, it seems, is that
successful arm-twisting tends to succeed early in the process,
and usually ends up compelling abandonment of the right to ad-
judicate as well.
The overview just presented is a composite view of events
over a forty-two year period. In reality, the legal events during
this period were anything but uniform. A more accurate por-
trait of the GATT dispute settlement system requires, first,
breaking this data down into smaller time periods.
C. A DECADE-BY-DECADE ANALYSIS
This section examines the 207 dispute settlement com-
plaints on a decade-by-decade basis. To simplify matters, we
treat the first twelve years of GATT history, 1948-1959, as a sin-
gle "decade." The next three decades will be the ordinary ten-
year kind - 1960-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989. The four decades
will be referred to as the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
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1. THE VOLUME OF LEGAL AcTvWTy, DECADE BY DECADE
The following table presents a decade-by-decade breakdown
of the 207 dispute settlement cases, further subdivided into the
three categories of procedural outcome employed in this
analysis.
TABLE DIc
PROCEDURAL OUTCOMES (B Decade)
Tota d-Coede by Def. Withdrawn or Abandoned
Complaints Number % of total Number % of total Number % of total
1950. 53 21 40% 22 42% 10 19%
1960 . 7 $ 71% 2 29% 0 0%
1970s 32 15 47% 12 38% 5 16%
1980. 115 47 41% 28 24% 40 35%
Total 207 88 43% 64 31% 55 27%
The volume of complaints was reasonably strong in the
1950s (fifty-three complaints), fell to almost nothing in the 1960s
(seven complaints), started climbing back a bit in the 1970s
(thirty-two complaints), and then exploded in the 1980s (115
complaints). More than half of the GATT's 207 complaints in
this four-decade period were brought during the final ten-year
period.
These changes in volume correspond with well-known de-
velopments in the evolution of GATT as a whole. The fairly
high volume of litigation during the first decade was largely due
to the activity of individual European states, for whom rule-
based adjudication was the most efficient and sensible way of
resolving disputes. Legal activity slowed considerably in the
1960s, primarily due to major changes in both the membership
and the mission of GATT during that period. The United States
led an effort to restart the dispute settlement procedure in the
1970s, achieving a modest level of activity. The explosion of ac-
tivity in the 1980s grew out of the substantial emphasis on dis-
pute settlement during the 1973-1979 Tokyo Round negotiations.
In later parts of this statistical study, we shall focus on the
demarcation between the first three decades and the 1980s. The
1980s not only expanded the volume of legal activity, but it also
witnessed the transformation of GATT dispute settlement into a
new and more "legal" system, in contrast to the more "diplo-
matic" system of the first three decades. The 1980s exemplify
the present legal situation in GATT, and where numbers permit,
the study will report the data for this decade separately.
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2. PROCEDURAL OUTCOMES, DECADE-BY-DECADE
In Table Dec 1 above, the decade-by-decade breakdown of
cases into the three procedural outcome categories - "ruling,"
"settled-conceded" and "withdrawn-abandoned" 
- calls for two
observations. First, the percentage of complaints that end up
with legal rulings turns out to be remarkably constant over the
years. In the three decades with a large enough volume of com-
plaints to be representative - the 1950s, the 1970s and the 1980s
- formal legal rulings occurred in 40%, 47% and 41% of all com-
plaints, respectively. This tends to refute a widely held percep-
tion of GATT during the 1950s. According to the accepted view,
GATT in the 1950s was an "old boys" club consisting of just a
few key countries, where the members settled most disputes by
the informal diplomacy of the clubroom. The data suggests that
the "old boys" were just as keen to adjudicate violations of their
club rules as were their more formal successors.
Second, the percentage of complaints that were withdrawn
or abandoned seems to have gone up rather sharply in the 1980s.
In the 1950s and 1970s, the frequency of withdrawn or aban-
doned cases was a bit less than 20%, and was less than half the
number of cases in which the defendant settled or otherwise
conceded validity. In the 1980s, by contrast, the withdrawn-
abandoned rate almost doubled to 35%, a rate that was nearly
one and one-half times higher than the rate of settled or con-
ceded cases in the 1980s. The pronounced shift in these total
numbers signals the possibility that defendant governments
were exerting greater efforts to resist legal complaints brought
against them and to discourage complainants from moving for-
ward. Subsequent analysis will show that this was the case.
3. SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES, DECADE-BY-DECADE
0 Cases with Legal Rulings. The decade-by-decade break-
down of violation and no-violation rulings in cases with rulings
is presented in the following table:
TABLE Dec 2
SUBSTArIVE OUTCOMES: RULINOS - VIOLATION v. NO-VIOLATION (By Decade)
Tt Total As % of all No As % of all As % of all
Complaints Rti o aints Violation violation rulings cornplan
195W 53 21 40% 6 Is 71% 28%
1960s 7 5 71% 0 5 100% 71%
1970s 32 15 47% 7 8 53% 25%
1980. 115 47 41% 7 40 85% 35%
Total 207 88 43% 20 68 77% 33%
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The most noteworthy datum here is the increase in the per-
centage of violation rulings in the 1980s. Because the number of
cases in the 1960s is too small to make the percentages represen-
tative, the clearest picture of the practice prior to the 1980s
would be the average percentage in the three prior decades.
There were twenty-eight rulings of violation out of forty-one
rulings, or a violation rate of 68%. The jump to 85% in the 1980s
is striking, particularly given the very large volume of cases in
that decade. We shall return to its possible significance below.
The following table presents the outcomes in cases where a
ruling of violation was made.
TAIRE Dec 3
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: RULINGS - RESULTS OF VIOLATION RULINGS (By Decade)
Total Result Full Satisfaction Part Sstis. Ne ative Outcome
Violation Unknowa 6.2.3 6.2.4 Total % 6.2.2 % 6.2.1 6.2.5 Total %
1990 is 0 12 0 12 80% 3 20% 0 0 0 0%
1960. 5 0 3 0 3 60% 2 40% 0 0 0 0%
1970a 8 1 3 3 6 86% 1 14% 0 0 0 0%
19800 40 0 19 5 24 60% 9 23% 5 2 7 is%
Total 68 1 37 S 45 67% iS 22% 5 2 7 10%
Now All perenag am computed uaising mon emils.
6.2.3: Ruling or claim fully mtisfied.
6.2.4: Ruling or claim fully satisfied due to intenal legal decision or expiratioo of measure.
6.2.2. Ruling or claim partly mti fied.
6.2.1: No action tak..
6.2.5: Claim fully tisfied after complainant acceded to bilateral dennds.
The best measuring rod of success is the percentage of cases
which achieve positive results - the sum of full satisfaction and
partial satisfaction outcomes. The most important datum in the
decade-by-decade breakdown is the significant decline in the
success rate during the 1980s. For the first three decades, the
success rate for cases with rulings of violation was 100%. Every
ruling of violation produced at least partial correction.18 In the
18. Readers who know the DISC complaint against the United States,
United States: Income Tax Legislation, BISD 23d Supp. 98 (1977) (GATT panel
report) (adopted by the Council Dec. 7-8, 1981, BISD 28th Supp. 114 (1982))
(Case #69) [hereinafter United States: DISC Legislation], might wish to quar-
rel with the 100% success figure for the 1970s, because the United States
blocked adoption of the violation ruling against itself for four years, and then
responded with a legislative change that left a good portion of the problem un-
corrected. The authors have classified the case as "partial satisfaction" because
the offending law itself was largely removed, and the new law did change the
formal requirements under which most subsidies were granted.
In the three other cases, the European defendants also blocked adoption for
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1980s, however, the rate fell to 83%, as only thirty-three of forty
rulings produced positive outcomes.
The dramatic increase in negative outcomes for legal rulings
in the 1980s is obviously a major event in GATT legal history.
As we will shortly see, it is paralleled by an equally dramatic
increase in negative outcomes in the "withdrawn-abandoned"
category of complaints.
One hypothesis about the failure rate for legal rulings in
particular can be extracted from the data already presented.
The huge increase in the number of complaints filed during the
1980s indicates that a major change in government attitudes to-
ward dispute settlement was taking place. The fact that govern-
ments were using dispute settlement much more frequently
testifies that they had much greater confidence in the legal sys-
tem. This confidence, in turn, would tend to elicit more ambi-
tious complaints as well - complaints attacking trade measures
with powerful domestic political support, measures that might
have been left in peace in earlier decades. A higher incidence of
such ambitious complaints could well explain, at least in part, a
higher incidence of legal failure. It could also explain a higher
incidence of resistance to legal complaints in general, the sort of
resistance that might show up in a greater percentage of com-
plaints withdrawn or abandoned.
A second possible consequence of increased volume would
be increased visibility of the decision-making process, and this
increased visibility, in turn, would likely have an effect upon the
manner of decision-making. Placed under a spotlight, panels
would tend to adopt a more objective, legally sound approach to
decision-making, because in the end that is the only basis on
which a critical public audience will accept an adjudicatory deci-
sion. This more objective technique of decision-making would
tend to produce more findings of violations in hard cases, in con-
trast to the tendency of earlier, more "diplomatic" panels to
avoid confrontations by vague decisions that skirt a direct
finding.19
four years, but in the end they succeeded in obtaining a GATT Council ruling
that overruled the panel ruling. Those three are "no-violation" cases.
19. Examples of that earlier tendency can be found in United States: With-
drawal of a Tariff Concession Under Article XIX, GATT Doc. GATT/CP/106
(Mar. 27, 1951) (GATT panel report) (Case #13) [hereinafter United States:
Withdrawal of a Tariff Concession Under Article XIX]; European Community:
Refunds on Exports of Sugar I, BISD 26th Supp. 290 (1980) (GATT panel re-
port) (Case #86) [hereinafter European Community: Refunds on Exports of
Sugar 1]; European Community: Refunds on Exports of Sugar H, BISD 27th
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A slight confirmation of such a change in decision-making
techniques is found in the change in percentage of violations re-
ported in Table Dec 2 above. The 85% rate for rulings of viola-
tion in the 1980s is significantly higher than the average rate of
68% for the previous three decades. Among the 85% of violation
rulings in the 1980s were several cases where the European
Community and the United States suffered adverse legal rulings
against some very "sensitive" trade measures, rulings which
probably would have been avoided a decade or so earlier.2 °
0 Cases in Which Defendants Settled or Otherwise Conceded
Validity. As noted before, the percentage of total complaints
settled or conceded declined in the 1980s, while the percentage
of cases withdrawn or abandoned increased. This change sug-
gests that defendant governments exerted greater resistance
against dispute settlement complaints. The lower percentage of
settled or conceded cases meant a lower percentage of positive
results overall, and thus another element of declining
performance.
The decade-by-decade breakdown of the actual results in
settled or conceded cases appears in the following table. It
shows no significant trend in the rate of full satisfaction. In par-
ticular, the rate of full satisfaction does not turn downward in
the 1980s, as do most other indicators of success. For settled or
conceded cases, the percentage of cases achieving full satisfac-
tion of the legal claim was actually higher in the 1980s than the
average for the entire forty-two year period.
Supp. 69 (1981) (GATT panel report) (Case #87) [hereinafter European Com-
munity: Refunds on Exports of Sugar II]; and United States: Spring Assemblies
(Case #102), supra note 4.
20. See, e.g., United States: Section 337 (Case #162), supra note 11; and
European Community: Oilseeds (Case #179), supra note 7. The contrast with
earlier techniques can be seen most vividly by comparing the 1982 decision in
United States: Spring Assemblies (Case #102), supra note 4, with the 1989 deci-
sion in United States: Section 337 (Case #162), supra note 11, both involving
the same U.S. law.
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TAZZ Dec 4
SUBSTANTWE OUTCOMES: COMPLAINTS SETLED OR CONCEDED (By Decade)
Total Settled Resul Full Satisfaction Partial Satisfaction
or Conceded Unknown 6.2.3 6.2.4 Total % 6.2.2 %
1950s 22 0 16 0 16 73%5 6 27%
1960s 2 0 0 0 0 0% 2 100%
1970s 12 1 3 0 3 27I 8 73%
1980. 28 0 18 ' 1 19 68% 9 32%
Total 64 1 37 1 38 60% 25 40%
Not: All pesrcetages am compsted using known results.
6.2.3: Ruling or claim fully satisfied.
6.2.4: Ruling or claim fully satisfied due to internal legal deciaion ot expiration of
6.2.2: Ruling or claim partly satisfied.
I Cases in Which the Complaint Was Withdrawn or Aban-
doned. At the beginning of this section we observed that the
decade-by-decade data showed a fairly sharp increase in the rela-
tive percentage of complaints withdrawn or abandoned during
the 1980s. This change suggested that defendant governments
might be resisting dispute settlement proceedings more strongly
than before. A more detailed analysis of withdrawn or aban-
doned cases confirms this hypothesis.
The following table presents the decade-by-decade break-
down of the actual substantive outcomes in cases involving with-
drawn or abandoned complaints.
TABLZ Dec 5
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: COMPLAINTS WIDRAWN OR ABANDONED (By Decade)
Reslt Neutral: W/d fiw Negativm Withdrm afir imnpasse o complai nt
U= dq ran aceded to bilateral demands
Totl Valid Total wld Total Total Total As S of all lmpint probably valid
Cdmpl. Compl orah-A'd Number Number Number complaints Number % ofvalid complaints
195OB 53 38 10 5 3 2 1 4% 1 3%
1 7 7 0 0 0 0 0% 0 0%
1 32 19 3 0 3 2 6% 1 5%
1980. 115 75 40 3 14 23 20% 7 9%
Total 201 139 55 4 20 27 13% 9 6%
The table presents two kinds of data confirming the higher
level of resistance by defendant governments during the 1980s.
First, when complaints withdrawn or abandoned are broken
down into withdrawals for "neutral" reasons and withdrawals
for "negative" reasons, we see that there has been a substantial
increase in the percentage of negative withdrawals. For the first
three decades, only four of ninety-two complaints with known
results, or roughly 4%, ended with negative withdrawals. For
the 1980s, the percentage was 20%. It would appear that defend-
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ant governments were putting more pressure on complainants to
not go forward.
Second, the rate of actual legal failures in the withdrawn-
abandoned category went up sharply in the 1980s. Of the nine
legal failures overall, seven occurred during the last decade.
Taken as a percentage of all valid legal claims, the increase in
this particular type of legal failure is not quite as sharp as the
raw numbers suggest, but it is still quite significant. In the three
decades before 1980, there were only sixty-four valid legal com-
plaints in all categories, of which the two legal failures in this
category represented 3%. From 1980 to 1989, there were sev-
enty-five valid legal complaints in all categories, of which the
seven legal failures in this category represented 9%.
Examination of the seven legal failures during the 1980s
tends to confirm that there was an outbreak of what might be
called "muscular diplomacy." The seven cases involve three
arm-twisting trade restrictions in support of Voluntary Export
Restraint (VER) demands, 21 three other arm-twisting trade re-
strictions in support of bilateral demands for market access, 22
and one other arm-twisting restriction in support of environ-
mental demands on the killing of baby seals. 23
• Combined Results of All Cases with Legally Valid Com-
plaints. The following table presents the combined decade-by-
decade breakdown for all three categories of dispute settlement
cases discussed above.
TABIL De 6
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: COMBINED DATA (By Decade)
(Includes onl cases with known results)
Cases ruling of viohtion. settled , conceded valid, or withdrwn and probably valid
Total Full Satisfaction Part Satisfaction Negtive Outcome
Complaints Number % Number % Number %
1950s 38 28 74% 9  2 4% 1 3%
1960s 7 3 43% 4 57% 0%
1970s 19 9 47% 9 47 1 5
1980S 75 43 57% is 24 % 14 19%
Total 139 83 60% 40 29% 16 12%
21. Poitiers Customs House (Case #119), supra note 16; United States:
Steel Pipe from EC (Case #138), supra note 16; and United States: Cotton Pil-
lowcases (Case #144), supra note 16.
22. Semiconductor Retaliation (Case #161), supra note 16; Phar aceuti-
cal Retaliation (Case #189), supra note 16; and Hormones Retaliation (Case
#193), supra note 16.
23. European Community: Seal Skins (Case #145), supra note 16. The
celebrated Tuna case was filed in 1990, after the cut-off date for this study. See
GATT Doc. DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991) (GATT panel report).
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Not surprisingly, the combined results present the same
pattern of gradual decline found in each of the separate catego-
ries presented above. The 1950s begin with a very impressive
rate of overall success, with nearly 100% positive results and
with about 75% of all complaints being fully satisfied. The 1960s
and 1970s show a small amount of slippage. Complaints in gen-
eral still achieve the same high rates of overall success, but
slightly less than 50% of all complaints are fully satisfied. The
1980s then show a marked decline in overall success. The rate of
positive results drops from an average of 97% during the first
three decades to only 81% during the 1980s. The massive in-
crease in negative outcomes completely overshadows a modest
improvement in the percentage of "full satisfaction" results.
While the decline in the success rate during the 1980s was
clearly a serious problem for the GATT legal system, it is impor-
tant not to read too much "decline" into these numbers. Part of
the decline was a natural event inherent in the evolution of any
legal system. GATT's early success rate, although impressive,
was somewhat artificial. Those who managed the system under-
stood that a high rate of success was essential for the infant
GATT, and so they walked very carefully and prudently in se-
lecting cases that could produce victories, and in avoiding battles
that could not be won. At some point, the safety of that early
approach had to be set aside, and the system had to venture into
rougher waters if it was to gain and retain credibility.
By 1980, the GATT legal system had succeeded in establish-
ing itself as a serious enterprise. In so doing, it forced itself to
move on to the next and more difficult level. Success builds con-
fidence, and confidence stimulates greater demands upon the
system. Governments became more aggressive in selecting com-
plaints to bring, and decision-makers, now in the open, began to
give direct answers to hard questions. Legal systems must take
these risks if they are to become stronger. Governments have to
be challenged, and the challenges will almost inevitably cause
some failures by demanding too much too soon. The failures
themselves are not the problem. The trick is to keep improving
the system in order to overcome them.
Unfortunately, what happened in the 1980s was more than
simply a painful growing-up process. Just at the time that the
legal system started making more demands, domestic political
pressures in some leading countries made governments start to
move in the opposite direction. The increasing incidence of arm-
twisting trade measures testified to a marked increase in the
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willingness of certain governments to resort to economic force as
an instrument of trade diplomacy.
The next section of this study presents the country-by-coun-
try breakdown of outcomes for individual complainants and de-
fendants. As we identify the countries primarily involved in the
declining performance of GATT law during the 1980s, we may
begin to examine the domestic political changes which caused
this decline in law-abiding tendencies.
D. COMPLAINANTS AND DEFENDANTS
In this section, we examine the identity of the complainants
and defendants who participated in the 207 GATT complaint
proceedings between 1948 and 1990. We begin by examining the
frequency with which particular nations were involved in dis-
putes, both as complainants and defendants. Thereafter, we ex-
amine outcomes that individual countries achieved, focusing
first on their relative level of compliance when charged as de-
fendants, and then, their relative level of success when acting as
complainants.
Dealing with individual parties presents a minor method-
ological issue. Several of the 207 complaints in the 1948-1990 pe-
riod involve multiple parties - either multiple complainants
against a single defendant, or a single complainant against multi-
ple defendants. If one counts each appearance by an individual
country as a separate event, there were 229 complainants and
223 defendants in this 207-case database. This section of the
study will use two enlarged databases, one for complainants con-
taining separate entries for each of the 229 individual com-
plaints, and another for defendants containing separate entries
for each of the 223 appearances as defendant. 24
The participation of the EC and its various member coun-
tries presents another methodological issue. Many complaints
were brought by and against EC member countries before they
became members of the EC. These pre-membership cases are
24. Thus, for example, in United States: Customs User Fee, BISD 35th
Supp. 245 (1989) (GATT panel report) (Case #153), which was a consolidated
complaint brought against the United States by Canada and the EC, this section
of the study will count the United States as one defendant, while Canada and
the EC will each be counted as one complainant. Conversely, in European Corn-
munity, Canada, Australia: Trade Restrictions Applied for Non-Economic Rea-
sons, GATT Doc. L/5317 (Apr. 30, 1982) (complaint by Argentina) (Case #112),
which was a complaint by Argentina against the EC, Canada and Australia, this
section of the study will count Argentina as one complainant, while the EC,
Canada and Australia will each be counted as one defendant.
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credited to that individual member country separately, and not
the EC. On the other hand, in the few cases where an individual
EC country was named as a defendant after it had become a
member of the EC, the EC was primarily responsible for the
matter in GATT, and so the "EC" is treated as the defendant.2 5
To permit analysis of both the whole and its various parts, the
data for all EC members are presented alongside the data for the
EC itself, and separate totals are then given for "EC," for indi-
vidual EC members, and for "EC and Members."
1. FREQUENCY OF PARTICIPATION
The following two tables present a complete breakdown of
complainants and defendants in the entire body of 207 com-
plaints filed from 1948-1989. The tables provide both a decade-
by-decade breakdown and the totals for the entire forty-two
year period.
25. 15 Developed Countries: Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, BISD
11th Supp. 95 (1963) (GATT panel report) (Case #54) [hereinafter Uruguayan
Recourse to Article XXII)]; France: Import Restrictions I, BISD 11th Supp. 94
(1963) (GATT panel report) (Case #56); Italy: Import Restrictions, GATT Doc.
L/1830 (Sept. 20, 1962) (U.S. complaint) (Case #57); Italy: Administrative and
Statistical Fees, GATT Doc. L/3279 (Dec. 1, 1969) (U.S. complaint) (Case #60);
France: Import Restrictions II, GATT Doc. L/3744 (Sept. 12, 1972) (U.S. com-
plaint) (Case #67); France: Income Tax Practices (Case #70), supra note 4;
Belgium: Income Tax Practices (Case #71), supra note 4; and Netherlands: In-
come Tax Practices (Case #72), supra note 4.
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Ic " 1 BY INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS (Total and by Decade)
USA 73 32%1 13 21% 51 63% 161 50% 39 31%
E-C & Memr 63 28%1 32 52% 11 13% 31 9% 27, 21%
.. _C ._ 113 .... L .. __ 2___ .. __ !11 .... .. __ !! .... ..6 _ _ ok ....
._,-_ T-- --__ Li. ---- !... M_- e__. . ___ _ .... ---- L _- 21 .---- _ L o- Sit---
Derank 5 21 5 8% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
22_ _ _ 1% 2 3% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Lxen---- O4 2% --- -- % _ _ 0% -- -0- -% -- -0 O--0
Canada - 1& 8% 0 0% 0_ 0% 2 6% 16 13%;
Australia - 13 6% 3 5% 0 0% 4 13% 6 5%
SubTotsaL 167 73% 48 77%1 6 75% 251 78% 88 69M
Brazil 9 4% 0 0% 1 _Q3% 11 3% 7 6%
Chile 5 2% 1 2% 0 0%j 2 6% 2 2%
Ida5 2% 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 4 3%
Japant 4 2% 0 0% 0 0% 1 3% 3- 2%
Argentina 3 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 2%
Cuba 3 1% 2 3% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1%
czoc-hoslovakia 3 1% 3 $% 0 0%1 0 0% 0 0%
Finland 3 Is 0 0%i 0 0%1 0 0% 3 2%
Hong Kong 3 1%l 2 0% 0 0%1 1 3% 2 2%
Now Zealand 3 1% 03 0% 0 0% .2 0% 3 2%
Nicaragua 3 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 2%
Norway 2 1% 2 3% 0 0%i 0 0% 0 0%
Sweden 2 1% 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1%
Turkey 2 1% 2 3% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Austria 1 0% 1 2% 0 0% 01 0% 0 0%
Colombia 1 0% 03 0%1 0 0% 0 0% 1 1%
Dominican Rep. 1 0% 03 0%1 0 0% 0 0% 1 1%
Israel 1 0% 03 0%1 0 0% I1 3% 0 0%
Korea 1 0%! 0 0%1 0 0% 1! 3% 01 0%
Mexico 1 0%j 0 0%1 0 0% 0 0% 1 1%
Pakistan 1 0%[ 1 2% 0 0% 
0  
0% 0 0%
Peru 1 0% 03 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1%
Philippines 1 0% 03 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1%
Poland 1 0% 03 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1%
S. Africa 1 0% 0 0% 0 0%1 0 0% 1 1%
Uruguay. 1 0% 03 0% 1 13% 01, 0% 0 0%
SubTotalB 62, 27%. 14, 23%. 2 25% .7[ 22%1 3 1
TOTAL 12291 621 8a 3 2 11271
[Note. Sample onsists of 229 omplamnts rather than 207 because each cmplaiant in
ca~see with multiple complainants is counted separately. Cases with multiple
complainants: See Appendix numbers S. 14, 15, 21, 22, 25,.34, 49, 59, 110, 152, 153.
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TABLE Def 1
COMPLAINTS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS (Total and by Decade)
countr Total 19501 11960. 1970s 1980
EC& M 98 44% 321 60%1 10 48% 70 63% 36 31%
E_ C 57.. __ 26% 0 0% 8 38% iS 47% 34 29%
___ jum.. 3 ... 1% _ 3_ 6% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
France 9 4% 9 17% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Ge__ ma_ 4 __ 4 _ 8 _ 0 0% 0 0% 0
hal 6 3% 6 11% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0
Netherl d. 1 0% 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 0%
Denmark 2 1% 0 0% 1 5% 1 3% 0 0%
UK 7 3% 4 8% 1 5% 2 6% 0 0%
Greece 6 3% 5 9% 0 0% 1 3% 0 0%
Spain 3 1% 0 0% 0 0i 1 3 2 .2%
USA 52 23% 9 17% 2 10% 3 9% 38 32%
Japan 20 9% 0 0%1 1 5% 5 16% 14 12%
Canada 15 7% 0 0%1 2 10% 2 6% 11 9%
SubTotalA 185 83% 41 77% 15 71% 30 94% 99 85%
Brazil 4 2% 2 4%1 0 0% 0 0% 2 2%
Australia 3 1 % 1 2 0 0% 0 0% 2 2%
Chile 3 1 % 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 2 2%1
Cuba 3 1 % 3 6% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%1
Finland 3 1 % 0 0% 1 5% 0 0% 2 2%
India 3 1 % 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 2 2%
Korea 3 1 % 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 3%
Norway 4 2% 0 0%, 1 5% 1 3% 2 2%
Sweden 3 1% 1 2% 1 5% 0 0%, 1 1%
Austria 1 0% 0 0% 1 5% 0 01 0 0%
Czechoslovalda 1 0% 0 0% 1 5% 0 0% 0 0%
Jamaica 1 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 3% 0 0%
New Zealand 1 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1%
Pakistan 1 0% 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Peru 1 0% 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Switzerland 2 1% 0 0% 1 5% 0 0% 1 1%
Turkey 1 0% 1 2% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
SubTotalB 38 17% 12 23% 6 29% 2 6% 18 15%
TOTAL 223 53 21 32 117
Note 1: Sample consists of 223 complaints, rather than 207, because each defendant in caaea with
multiple defendants is counted as the object of a separate complaint. Cases with multiple
defendants: See Appendix numbers 54 and 112.
Note 2: All complaints against individual EC countries after their accession to the community are
counted as complaints against the EC. See Appendix numbers 54, 56, 57, 60, 67, 70, 71, 72.
* The Entire Forty-Two Years. The GATT's dispute resolu-
tion mechanism has been dominated by just a few large coun-
tries. For the entire forty-two year period, 73% of all complaints
were filed by the United States, the EC and EC members, Can-
ada and Australia. The role of defendant has been even more
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heavily concentrated. The United States, the EC and EC mem-
bers, Canada and Japan accounted for 83% of all appearances as
defendants.
Even more striking is the dominant share of participation
occupied by just the two largest members - the United States
and the European Community. As complainants, the United
States and the EC-plus-members group were the initiating par-
ties in 136 of 229 complaint appearances, accounting for almost
60% of all complaints recorded. As defendants, the EC-plus-
members and the United States were named defendants on 150
occasions, or 67% of all claims against defendants. The most
striking item of all is that, out of the 207 cases in this database,
190 (92%) had either the United States or the EC-plus-members
as a party. In other words, only seventeen of 207 cases did not
involve either the United States or the EC-plus-members.
The opposite side of this coin is that most other GATT
members have made little use of the dispute settlement system.
The GATT currently has 105 members. Aside from the five
dominant participants on the complainants and defendants lists,
only twenty-seven "other" countries have ever participated -
twenty-five of them as complainants, and sixteen of them as de-
fendants. Nine of these twenty-seven "other" participants made
only one appearance. The large majority of GATT contracting
parties have never participated in the dispute settlement
process.
The developing countries share of overall participation was
slight. Developing countries accounted for forty-four of 229
complaints (19%) and twenty-nine of 223 appearances as defend-
ant (13%). (For the purposes of this study, a "developing coun-
try" is any country that so described itself at the time of the
complaint.)
The fact that most complaints were concentrated among
just a few of the largest and most powerful countries can be
viewed as evidence that the dispute settlement system still has
some weaknesses. The correlation between size and frequency
of complaints suggests that the system works better for the large
countries. Why would this be so? First, the act of complaining is
frequently irritating to the defendant, and, assuming GATT law
itself is not entirely capable of protecting complainants from
threats of retribution, larger complainants have less to fear from
retribution than smaller countries. Second, GATT law is not
self-executing. Legal victory often needs to be backed up with
political and economic pressure in order to achieve results, and
[Vol. 2:1
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larger countries will tend to have greater confidence in their
ability to apply such pressure.
That Japan is not among the top four complainants is not
necessarily inconsistent with this hypothesis. Japan has always
been somewhat isolated in GATT, the target of special restric-
tions against its exceptionally competitive exports and the target
of special suspicions about its "different" economic system. Ja-
pan's vulnerability to attack has led it to follow the same course
as many smaller countries, who choose not to "rock the boat."
The fact that large countries are also the most frequent de-
fendants needs additional explanation. One might expect com-
plainants to prefer lawsuits against smaller countries, who can
more easily be pressured into meeting legal claims. The answer,
it seems, is that large countries have the largest and most lucra-
tive markets. Large countries also tend to hold each other to
higher standards of compliance, in part because they make so
many demands on behalf of their own exporters.
One factor which accentuates the concentration of litigation
among the leading governments is the GATT tradition of tit-for-
tat lawsuits. Defendants rarely enjoy being sued and will often
retaliate by filing one or more lawsuits of their own against the
complainant. Thus, one appearance as complainant often guar-
antees at least one other appearance as defendant, and vice-
versa. A casual look at the list of GATT lawsuits over the years
shows several examples of such tit-for-tat litigation among the
larger countries.26
26. The three most frequent participants are the United States (105 appear-
ances), the EC (87 appearances) and Canada (33 appearances). Examples of tit-
for-tat filings among these Big Three litigants include the following:
(1)
the United States files France: Income Tax Practices (Case #70),
supra note 4; Belgium: Income Tax Practices (Case #71), supra note 4;
and Netherlands: Income Tax Practices (Case #72), supra note 4,
against EC countries, in response to United States: DISC Legislation
(Case #69), supra note 18;
(2)
the EC files Canada: Withdrawal of Tariff Concessions Under Article
XXVIII3, BISD 25th Supp. 42 (1979) (GATT panel report) (Case #79),
against Canada in response to European Community: Adequacy of
Compensation in Article XXIV:6 Negotiations, GATT Doc. C/M/101
(Council meeting of Nov. 8, 1974) (complaint by Canada) (Case #73);
(3)
the EC files United States: "Manufacturing Clause" in US Copyright
Legislation, BISD 31st Supp. 74 (1985) (GATT panel report) (Case
#122); United States: Export Subsidy on Sales of Wheat Flour to
Egypt (all documents restricted) (Case #123); United States: Tariff
Reclassification of Machine-Threshed Tobacco, GATT Doc. L/5541
(Sept. 30, 1983) (EC complaint) (Case # 127); United States: Definition
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To the extent that the imperfections of the GATT legal sys-
tem do in fact discourage smaller countries from using the
GATT dispute settlement procedure, the legal system is obvi-
ously less successful than one would want it to be. Viewed in
developmental terms, however, any newborn legal system is go-
ing to begin this way. The hope is that the legal system will be-
come stronger as it develops, and that, as it does so, it will
become more and more capable of protecting smaller countries
and enforcing their legal victories.
The first signs of such improved protection for smaller
countries may be appearing in the decade-by-decade breakdown
of participation data, in the two tables above. The percentage of
complaints filed by "other" complainants has clearly been grow-
ing over the years. For the first three decades, "other" com-
plainants accounted for twenty-three of 102 individual
complaints, or 23%. During the decade of the 1980s, complaints
by "other" countries accounted for thirty-nine of 127 individual
complaints, or 31%.27 For developing countries, the respective
percentages are 16% for the first three decades, and 22% in the
1980s.28
of "Industry" Concerning Wine and Grape Products, GATT Doc.
SCM/71 (Mar. 24, 1986) (GATT panel report) (Case #137); and United
States: Steel Pipe from EC (Case #138), supra note 16, against the
United States in response to U.S. complaints in European Community:
Subsidies on Export of Wheat Flour, GATT Doc. SCM/42 (Mar. 21,
1983) (GATT panel report) (Case #103) [hereinafter European Com-
munity: Wheat Flour]; European Community: Subsidies on Exports
of Pasta Products, GATT Doc. SCM/43 (May 19, 1983) (GATT panel
report) (Case #105) [hereinafter European Community: Pasta Prod-
ucts]; European Community: Subsidies on the Export and Production
of Poultry, BISD 32d Supp. 162 (1985) (conclusion of consultations)
(Case #106); European Community: Production Aids on Canned
Peaches, Canned Pears, Canned Fruit Cocktail and Dried Grapes,
GATT Doc. L/5778 (Feb. 20, 1985) (GATT panel report) (Case # 107)
[hereinafter European Community: Canned Fruit]; European Com-
munity: Export Subsidies on Sugar (all documents restricted) (Case
#109); European Community: Tariff Treatment of Citrus Products
from Certain Mediterranean Countries, GATT Doc. C/M/190 (June 5,
1985) (discussion of GATT panel report) (Case #113) [hereinafter Eu-
ropean Community: Citrus Products]; and European Community:
Value-Added Tax (VAT) and Threshold, BISD 31st Supp. 247 (1985)
(GATT panel report) (Case #114).
27. Interestingly enough, the percentage of appearances by "other" defend-
ants declined during the same period, from an average of 19% in the first three
decades to only 15% in the 1980s.
28. These figures are computed from the complainant figures presented in
Table Comp 2, p.254 infra. To arrive at the figure for the first three decades,
subtract the 1980s data from the 42-year data. Sixteen of 102 complaints were
made by developing countries.
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It is difficult to say what percentage of complaints would be
an appropriate share for smaller countries. Larger countries
have many more distinct trade interests than smaller ones.
While total volume of trade is not a very exact surrogate for the
number of possible legal claims, it gives some idea of the propor-
tions between developed and developing countries. The four
leading complainants plus Japan accounted for 63.5% of world
merchandise exports in 1990.29 Measured by volume of export
trade, the 31% share of GATT complaints by smaller countries
during the 1980s, while low, is at least near to their share of
world exports.
* Decade by Decade. As just noted, the two tables presented
above also provide a decade-by-decade breakdown of country
participation. The decade-by-decade data tracks some of the ma-
jor developments that were taking place in GATT dispute settle-
ment over these forty-two years.
In the 1950s, the most interesting datum is the dominant
role played by the European countries who are now members of
the European Community. By themselves, these European na-
tions accounted for well over half of all appearances as com-
plainant and defendant in the 1950s - 52% as complainant, 60%
as defendant. European countries quickly adopted GATT adju-
dication as a way of resolving trade disputes and they became
the major impetus that set GATT dispute settlement in motion
and gave it initial respectability. Their reasons for doing so are
not hard to understand. These European states were crowded
into a small economic space; they were cognizant of the need for
orderly settlement of disputes; and they had a strong tradition of
respect for international law which made it easy for them to ac-
cept law as the most efficient way of settling their disputes.
The advent of the European Community in the late 1950s
meant the disappearance of individual European countries as
leading participants in GATT dispute settlement. Disputes be-
tween EC member countries would now be settled in Brussels.
In GATT, meanwhile, the legal system would have to adjust to a
more demanding kind of adjudication, one that was dominated
by disputes between superpowers and super-blocs.
This new legal order caused the volume of GATT litigation
to drop sharply in the 1960s and 1970s. The primary cause of this
decline can be seen in the percentage share of legal complaints
filed by the Community. Whereas EC members had filed 52% of
29. GAr'r, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1990-91, Vol. II, table 1.4, at 3 (1992).
1993]
MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
all GATT complaints in the 1950s, the EC share was about 10%
over the next two decades. This reluctance to litigate reflected
the EC's general antipathy toward GATT legal procedures at
this time. Despite an impressive degree of compliance with
GATT, several important aspects of the Community's structure
and policy were open to GATT legal challenge, and the Commu-
nity worked very hard during this period to direct all legal chal-
lenges into non-legal channels.
The fact that the United States accounted for 53% of all
legal complaints during the 1960s and 1970s testifies to the com-
paratively strong U.S. interest in the dispute settlement system
at this time. The United States position was in part simply an
expression of Anglo-Saxon attachment to legal procedures, but
most of the actual U.S. activity was in response to congressional
demands for tangible proof that the United States was in fact
enforcing its GATT legal rights.
Following these individual country numbers into the 1980s
produces some interesting insights about the explosion of GATT
litigation during that period. The EC instituted a striking
change of legal policy during the 1980s, filing twenty-six com-
plaints, or 20% of all complaints for the decade, as opposed to
only four complaints in the previous two decades. This dramatic
increase in legal participation suggests that the EC's legal rela-
tionship with the GATT had finally begun to stabilize. Interest-
ingly, however, the twenty-six EC complaints in the 1980s only
brought the EC back to the number of legal complaints filed by
its member states in the 1950s. The increase from sixty-two
complaints in the 1950s to 127 complaints in the 1980s was actu-
ally due to increases in volume by the United States (thirty-nine
complaints as opposed to thirteen), by "Other" (thirty-nine com-
plaints as opposed to fourteen) and by Canada (sixteen com-
plaints as opposed to none). On the other hand, the emergence
of the EC as a willing participant undoubtedly played an indirect
role in encouraging some of these other countries to become
more active.
On the defendants' side, the most dramatic change over
time was the change in relative roles of the United States and
the EC from the 1960s to the 1980s. During the 1960s and 70s,
the EC was far and away the most frequently sued defendant,
being named in 43% of all defendant appearances during those
twenty years, while accounting for only 10% of the complaints.
The United States, by contrast, was named in 9% of the defend-
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ant appearances during the 1960s and 1970s, while accounting for
53% of all the legal complaints.
The total number of complaints against the EC increased
from twenty-three in the 1960s and 1970s to thirty-four in the
1980s, but due to the enormous increase in the overall volume of
complaints, its share of all defendant appearances fell to just
29%, from the 43% share in the 1960s and 1970s. The United
States, by contrast, experienced a large increase in its role as de-
fendant. United States appearances as defendant increased from
a total of five in the 1960s and 1970s, to thirty-eight in the 1980s
alone, in percentage terms from 9% to 32%. In effect, the United
States had become the primary victim of its own campaign to
strengthen the dispute settlement system.
2. ANALYSIS OF OUTCOMES FOR INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
We turn now to an analysis of the outcomes that individual
governments achieved in dispute settlement proceedings. The
most important data is a government's compliance record when
acting as a defendant. Accordingly, this section begins by exam-
ining the data from the defendant's perspective.
The only individual defendants whose participation was fre-
quent enough to provide sufficient data for analysis are the four
most frequent defendants: (a) the EC (fifty-seven appearances),
(b) the United States (fifty-two appearances), (c) Japan (twenty
appearances) and (d) Canada (fifteen appearances). The EC
member states, with forty-one total appearances, will be re-
ported alongside the EC. All the remaining countries who made
appearances as defendants - seventeen countries who made
thirty-eight appearances - will be gathered into one additional
group called "Other." A separate table comparing outcomes for
developed and developing countries will appear as a supplement
to each table.
a. Procedural Outcomes, by Defendant
As usual, the analysis of outcomes begins by dividing the
complaints against each defendant into the three categories of
procedural outcomes: rulings, settled-conceded and withdrawn-
abandoned.
1993]
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PROCEDURAL OUTCOMES (By Defdant)
42 Yeam
Total Rulings SeleConce by Def. Withdrawn or Abandoned
Defidant C ints Number % of total Number % of total Number % of total
EC & Member 98 43 44% 32 33% 23 23%
EC 57 27 47% 13 23% 17 30%
EC Membes 41 16 39% 19 46% 6 15
U.S. 52 23 44% 6 12% 23 44%
Japan 2 6 30% 13 65% 5%
Canada 15 11 73% 1 7% 3 20%
Othe" 3 19i 50% 12 32% 7 18%
Total 223 102 46 64 29%1 17 26%
IDC 1 914 89 46% 1 52 1 27% 1 53 1 27%
ILDC 1 29 1 3 1 45% 1 12 1 41% 1 4 1 14%
jTotMal 223 1 102 1 46% 1 64 1 29% 1 57 1 26%
19& I
Total Rulings Settled-Conceded by De. Withdrawn or Abandoned
Defendant Complaints Number % of total Number % of total Number % of total
EC & Members 36 15 42% 9 25% 12 33%
EC 34 13 31% 9 26% 12 35%
EC Members 2 2 100% 0 0% 0 0%
U.S. 38 is 39% 3 89% 20 53%
Japn 14 5 36% 8 57% 1 7%
Canada I1 7 64% 1 9% 3 27%
Other 18 5 21% 7 3956% 6 33%
Total 117 47 40% 28 24% 42 36%
DC 1 306 1 42 1 40% 1 24 1 23% 1 40 1 38%
ILDC 1 1 S 45% 1 4 1 36% 1 2 1 81a%[Total 117 1 47 1 40% 1 28 1 24% 1 42 36% ]
The defendants differ quite a bit in the percentages of cases
against them that fall into these three procedural outcome cate-
gories. The differences between countries conform rather well
to a priori assumptions about the differences between national
policies toward GATT litigation.
Japan has the most distinctive profile. Over the entire
forty-two year period, Japan had by far the highest percentage
of cases settled or conceded (65%), more than double that of any
other single participant. Japan also had the lowest percentage of
cases in the two other categories - complaints that produce a
legal ruling (30%) and complaints withdrawn or abandoned
(5%). The 1980s data for Japan is essentially the same. These
numbers coincide almost perfectly with the popular perception
of Japan's position in GATT - an economic giant, but politically
a rather weak player because of its traditional isolation and its
relatively closed society and economy. Whether from political
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weakness or cultural aversion to litigation, or both, the record is
clear that Japan has tried to avoid confrontational extremes in
litigation and to settle complaints against it whenever possible.
Canada presents an interesting contrast to Japan. Being
smaller than the United States or the European Community,
one would expect that Canada would behave similarly to Japan.
The two countries are similar in having a low percentage of the
complaints against them withdrawn or abandoned, possibly due
to both countries' relative lack of "muscle" in resisting com-
plaints. Throughout the entire forty-two year period and in the
1980s, however, Canada clearly preferred to litigate rather than
to settle. Canada has the lowest settlement rate, and by far the
highest percentage of cases that proceed to a legal ruling, 73%
for the full forty-two year period, and 64% for the 1980s alone.
In sum, Canada presents the profile of a smaller country that
prefers to wage open combat over legal complaints against it.
Being relatively small, Canada is usually forced to resist all the
way to a legal ruling.30
The United States also seems to prefer resistance to settle-
ment, but its power makes its resistance considerably more ef-
fective. Except for Canada which has only a narrow edge, the
United States had by far the smallest percentage of cases settled
or conceded - in the forty-two year period, 12% as opposed to
34% for all other GATT countries, and in the 1980s, 8% as com-
pared with 32%.31 Instead of proceeding to litigation, however,
nearly half or more of the complaints against the United States
were withdrawn or abandoned - 44% overall and 53% in the
more rough-and-tumble 1980s. In both cases, the percentage of
withdrawn or abandoned complaints is about double the average
rate for all other defendants combined. The United States
emerges as an unruly defendant that is difficult to bring into
court.
If one were to hypothesize that a country's ability to resist
30. If one were to speculate on the reasons for the difference in Canadian
and Japanese policies toward litigation, the three factors that first come to mind
would be (a) national character, (b) the closeness and comfort level of each na-
tion's relationship to the two GATT superpowers, and (c) the relative ability to
obtain domestic political acceptance for settlements that reduce the level of
trade barriers protecting the home market.
31. The combined average for other countries is calculated by subtracting
the U.S. cases from the total. For the 42-year period, for example, 223 cases
minus 52 by the United States, leaves 171 non-U.S. cases. Of the 64 settled or
conceded cases, six were by the United States, leaving 58 non-U.S. cases. Divid-
ing 58 by 171 yields 34%. The same method yields a non-U.S. percentage for the
1980s of 32%.
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GATT lawsuits depends on its power, one would expect to see
the European Community next in line after the United States in
terms of successful resistance, while both the "Other" and devel-
oping country groups would be at the very bottom of the list.
That is in fact how the data line up. Among individual defend-
ants both over the forty-two year period and in the 1980s, the
Community has the second largest percentage of withdrawn or
abandoned cases overall, and, after Canada and the United
States, the third lowest percentage of settled or conceded cases.
At the other end of the spectrum, the most dramatic data appear
in the supplemental table comparing procedural outcomes for
developed and developing countries. While 27% of all com-
plaints against developed country defendants are withdrawn or
abandoned, only 14% of complaints against developing countries
are similarly abandoned. In the 1980s, the gap is even larger -
38% as opposed to 18%. And just the reverse is true with settled
cases. Over the last forty-two years developing countries have
agreed to settle 41% of the complaints against them whereas de-
veloped country defendants settled only 27%. Though narrower,
the 1980s gap is still 36% to 23%. Results for "Other" countries
are closer to average, but, as predicted, they are second from the
bottom. On the whole, therefore, power does seem to play a role
in the procedural outcomes achieved by complaints.
b. Substantive Outcomes, by Defendant
0 Cases with Legal Rulings. The following tables present the
breakdown of Violation/No Violation rulings, for the entire
forty-two year period and then for the 1980s alone.
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TABLE Det 3
SUBSTANrIVE OUTCOMES: RUUNGS - VIOLATION v. NO-VIOLATION (By Defendant)
42 Years I
Total Total As % ofall No Aaofall Asofajl
Defendant Complaits Rulings compaints Violation Violation rulings complint
EC & Menbers 98 43 44% 11 32 74% 33%
EC 57 27 47% 7 20 74% 35%
EC Members 41 16 39% 4 12 75% 29%
U.S. 52 23 44% 9 14 61% 27%
Japan 20 6 30% 2 4 67% 20%
Caada 15 11 73% 2 9 82% 60%1
Other 38 19 50% 4 15 79% 39!
Total 223 102 46%1 28 74 73%, 33 ,1
DC I 194 1 89 I 46% I 25 I 64 I 72% 1 33% I
LDC 29 13 45% 3 10 77% 34%
ITotal 223 102 1 46% 1 28 1 74 1 73% 1 33%
1980 I
Total Total As a ofall No As of all As of all
Defendant Complaints Rulings complnts Violation Violation rulings complaints
EC & Mebers 36 15 42% 1 14 93% 39%
EC 34 13 38% 1 12 92% 35%
EC Members 2 2 100% 2 100% 100i
U.S. 38 15 39% 5 10 67% 26%
Japan 14 5 36% 1 4 80% 29%
Canada 11 7 64% 0 7 100% 64%
Other 18 5 28 0 5 100% 28%
Total 117 47 40%1 7 40 85%1 34%
IDC 1 106 42 40% 1 7 35 1 83% I 33% ]
LDC 1 11 5 1 45% 1 0 1 5 1 00% I 45%
Total 117 47 40% 7 40 85% 1 34%
The interesting question with regard to the comparative
data on rulings of violation is whether more powerful defend-
ants tend to fare better than smaller ones. For the United
States, the rate of violation rulings during the forty-two year pe-
riod was markedly lower - only 61%, as opposed to an average
rate of 76% for all other defendants. In the 1980s, when the av-
erage rate for other countries was 94%, the U.S. rate was an even
more distant 67%. The relatively low rate for the United States
is doubly significant in view of the fact that the United States
settled so few cases. One cannot explain these numbers by sug-
gesting that many meritorious complaints against the United
States had been siphoned off by settlement. Rather, the data
seem to suggest that power, tenacity, or both, may exert some
influence on how panels rule.
The data on the other major participants is less clear, but
what evidence there is is mildly supportive. The data for the
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forty-two year period show developing countries with a slightly
higher rate of violation rulings than developed countries. Japan
and the European Community have lower rates than Canada
and "Other." The same differences are somewhat magnified in
the smaller sample for the 1980s.
We now turn to the way individual countries responded to
adverse legal rulings against them. The following tables present
the substantive outcomes in the cases where rulings of violation
were issued.32
32. The breakdown of the data into individual appearances produces one
more negative result - Norway's failure to respond to a self-admitted violation
ruling in Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII (Case #54), supra note 25. The
case as a whole, which had 14 other defendants, is treated as a "partial compli-
ance" outcome in the 207-case database.
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TABLE Def 4
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: RULINGS - RESULTS OF VIOLATION RULINGS (By Defendat)
42 Yeas I
Total Result Full Satisfaction Part Satis. Negative Outcome
Defendant Violation Unknown 6.2.3 6.2.4 Total % 6.2.2 % 6.2.1 6.2.5 Total I
EC & Merber 32 0 17 2 2l 66 10 31% 1 0 1 3%
EC 20 0 8 4 12 60% 7 35% 1 0 1 8%
EC Members 12 0 9 0 9 7% 3 25% 0 0 0 0%
U.S. 14 0 6 3 9 64% 0 7% 2 2 4 29%
Japan 4 0 3 0 3 75% 1 25% 0 0 0 0%
Canada 1 2 1 3 4 50% 2 25% 2 0 2 259%
Other 5 0 21 11 73% 3 20% 0 0 1 7%
Total 74 1 401 8 48 66% 17 23% 6 2 8 11%
IDC 1365 1 1 3 14 I1II 165% 1141 20% 6 2 1 7 1%
LDC 1 0 3 0 3 60% 2 40% 0 0 0 0%
jTotal 4 0 14 1 8 48 60% 9 7 23% 1 5 2 7 8 1%
I 198os
Total Result Full Satisfaction Part Satis. Neative outcome
Defe6ant Violation Unknown 6.2.3 6.2.4 Total 6.2.2 6.2.16.2.5 TotalI
EC & Members 14 0 8 2 tO 71% 3 21it 1 r 1 7
E  12 0 6 2 8 67%$ 3 2.5% 0 1 8%[
EC Members 2 0 2 0 2 100%$ 0 0% 0 0 0 0%[
U.S. 10 0 4 2 6 60%; 0 0% 2 2 4 40%[
Japan 4 0 3 03 3 75% 1 25 % 0] 0 0 0%9
71aa 31 43% 2 29%o 2 0 2 29%,
When da w ith3 60%d i 0 0 Op
iTotal T 4c 0 19 5 24 60of 9c 23o a 5e 2t 7 1 8
Note 1: All percentages are computed using known results.
Note 2: Spara treatment of each defenan produces one more negative outcome in the 42 year section because
one of the 15 defendnts in cash 4 (Norway) did not comply with ruling of violation. See Appendix number 54.
6.2.3: Ruling h r claim fully satisied.
6.2.4: Ruling t e laim fully saisfied due to interna legal decision expiration of measute p
6.2.2: Ruling or claim partly satisfied.
6.2.1: No action tkan.
6.2.$: Claim fllyp satisfied after complainant acceded to bilateral demands.
When dealing with individual countries, the issue of compli-
ance is somehow more tangible if one measures vice instead of
virtue. The principal measure of compliance, then, will be the
rate of "negative outcomes" for each participant - the percent-
age of cases in which each failed to observe a ruling of violation.
The data here present a rather strong indictment of the
United States' performance. Consistent with the pattern of
resistance suggested by the data in previous sections, the United
States appears to be the defendant that most frequently resists
the legal rulings of the dispute settlement process. Four of the
MIm. J. GLOBAL TRADE
fourteen rulings of violation made against the United States
ended with a negative outcome - two with a failure to comply
and two with compliance only after the complainant had ac-
ceded to arm-twisting demands. All four negative outcomes oc-
curred in the 1980s, leading to a negative-outcome rate of 29%
for the entire forty-two year period, and a 40% rate for the 1980s
alone.
Canada, the defendant that litigates a higher percentage of
complaints against it than any other, comes in with the second
worst compliance record. Canada had only eight rulings of viola-
tion with known results. Canada's refusal to follow two rulings,
both in the 1980s, leads to an overall negative-outcome rate of
25%, and a rate of 29% for the 1980s alone.
The remaining three groups of defendants have a much
lower rate of negative outcomes where rulings of violation are
concerned. Both the EC and "Other" have one negative out-
come apiece, representing between 5-8% of all rulings against
them. Japan has none. Not surprisingly, developing countries
have none.
GATT observers may well argue that these data are mis-
leading in suggesting such a wide difference between United
States and European Community performance. The difference
rests on the contrast between four cases in which the United
States did not comply, and just one where the Community did
not comply. Observers might note that in the early 1980s, the
European Community created a major legal crisis by blocking
GATT Council adoption of three major panel rulings against it
- the celebrated Pasta, Canned Fruit, and Citrus cases.33 These
cases do not show up as negative outcomes, because the United
States and the Community eventually agreed to settle each of
the cases by partially correcting the problem complained of. At
the time, it seemed that the EC's behavior amounted to a repudi-
ation of the authority of the legal system. On the other hand, it
can also be argued that the EC had a plausible legal basis for
objecting to each of the three rulings, and that it actually did
manage to sustain its main legal objections by achieving settle-
ments that set aside those parts of the legal ruling the EC found
particularly objectionable. Moreover, if cases like Pasta, Canned
Fruit and Citrus are to be considered, similar data on U.S. legal
performance, such as the DISC case, would also have to be con-
33. European Community: Pasta Products (Case # 105), supra note 26; Eu-
ropean Community: Canned Fruit (Case #107), supra note 26; and European
Community: Citrus Products (Case #113), supra note 26.
[Vol. 2:1
GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
sidered. The additional data on both sides would probably dilute
the sharp 4-to-1 difference here, but it would not erase the U.S.
performance deficit.
The data on "full" versus "partial" satisfaction offsets the
dismal U.S. record to some extent. In the ten cases where the
United States did respond positively to an adverse legal ruling
over the forty-two year period, the result was full compliance in
nine of the ten cases (although in three of those nine cases the
offending measure simply expired). Other defendants had a
much lower rate of full satisfaction outcomes. Excluding nega-
tive outcomes from the sample, the rates of full satisfaction were
57% for Canada, 65% for the EC, 70% for developing countries,
75% for Japan, and 79% for "Other." 4 Except for the United
States, these data on full versus partial satisfaction suggest that
the stronger countries tend to get away with partial compliance
more often than the weak.
* Cases in Which Defendant Settled or Otherwise Conceded
Validity. The data as to the actual outcomes achieved in set-
tled-conceded complaints is presented in the tables below.
34. The calculations involve subtracting negative outcomes from total
violations.
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TABLE Def 5
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: COMPLAINTS SETLED OR CONCEDED (By Defendant
42 years
Total Settled IResu l Full Satisfaction Partial Satisfaction
Defendant or Conceded Unknown 6.2.3 6.2.4 Total 6.2.2 %
EC& Meerr 32 1 16 1 17 55% 14 45%
EC 13 0 6 1 7 54% 6 46%
EC M 1s 19 1 10 0 10 56% 8 44%
U.S. 6 0 4 0 4 67% 2 33%
Japan 13 0 6 0 6 46% 7 54%
Canada 0 1 0 1 0 0 0%
Other 12 0 10 0 10 83;% 2 17%
Total 64 1 37 11 38 60% 25 40%
IDC I 52 I 0 28 1 i I 29 1 56 % 23 I 4% I
LC 1 12 1 1 1 9 0 1 9 1 82% 1 2 1 IS:
Tota 64 1 1 37 1 1 1 38 160% 1 25 40%0
1 19808
Total Settled- I Result Full Satisfaction Partial Satisfaction
Defendant or Conceded Unknown 6.2.3 6.2.4 1Total %; 6.2.2 %;
EC & Manboen 9 . -0 5 I 6 67% $ 353%
EC 9 0 5 1 6 67% 3 -33%
EC Members 0 0 0 0 0 0%; 0 0%;
U.S. 3 0 1 0 33% 2 67%9
pan 4 0 6 0 6 75% 2 25%,1md 0 0 i 100%; 0 0%;
W 0 0 5, 71%1 2. 29%i
IFooa1 281 01 i 1. 191 68%1! 91 32%[
IaC 24 1 0 s 151, 16 16v7% 1 8 33:
ILDC 4 0o 3 1o 3 ,1 75%. 1 1 1 51
Totd 28 0 18 1 19 68% 1 9 32%
Note: All perceatages ae computed using known result .
6.2.3: Ruling at claim fully satified.
6.2A Ruling o claim fully satified due to internal legal decision or expiration of measue.
6.2.2: Ruling or claim partly satisfied.
Earlier, it was noted that, except for Japan, the smaller and
weaker defendant countries tend to settle more complaints than
the larger and stronger ones. The only further data presented
by this breakdown of actual outcomes are the distribution of
"full" versus "partial" satisfaction (subject to the caveat that
"partial" settlements may not necessarily mean only partial
compliance).3
Canada and the United States have settled so few cases that
the data about their performance are too small to deserve much
weight. The EC, Japan and "Other" have settled the same
35. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
1993] GATT DIsPuTE SETTLEMENT
number of cases against them. So have the developing countries
as a group. Within this group of defendants, it does appear that
the smaller countries have granted the more favorable settle-
ments. During the entire forty-two year period, both developing
countries and "Other" countries have settled 82-83% of their
cases by granting full satisfaction of the claim. Japan and the
EC, on the other hand, have granted full satisfaction in only 46%
and 54% of their settlements, respectively. In the 1980s, the EC
had a slightly lower rate of full satisfaction, but Japan did not.
; Cases Withdrawn or Abandoned. The following table
presents a defendant-by-defendant breakdown of the outcomes
in those cases where the complaint was withdrawn or abandoned
prior to ruling or settlement.
TABLE De 6
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: COMPLAINTS WITHDRAWN OR ABANDONED (By Defendant)
42 Years Result Neutral: W/d for Negative: Withdrawn after impasse or complainant
UIlmown ade uate reason acceded to bilateral demands
Total Valid Total .1d Total Total Total As % of all Complaint probably valid
Defendant Conpl. Coffl. oraband'd Number Number complaints Number % of valid complaints
EC & Members! 98 67 23 5 8 10 10% 4 6%
EC 57 36 17 I 7 9 16% 3 1%
EC Members 41 31 6 4 t I 2% 1 3%
U.S. 52 25 23 1 a 14 27% 5 20%
Japan 20 t7 1 0 0 • 5% 0 0%
Canada 15 9 3 0 1 2 13% 0 0%
Otber 38 27 7 2 3 2 5%$ 0 0%
Total 223 145 57 8 20U 29 13%1 9 6%
DC 194 124 1 53 1 7 is 1 28 14% 1 9 7%
LDC 29 21 4 1 2 1 13% 0 0!
Total 223 145 57 18 20 29 13% 9 6%
1980s 17aumt Neutral: W/d for Negatve: Withdrawn afte impasseo omplainant
Untkno" adequate reso seceded to bilateral demands
Total Valid Total w/d Total Total Total As %$ of all Cormlait probably, valid
DefeQda - Compl. Compl. oraband'd Number Number Number complaints Number % of valid complaints
EC & Members 36 25 12 1 4 7 19% 2 8%
EC 34 23 12 1 4 7 21% 2 9%$
EC Members 2 2 0 0 0 0 0% 0 0%
U.S. 38 is 20 0 7 13 34% 5 28%
Japan 14 12 _ 0 0 1 7% 0 0%
Canada 11 1 2 1&9 0 _ 0%
j., ther 1 181 12 6 212 2 11%1 0 0%
Total 117 75 42 31 14 25 21%1 7 9%
DC 106 66 40 3 3 24 3% 7 11%
411 9 2 0 1 1 9% 0 1 0
Total 117 1 75 1 42 1 3 1 14 1 25 1 21% 1 7 9%
Earlier in this section, we noted that a higher percentage of
complaints against the United States and European Community
were withdrawn or abandoned than against other defendants.
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Slightly more than 44% of the complaints against the United
States were withdrawn or abandoned over the entire forty-two
year period, and nearly 53% for the 1980s alone. Nearly 30% of
the complaints against the EC were withdrawn or abandoned
during the entire forty-two year period, and slightly more than
35% for the 1980s. While the EC figures are not as high as those
for the United States, they are nevertheless significantly higher
than the rates for the other defendants. We suggested that these
higher rates of withdrawal were evidence that more powerful
defendants were able to exert their power at an early stage in
the process, by discouraging many complainants from proceed-
ing further with their complaints.
As noted earlier, not all withdrawn or abandoned cases ac-
tually involve pressure to drop the complaint. A more precise
measure of a country's power to discourage dispute settlement
proceedings would be to subtract the withdrawals for neutral
reasons, and take the percentage of all complaints that were
withdrawn for negative reasons. The above table shows that the
pattern of negative withdrawals is much the same. The United
States managed to induce negative withdrawals in a striking 27%
of all complaints against it, and an even more striking 34% of all
1980 complaints. The Community is a distant second at 16% and
21% over the same periods. "Other" countries, Japan, and the
developing countries occupy their customary place at the bottom
of the chart, having induced negative withdrawals in 3-5% of all
complaints, and 7-11% of all complaints in the 1980s.
The critical compliance datum, of course, is the distribution
of "negative outcomes" - negative withdrawals in cases where
the complaint can be found to be legally valid. The distribution
follows the general pattern of compliance described so far. Of
the nine legal failures found in this category, the United States
is the responsible defendant in five, the European Community in
three, and a Community member, France, in one early case.36
Taken as a percentage of the total number of valid legal claims
against the particular defendant, the negative outcomes in this
category represent 20% of all valid claims against the United
States, 8% of valid claims against the EC and 3% of valid claims
against EC members. For the 1980s, the five negative outcomes
produced by the United States represented 28% of all valid
claims made against it in the decade.
* Combined Results for All Valid Claims. We turn now to an
36. France: Auto Taxes (Case #40), supra note 16.
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analysis of combined results from all three categories of cases in
which a valid complaint was filed. Due to the enlarged database
for individual defendants being used in this section of the study,
the total number of valid claims in all three categories is now
145.
TABLE Def 7
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: COMBINED DATA (By Defelant)
(Includes only a with known results)
42 Years
Cases where ruling of violation ttled, conceded valid. or withdrawn and probably valid
Total Full Satisfaction Part Satisfaction Negative Outcome
Defendant Complaints Number % Number % Number %
EC & Members 67 38 57% 24 36% 5 7%
EC 36 19 53% 13 36% 4 It%
EC Members 31 19 61% 11 35% 1 3%
U.S. 25 13 52% 3 12% 9 36%
1apan 7 9 53% 8 47% 0 0%
Canada 9 5 56% 2 22% 2 22%
Other 27 21 78% 5 19% I 4%
TOTAL 145 86 59% 42 29% 17 12%
IDC 124 70 56% 1 37 30% 1 17 14%
ILDC 1 21 1 16 176% 1 5 124% 1 0 1 0%
Total 145 86 59% 42 29% 17 12%
1980s
Cases where ruling of violation, settled, conceded valid, or withdrawn and probably valid
Total Full Satisfaction Part Satisfaction Negative Outcome
Defendant Complaints Number % Number % Number %
EC& Members 25 16 64% 6 24% 3 12%
EC 23 14 61% 6 26% 3 13%
EC Members 2 2 100% 0 0% 0 0%
U.S. 18 7 39% 2 11% 9 50%
Japan 12 9 75% 3 25% 0 0%
Canada 4 50% 2 25% 2 25%
Other 12 7 51% 5 42% 0 0%
TOTAL 751 43 57% 18 24% 14 19%
JDC 1 66 1 37 156% 15 23% 1 14 21%
LDC 9 6 167% 3 33% 0 0%
Total 75 43 57% 18 24% 14 19%
Note Separate treatment of each defendant produces one mere negative outcome in the 42 year section because
one of the 15 defendants in case 54 (Norway) did not comply with a ruling of violation. See Appendix number 54.
The combined results from the enlarged database for de-
fendants yield the same overall percentages of positive results as
in the 207-case database. For valid legal claims over the full
forty-two year period, positive results occur in 88% of the cases,
while in the 1980s the rate is 81%. Again comparing individual
countries in terms of vice rather than virtue, the percentages of
negative outcomes are 12% for the entire forty-two year period,
and 19% for the 1980s alone.
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The United States has by far the worst compliance record in
any time period. The United States forced negative outcomes in
36% of all valid complaints against it over the entire forty-two
year period, and in 50% of the valid complaints filed against it in
the 1980s. This is a seriously deficient record. It cannot be dis-
missed as the product of a statistically inadequate sample. The
United States was responsible for nine negative outcomes out of
eighteen valid complaints against it in the 1980s, and nine out of
twenty-five for the full forty-two years.
Canada's two negative outcomes are enough to retain second
place in percentage terms - 22% for the forty-two year period
and 25% for the 1980s. The European Community's four nega-
tive outcomes make it second worst in absolute terms and third
in percentage terms. The Community was responsible for nega-
tive outcomes in 11% of the valid complaints against it over the
entire forty-two year period, and in 13% during the 1980s alone.
Some will view the EC's compliance record as understated be-
cause it does not take account of its blockage of Council adoption
of three other violation rulings in the early 1980s; others will
dispute the significance of those cases, pointing out that the EC
did settle all three blocked cases eventually.
The "Other" defendants were responsible for only one nega-
tive outcome overall.37 Neither Japan nor the developing coun-
tries were responsible for any negative outcomes.
What can explain these differences in legal performance
among leading GATT members? The first thing to note is that
all the negative outcomes in complaints against the United
States and Canada, and three of the four negative outcomes in
complaints against the EC, occurred in the 1980s. Thus, one
must look at the situation of these countries during the 1980s for
an answer.
As noted in the previous section on decade-by-decade data,
one condition common to all GATT countries in the 1980s was a
higher level of ambition for GATT dispute settlement. Govern-
ments filed more complaints; they filed more demanding com-
plaints; and the dispute resolution system tried to respond more
objectively. These conditions were bound to produce a greater
number of legal challenges to important trade policy measures,
and thus a higher level of resistance - even noncompliance -
than before. Because all parties felt similar pressures of more
37. The negative outcome for "Other" is Norway's failure to comply with
an admitted violation in Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII (Case #54),
supra note 25.
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ambitious dispute settlement proceedings, however, they should
have all experienced an equal incidence of negative outcomes
caused by this factor alone. The absolute number of negative
outcomes would, of course, vary with the frequency of participa-
tion, but the rate of negative outcomes should be the same. The
rates of negative outcomes in the 1980s were manifestly not the
same - 50% for the United States, 25% for Canada, 13% for the
EC, and zero for Japan and "Others." Other factors must be
sought to explain important differences in legal compliance.
There is obviously some correlation between size, or power,
and the general level of resistance to dispute settlement The
United States and the European Community generally rank in
1-2 order in terms of most categories of resistant behavior -
negative withdrawals as well as negative outcomes. Setting
aside Japan as a special case, Canada's numbers likewise fit the
expected profile for the third most powerful number. Yet power
alone cannot explain the large gap between the United States
outcomes and the European Community outcomes in the 1980s.
Even allowing for some under-reporting of EC resistance to
GATT law, the numbers for the two superpowers should be
much closer than they are, if power alone were determinative.
It would appear, rather, that other factors drove the United
States to challenge the GATT's legal system a great deal more
vigorously than the EC.
The key change in the United States during the 1980s was
the adoption of a more bellicose and demanding trade policy.
That policy had evolved slowly during the 1960s and 1970s as the
U.S. Congress became more and more concerned about the in-
crease of foreign competition in U.S. markets - partly because
of perceived harm to U.S. industries, and partly because of the
conviction that other countries were not opening their markets
to the same extent. That policy took a more violent turn in the
1980s, due in large part to the occurrence of a massive trade defi-
cit. Congress, blaming the deficit on trade restrictions by others,
demanded that the U.S. government take the law into its own
hands to obtain true reciprocal market access. Satisfying these
demands required the U.S. Administration to impose concrete
and highly visible acts of arm-twisting retaliation to prove that it
was defending U.S. interests. The prevailing sense of injured
rectitude also helped to reduce the sense of obligation when or-
dinary laws and administrative decisions were found to violate
GATT.
The domestic political situation within the European Coin-
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munity does not display the same characteristics. In the first
place, the Community did not face the "get tough" imperatives
of U.S. domestic politics. Parliamentary systems of government
are generally less prone to the adversarial legislative-executive
relationships which generate such high-visibility demands for
toughness, and Community politicians are one step further re-
moved from day-to-day electoral politics which tend to produce
such grandstanding. While the EC undoubtedly experienced
similar impulses toward "get tough" policies, it tended to exe-
cute them behind closed doors.38
In the second place, the Community's internal political situ-
ation actually contained some important restraints against
openly GATT-illegal behavior. The Community is a legal rather
than a political entity. The law which creates the Community
and empowers it to act also serves to constrain it. Even though
GATT as a whole is not considered formally binding in Commu-
nity law, Community officials always fear that clear GATT vio-
lations may cause internal legal problems under various
provisions that give legal standing to international obligations. 39
This often leads the Community to take extra care to assure that
its policy actions will not be subject to any formal rulings of
GATT violation.40 It is no accident that three of the Commu-
nity's four negative outcomes were by means of inducing the
complainants to withdraw. Only one legal ruling was ignored,
and it was actually just "postponed" until the end of the Uru-
guay Round.41
It seems clear that the differences between U.S. and EC atti-
tudes toward compliance with GATT law - both in appearance
and in the actual numbers they record - are exaggerated by the
differences in style imposed by their different political settings.
But in the end, style becomes substance. Over time, the need to
38. France's whimsical gambit of requiring all Japanese VCRs to clear cus-
toms at the tiny customs office at Poitiers, Poitiers Customs House (Case #119),
supra note 16, is an exception to the rule.
39. Article 228 of the Treaty of Rome provides that international obliga-
tions of the Community shall be binding on Community institutions and mem-
ber states. While GATT as a whole has been found not to be directly applicable
under Article 228, individual tariff bindings have been. Joined Cases 21-24/72,
International Fruit Co. v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit 1972 E.C.R.
1219. For a book devoted almost entirely to this subject, see THE EuROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND GATT (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986).
40. For example, the Community is much more careful than most other
countries to block adoption of panel rulings that threaten its existing practice,
or to reserve its position explicitly.
41. Screwdriver Assembly (Case #188), supra note 11.
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respond to political demands for toughness, coupled with a sense
of comparative rectitude, has driven the United States to take
greater liberties with GATT law more frequently than the EC.
Canada's relatively poor performance is hard to explain in
fundamental terms. Canada does practice a fair amount of pro-
tectionism, and with trade being such an important part of the
national economy, trade issues do become a subject of electoral
politics, making change much more difficult. Canada's 25% rate
of negative outcomes in the 1980s, however, rests on only two
negative outcomes - two failures in eight valid claims. One
legal failure was a countervailing duty case in which a number
of other countries, including the United States, joined Canada in
expressing the view that the panel's legal ruling was plainly
wrong. The other was a recent ruling which would have re-
quired changes in the entire structure of Canadian agricultural
price support policy. The United States itself did not press very
hard, in part because the firm mainly responsible for the com-
plaint decided to invest in Canada instead.42 Canada's experi-
ence in the 1980s may just be the normal reaction of a larger
country to the more demanding nature of GATT dispute settle-
ment in that decade.
Turning to other indications of legal compliance reported in
the combined data, we find that the distribution of "full" versus
"partial" satisfaction outcomes presents an intriguing overlay to
the pattern of negative outcomes. If one removes negative out-
comes to avoid double counting, one finds that the United States
and "Other" have roughly an 81% rate of full satisfaction, with
developing countries close behind at 76%. Japan has the lowest
rate at 53%, followed closely by the EC at 59%.
It is possible to view the combined patterns of negative out-
comes and full-partial outcomes as a further reflection of the
policy differences described above. The combined data suggests
that Japan will almost always try to negotiate compromise an-
swers, the United States will almost always eschew compromise
in favor of yes-no, right-wrong answers, and the Community
falls somewhere in the middle. To those who watch the GATT
behavior of these three superpowers, the suggested pattern rings
true. The inclination of the United States toward yes-no an-
42. These two cases were Canada. Boneless Beef (Case #149), supra note
11, and Canada. Ice Cream and Yoghurt (Case #195) supra note 11. Another
possible reason for U.S. restraint in the second case was a Canadian counter-
claim against a similar U.S. restriction. United States: Import Prohibition on
Imports of Ice Cream from Canada, GATT Doc. L/6444 (Dec. 9, 1988) (com-
plaint by Canada) (Case #194).
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swers does seem to be a logical consequence of the highly public,
adversarial relationship between the U.S. Congress and the Ex-
ecutive. Often carried out in the form of a morality play, this
relationship seems to leave much less room for international
compromise.
In sum, we can suggest three conclusions about the surge of
legal failures in GATT dispute settlement during the 1980s.
First, the increased rigor of the dispute settlement process cre-
ated a situation in which some increase in the rate of legal fail-
ures was natural, and normal. Second, it seems undeniable that,
as a group, the more powerful members of the GATT comply
less well with the demands of GATT law and legal process than
do the weaker countries as a group. And third, it would appear
that the actual level of resistance and legal failure in the 1980s
was augmented, and its distribution affected, by important
changes in United States domestic policy. The new and more
bellicose policy adopted by the United States clearly increased
U.S. resistance and noncompliance to a level above all other par-
ticipants. It is reasonable to hypothesize, moreover, that the
U.S. example also encouraged other large powers to resist more
than they might have done otherwise, although there is no way
to measure this.
A final word is needed about the present susceptibility of
GATT law to the influence of power. All primitive legal systems
are subject to power differences. Those differences diminish
(but never disappear entirely) as the legal system matures. Out-
wardly, the GATT legal system has matured considerably in the
1980s. One of the reasons legal failures have increased is that
legal rulings have become more objective, and less power-sensi-
tive. Another sign of maturation is the increasing share of com-
plaints filed by "Other" countries. At present, to be sure, the
process of maturation has yet to win the full support of the su-
perpowers. But the process is in motion.
3. ANALYSIS OF OUTCOMES FOR INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINANTS
The preceding section analyzed the behavior of individual
defendants against whom GATT legal complaints had been filed.
The present section examines the same cases from the viewpoint
of the complainant. It examines the outcomes achieved by each
major complainant or group of complainants - first the proce-
dural outcomes, and then the substantive outcomes on valid
legal complaints.
As before, the analysis of individual complainants is limited
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to the four most frequent complainants, who were the United
States (seventy-three complaints), the European Community
(thirty complaints), Canada (eighteen complaints) and Australia
(thirteen complaints). The list is very similar to the list of most
frequent defendants, except that (a) the United States replaces
the European Community at the head of the list, (b) Canada
moves up from fourth to third and (c) Australia replaces Japan.
Once again, the member countries of the European Community,
who filed thirty-three early complaints, will be listed alongside
the EC itself. As before, the twenty-six other countries that
made an appearance as a complainant are gathered together in a
single group called "Other"; these twenty-six countries ac-
counted for a total of sixty-two complaints. Each of the tables
will also contain a supplementary section comparing the out-
comes for developed and developing countries.
a. Procedural Outcomes, by Complainant
The distribution of procedural outcomes obtained by each
complainant is presented in the following tables.
1993]
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TABLE Coop 2
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PROCEDURAL OUTCOMES (By Complainant)
42 Year
Totw Rulings Settled-Conceded by Def. Withdrawn or Abandoned
Complainant Complaints Number % of total Number % of total Number % of total
U.S. 73 30 41% 34 47% 9 12%
EC & Menbe 6 3 0 48% 12 19% 21 33%
EC 30 15 50% 1 3% 14 47%
EC Members 33 15 45% 11 33% 7 21%
Canada 18 8 44% 3 17% 7 39%
Australia 13 4 31% 6 46% 3 23
Other 62 26 42% 11 18% 25 40%
Total 229 98 43% 66 299 65 28%
DC 185 83 I 45% 58 31% 44 24%
DC 44 15 34% 8 18% 21 48%
Total 229 98 43% 66 29% 65 28 %
1980s
Total Rulings Settled-Conceded by Def. Withdrawn or Abandoned
Complainant Complaints Number % of total Number % of towa Number % of total
U.S. 39 16 41% 17 44% 6 15%
EC & Menbers 27 12 44% 0 0% 15 56%
EC 26 12 46% 0 0% 14 54%
EC Members 1 0 0% 0 0% 1 100%
Canada 16 8 50% 2 13% 6 38%
Australia 6 2 33% 3 50% 1 17%
Other 39 12 31%1 6 15%1 21 54%
Total 127 50 39% 28 22% 49 39%
DRC 99 1 43 I43% 1 24 1 24% I 32 I 32%28 17 125% 4 14% 1 17 61 %
Total 127 50 39% 28 22% 49 39%
When examining procedural outcomes for individual de-
fendants, we noted that complaints against the two strongest de-
fendants, the United States and the European Community, were
withdrawn or abandoned at a higher rate than were complaints
against weaker defendants. We also noted that the stronger de-
fendants were among the least likely to agree to a settlement.
We suggested the hypothesis that stronger defendant countries
have a greater likelihood of persuading the complainant to quit,
and also a greater ability to resist pressures to settle. If that hy-
pothesis were valid, one might expect a mirror image of these
results to show up in the data for complainants. That is, the
stronger complainants should experience the lowest rate of with-
drawal or abandonment for their own complaints because the
strong should be better able to overcome resistance by defend-
ants and force cases to a conclusion. Stronger complainants
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should also obtain the highest percentage of agreements to
settle.
The hypothesis is certainly supported by the overall com-
parison between developed and developing country results.
During the forty-two year period, developing country complain-
ants withdrew twice the percentage of complaints that devel-
oped country complainants did, 48% to 24%. During the 1980s,
when the rate of withdrawals went up, developing country com-
plainants again withdrew approximately twice as many com-
plaints, 61% to 32%. Developing complainants also fared clearly
worse in obtaining settlement agreements. During the forty-two
year period, they obtained settlement agreements in only 18% of
their complaints as compared to 31% for developed country com-
plainants. The ratio for the 1980s was 14% to 24%.
The averages for developed country complainants conceal
some surprising differences, however, in the distribution of pro-
cedural outcomes for individual defendants. The United States
fits the strong-country profile almost perfectly. It withdrew or
abandoned a comparatively low 12% of its complaints in the en-
tire forty-two year period and only 15% in the 1980s. It also pro-
cured the highest percentage of settlement agreements from
defendants during the forty-two year period (47%) and, except
for Australia, in the 1980s (44%). Other things being equal,
these procedural outcomes would suggest that the United States
exerts more force than other complainants in pursuit of some
positive corrective action.
This conclusion is certainly consistent with the external ap-
pearance of the U.S. policy toward GATT dispute settlement
complaints. The other half of the United States' bellicose policy,
described in the preceding section, is a policy of vigorously at-
tacking the legal wrongs of others at a fairly high level of public
visibility. This has been particularly so since the 1974 enactment
of "Section 301" which requires the U.S. executive branch to fol-
low all valid-claim cases to the end, or explain to the Congress
why it did not.43 These pressures often leave the U.S. Adminis-
tration with no exit from impasse situations except to threaten
immediate retaliation if the GATT complaint does not go for-
ward. The United States is large enough, and has retaliated
often enough, to make the threat credible.
The European Community, which should be second to the
United States if power alone matters, finds itself completely at
43. Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411, (as amended 1979, 1984,
1988).
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the other end of the scale, with a very high percentage of with-
drawn complaints. The EC has withdrawn or abandoned nearly
half of its complaints, 47% during the forty-two year period and
54% during the 1980s alone. Likewise, the EC has obtained the
very lowest percentage of settlement agreements of any partici-
pant - 3% in the forty-two year period, 0% in the 1980s.
The most plausible explanation for the wide differences be-
tween the outcomes for United States complaints and European
Community complaints is simply that the Community did not
try as hard. Upon closer examination, one finds that the Com-
munity has actually had a rather pronounced legal policy in this
direction. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Community was
opposed to extensive use of the GATT dispute settlement proce-
dure, fearing it had more to lose than to gain from a litigation-
oriented approach to commercial policy problems. Acting under
this policy, the Community occasionally filed GATT lawsuits as
a defensive device, a tit-for-tat reminder designed to discourage
complaints by others rather than an actual attempt to win legal
victories. Once the message was received, withdrawal of the
complaint was often a more desirable outcome for the EC than
to strengthen GATT law by pursuing the complaint to a ruling.
Even after the Community began to relax its opposition to dis-
pute settlement proceedings as such, it was never as totally com-
mitted to victory as the United States. The Community did
create a tit-for-tat Section 301 look-alike,44 but it had none of the
political urgency to prove toughness in a highly visible manner.
In sum, the United States numbers demonstrate that power-
ful complainants can accomplish better-than-average procedural
outcomes when they apply their power in a determined fashion.
The Community's numbers demonstrate that power is not al-
ways used to that end.
b. Substantive Outcomes, by Complainant
The following table presents the breakdown of violation and
no-violation rulings for each major complainant, for both the en-
tire forty-two year period and for the 1980s.
44. Council Regulation 2641/84, 1984 O.J. (L 252), sometimes referred to as
"the Commercial Policy Instrument."
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TABLE Camp 3
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: RULINGS - VIOLATION v. NO-VIOLATION (By Complainant)
S42 Years
Total Total As % of all No As % ofall As % ofall
Complnan Complaints Rulinp complaints Violation Violation rlings complints
U.S. 73 30 41% 7 23 7% 32%
EC & Members 63 30 48% 4 26 87% 41%
EC 30 15 50% 2 13 87% 43%
EC Membeus 33 15 45% 2 13 87% 39i
Canada 18 8 44% 2 6 75% 33%
Australia 13 41 312 
1 3 
75 % 23Ote 62 ; 6 42R , 7 19 73% 31%
Total 229 981 43% 21 77 79% 34%
IDC 1 185 1 83 1 4S% 1 17 I 66 1 80% I 365
ILDC1 44 1 15 1 34% 1 4 1 13 73% 1 25%5
JTotal 1 229 1 98 43% 1 21 1 77 1 79% .1 345%
I 198s I
Total Total As % of all No As % ofall As % ofall
Complainant Complaints Rulings complaints Violation Violation rulings complaints
U.S. 39 16 41% 1 15 94% 38%
EC& Members 27 12 44% 2 10 83% 37%
EC 26 12 46% 2 10 83% 38%
EC Members 1 0 0% 0 0 0% 0%
Canada 16 8 50% 2 6 75% 38%
Australia 6 2 33% 0 2 100% 33%
O!her 391 121 31 2 10 83% 26%
ITotal 1 1271 501 39%1 71 43, 86%6 34%
IDC 1 99 1 43 1 43% I 5 I 38 1 88% I 38%1!ILDC 1 28 1 7 1 25% 2 1 5 1 71% 1 8%
Total 127 50 39% 7 43 86% 34
Testing the hypothesis that stronger countries do better,
one might look for evidence that stronger complainants have a
higher percentage of rulings in which a violation is found - the
other side of the hypothesis that stronger defendants should
have fewer adverse legal rulings.45 The data supports such a hy-
pothesis, although the differences are quite small. For the en-
tire forty-two year period, developed country complainants
obtained violation rulings in 80% of all rulings, as opposed to
73% for developing countries. Individually, complaints by the
European Community and EC Members have measurably
higher rates of violation findings (87%) than all the others, and
the United States is next at 77%. The United States percentage
is actually higher if one adjusts for the fact that two of the seven
45. In the study of violation rates against defendants, see Part 2.b. of this
section, it was found that complaints against the United States did have a mea-
surably lower rate of violation rulings than others, but the data for the other
countries was inconclusive.
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no-violation rulings on the U.S. record were in fact rulings in its
favor.46 The data for the 1980s, however, do not really support
the hypothesis that powerful complainants obtain more viola-
tion rulings.
TABLE Comp 4
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: RULINGS - RESULTS OF VIOLATION RULINGS (By Complainant)
42 Years ]
Totl Reult Full Satisfaction Part Sati. Negative Outcome[Complain...t Violation Unknown 6.2.3 6.2.4 Total % 6.2.2 % 6.2.1 6.2.S$ TotalI%
C 23 0 11 14 61 9 % 1 9% 0 1 0 1 4%
EC & Members 26 16 1 17 68% 6 24% 2 0 12 8%
EC 13 447 1 8 67% 2 17% 2 0 2 17%
EC Members 13 0 19 9 69% 4 31% 0 0 0 0%
Canada 6 0 4 1 5 83% 0 0% 0 1 1 17%
Australia 3 0 1 2 11 33% 2 67% 0 0 0 0%1
Other 1 19 01 1 3 13 79% 1 5% _2 1 3 16%]
Total 77 1 44 52 68% 17 22% 5 2 7 16%
I 1980. I
Total Result Full Satisfaction Part Sais. lgative Outcome
Complainant Violation Unknow 6.2.3 6.2.4 Total % 6.2.2 % 6.2. 6.2.5 Total %U.S. 10 15 0 5 2"7 47% 7 47% 1 0 11 7%
EC 6 Members l 0 6 1 7 70% 1 10% 2 2 20%
EC 10 0 6 1 70% I1 10% 2 0 21 20%
EC Members 0 0 0 p s 0% 0 0% t m 0%
Canada 6 0 4 rt5 e83% dd p t see 17%
A u g , 1 2 0 1 0 5 0 % 
5 ) d C a I 0Othe 10 6 1 7 70 , 1 0%1 11 30%
ITotal 43 1 0 1 22 1 5 1 2 63% 9 121% 1 5 1 2 1 "7 16 96
Note All percentags a computed using known results.
6.2.3: Ruling or claim fully satisfied.
6.2.4: Ruling or claim fully satisfied due to internal legal decision or expiration of measure.
6.2.2: Ruin or claim partly utisfied.
6.2.1: No action taken
6.2.5: Claim fully satisfied after complainant acceded to bilateral demands.
Table Comp 4 presents the substantive outcomes in cases
where the complaint was ruled to be valid. The distribution of
substantive outcomes fits the rather odd pattern seen in the pre-
46. See Cuba- Restrictions on Textile Imports, GATT Doc. GATT/CP.3/82
(Aug. 10, 1949) (GA7Tr Working Party report) (Case #5); and Canada.- Import
Quotas on Eggs, BISD 23d Supp. 91 (1977) (GATT Working Party report) (Case
#75) [hereinafter Canada, Import Quotas on Eggs).
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vious analysis of procedural outcomes for particular complain-
ants. The United States seems to fit the hypothesis that the
strong do better. Except for Australia, the United States suf-
fered the lowest percentage of negative outcomes in both periods
(4% and 7% respectively). But the European Community finds
itself at the opposite end of the scale, along with Canada and
"Other." These three have nearly the same fairly high percent-
age of negative outcomes - 16-17% in the forty-two year period,
and 17-30% during the 1980s alone. All three have a signifi-
cantly higher negative outcome rate than the 9% rate for devel-
oping country complainants as a whole during the forty-two year
period. The most likely hypothesis to explain the European
Community's position at the opposite end of the scale is the one
suggested above - that the Community did not invest whole-
heartedly in its GATT legal complaints, while the United States
did. More generally, the unsystematic distribution of negative
outcomes suggests that a country's selection of complaints may
have a more powerful influence than strength or weakness.
The distribution of results between full and partial satisfac-
tion yields a pattern of results almost totally contrary to the
strong country hypothesis. Indeed, Canada and "Other"
achieved a higher percentage of full satisfaction results than
both the United States and the European Community in both
periods.
The unusually high rate of "partial satisfaction" results for
the United States stands out. Given the intensity of U.S. behav-
ior as complainant, the high rate of these partial satisfaction out-
comes leads one to look for some alternative explanation. Case
selection appears to be the most plausible explanation. Many of
the partial satisfaction results in U.S. complaints involved com-
plaints that attacked important and well-entrenched measures,
ones that could probably not have been eliminated with one
blow under even the most favorable circumstances.47 The same
Section 301 pressures that forced the United States to pursue
GATT complaints with such intensity may also have been re-
sponsible for complaints that tried to accomplish too much.
* Cases Settled or Otherwise Conceded, by Complainant. The
47. For example, in each of the celebrated U.S.-EC legal battles of the early
1980s - European Community: Wheat Flour (Case #103), supra note 26; Eu-
ropean Community: Pasta Products (Case #105), supra note 26; European
Community: Canned Fruit (Case #107), supra note 26; and European Commu-
nity: Citrus Products (Case #113), supra note 26 - the U.S. complaint in-
cluded demands that would have destroyed major EC programs.
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previous discussion has already covered the relative frequency
with which individual complainants managed to achieve settle-
ments or outright concessions, pointing out that the United
States was considerably more successful than other complain-
ants. The following table presents the data on the actual results
obtained in settled or conceded cases.
TABLE Cutp S
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: COMPLANrS SETTLED OR CONCEDED (By Complainant
42 Year
ITotal Settled ReutFull Satisfaction Part Satisfcto
C laiat or Conceded Unknown 6.2.3 6.2.4 Total 1 6.2.2 %
U.S. 34 1 19 0 19 58% 14 42%
EC & Member; 12 0 8 0 8 67% 4 33%
EC 1 0 1 0 1 100%5 0 0%Y
EC Members I11 0 7 0 7 64% 4 36%
Canada 3 1 0 1 33% 2 67%
0utni __6  3 0 3 5011 3 50%
2te ll 0 8 1 9 82% 2 18%
[Total 66 1 39 40 62% 25 38%
iD 58 i i 1331 1 134 160% 231 409 I
8 1 0 1 6 1 0 1 6 175% 1 2 1 25%6
Total 66 1 1 1 39 1 1 1 4 1 62% 1 25 1 38%
1980.
Total Settled RFut Full Satisfaction Part Satisfaction
Comlainant or Conceded Unknown 6.2.3 6.2.4 Total % 6.2.2 %
U.S. 17 0 13 0 13 76% 4 24%
EC & MAenbe 0 0 0 0 0 0% 0 0%
EC 0 0 0 0 0 0% 0 0%
EC Members 0 0 0 0 0 0% 0 0%
Canada 2 0 1 0 1 50% 1 50%
Australia 3 0 1 0 1 33% 2 67%
Other 6 0 3 1 4 67% 2 33%
total 28 0 18 1 19 68% 9 32%
ICI 24 I 0 1 16 1 1117171%1 7 129 9i4 0 2 0 2 50% 2 50%6
Total 28 0 18 1 19 68% 9 32%9
Note. All pertags ae omputed using known results.
6.2.3: RidiAg or claim fully usiafied.
6.2.4: Ruling or claim fully satisfied due to internal legal decision or expiration of measure.
6.2.2: Ruling or claim partly satisfied.
The only complainants with sufficient experience to gener-
ate meaningful data in this category of cases are the United
States and "Other." As between those two complainants, one
would expect the more powerful United States to have the
higher rate of full satisfaction. The data lean in the other direc-
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tion, however. Once again, the United States seems to have
asked for more than it could get.
Z Cases Withdrawn or Abandoned, by Complainant. A
breakdown of the actual results in withdrawn or abandoned
cases is presented, by complainant, in the following table.
TABLE Camp 6
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: COMPLATNTS WITHDRAWN OR ABANDONED (B Colainant
[4Y Resadt Neutra: W/d for Ncgativw Withdrawn after imas or cmpwlainant
Unknown adequate ream aweeded to bilt& demandsi
Total IV"o Total w/d T l Total To7 As fall C 9mplat probbly valid
ComDIlanun Coml. Compi. wrabsowdod Number Number Number complaints Number %of valid complaints
DC11 73 57 9 6 4 4 $% 1 2%
EC & ernen 63 40 21 5 _7 9 14% 3 8 1
EC 30 15 14 1 6 7 23% 2 6 3%
EC Members 33 25 2 1 2 6 1 41
,Uanad. isE 10 0 1! 4 22% 1 10%
ustali a 12 9 41 0 2 1 8 0 %
62 34 2 41 19 W4 12%
ro!229 _150 N 8 _ _201 371 16%1 9 6T
IDC 18151 1281 44 1 6 16 22 1 12% 1 6 I  5%H
LDc 44 122 121 1 2 4 115 34% 3 14%
Total 229 ISO 65 8 20 37 16% 19 6%
L 98 JResult Neutral: W/d for Negatve: Withdrawn ater impasse oqr complainat
Unknovm adequate reaton acceded to bilateral demnds
Total Valid Total ./d Total Total Total As % of all Complaint probably valid
Complainant COrne. Cornel. oraband'd Number Number Number cmp~laints Number % of valid conglit
U.S. 39 32 6 0 3 3 8% 0 0%
EC & Members 27 13 15 1 6 8 30% 3 23%
EC 26 12 14 1 7 27% 2 17%
EC Memrbers I 1 0 0 1 !00% 1 100%
Canada 16 9 20 3 3 _ 19% 1 1195
Austraia 6 5 0 0 171 0 0%
_Ohr 1 391 19 211 21 21 17 4% 3 16i%
roou 1271 781 491 31 141 2 25%1 71 9%
DC 1991 671 32 1 2 1 12 1181
ILDC 1 28 1111 17 1 1 1 2 1 14 1
Total 127 78 49 3 14 32
18% I 3 I
Earlier in this section, we noted that in both the entire
forty-two year period and in the 1980s, complaints by developing
countries were withdrawn or abandoned at twice the rate of
complaints by developed countries. Individually, United States
complaints had an even lower rate of withdrawal than developed
countries as a whole, while EC complaints, contrary to a priori
expectations, were withdrawn about as often as developing
country complaints. The table above permits us to examine the
same issue more precisely by looking at rates of negative with-
drawals alone - i.e., excluding withdrawals for neutral reasons.
The negative withdrawal percentages show that developing
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country complainants are in an even more disadvantaged posi-
tion. Developing country complainants suffered negative with-
drawals in 34% of all complaints during the forty-two year
period, and an astounding 50% of all complaints during the
1980s. Negative withdrawals in complaints by developed coun-
tries occurred only one-third as frequently, in 12% and 18% of
all complaints, respectively. United States complaints retain the
same exceptionally favored position, with negative withdrawals
in only 5-8% of all U.S. complaints. EC complaints, by contrast,
continue to suffer a relatively high level of negative withdraw-
als, 23-27%, although not as high as the rate for developing coun-
try complaints.
The most important datum in this table, of course, is the
distribution of "negative outcomes" by complainant - negative
withdrawals in cases based on valid legal claims. Taking such
legal failures as a percentage of total valid complaints, one finds
yet another repetition of the previous pattern - complaints by
the United States rarely encounter failure while complaints by
the EC fare no better than most others. The small number of
cases in the sample, however, makes the differences less
significant.
The United States is the complainant with the lowest per-
centage of legal failures, having suffered GATT legal failure in
its withdrawn complaints, which amounts to only 2% of the total
valid complaints filed by the United States. Moreover, the one
failure involved an impasse in a 1950s complaint against French
auto tax discrimination, a time long before Section 301 was im-
plemented.48 The European Community's two legal failures
amount to 13% of its fifteen valid complaints. This puts the EC
right in the middle of most other complainants. For Canada,
"Other" and the developing countries, legal failure occurred in
10% to 14% of all valid complaints. The data for the 1980s are
essentially the same.
It is not wise to make too much of differences that turn on
the results in one or two cases. Still, even these few results
demonstrate rather convincingly the importance of the political
determination typical of U.S. participation in GATT litigation.
Five of the nine legal failures in withdrawn or abandoned cases
occurred in cases where the United States was the defendant,
including both the failed EC complaints and two failed Japanese
complaints. Three of these five U.S. cases involved arm-twisting
retaliation by the United States, and the other two involved U.S.
48. France: Auto Taxes (Case #40), supra note 16.
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strong-arm restrictions supporting a demand for a Voluntary
Export Restraint (VER). GATT complaints were duly filed in
all five cases, but in each case the illegal U.S. restriction had con-
siderable political pressure behind it, and in the end none of the
complainants really seemed to believe a GATT legal victory
would change things. The complainants then backed away and
cut the best deal they could to secure removal or amelioration of
the U.S. restrictions.
The lesson, in short, is that power may have more to do with
these results than is at first apparent. Powerful complainants
probably can be bullied into giving up complaints, provided the
bullying is done by an equally powerful and more determined
defendant.
* Combined Results for All Valid Claims, by Complain-
ant. The following tables present the combined results for all
valid claims in all three types of procedural outcome.
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TAZL C mp7
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: COMBINED DATA (By Complainant)
(nludes only case with known results)
42 Years
Cases where ruling of violation, addled, conceded vaid, or withdrawn and probably valid
Total Full Satisfaction Part Satisfa'on Negative Outcom
Complainat Comlaints Number % Number % Number I %
DS. 5 712 33 68% 22 39% 2 4%
EC & M 67 40 25 6% 1 25% 5 13%
C is 6 60% 2 13% 3 27%
FC Members 25 16 64% 8 32% 1 4%1
TAoda 78 6 60% 2 20% 4 18 %
W . m i a 9 4 1 4 4 5 1 6 %2 0 
%
ite 4 4 7!11 31 9% 7 21%
To hcl 1b 150 92 61% 42 28the 1611%
DCl 128 1 77 160% 1 39 30% I  12 9% I
LDC 22 se ii 6t% mr3 14 4 1 T
ITWIO15 92 61% 42 28% 16 111%q
19809
CaS s Whcorlint s violation, atded, concended mlid, or w thdr e and probably valid
TOcp t Full Satisfaction Part Sais C on Negative Outco e
ter, Complaind t s Number % Numbpr % Number %UJ.S. 32 20] 63% 11 34% 1 3%
EC & Mmberful 7 54% t% 5 38%
EC 12 7 58% 1 8% 4 33%
EC Members 1 0 0% 0 0% 1 100%.
C..nad& 9 6 67% 1 11% 2 22%
Ath vi p sustralia h3 60% 0 0%
ite 19 111 58% 2 1%6, 32%
at all, and that the fifty-seve vali coplit yteU e
rToulI 781 461 59%]1 23%1 141 8%
DC 167 ha40 o 60% n t16 24% o m1 16ILDC I I 1 6 1 55  1 2 118  1 3 1 279,IToW 78 46 1 59% 1 s 18 1 2% 1 4 is1%
The combined data generally portray the same profile that
we have seen in the more detailed breakdowns above. The
United States complaints appear to enjoy more success than
complaints by other parties, whereas EC complaints fare no bet-
ter, and sometimes much worse, than complaints by the smaller
and less powerful members of the GATT community.
Starting with the most successful complainants, we find that
the nine valid complaints by Australia had no negative outcomes
at all, and that the fifty-seven valid complaints by the United
States had only two negative outcomes, a minuscule 3-4% rate of
negative outcomes. The relative success of U.S. complaints is no
surprise. Australia's record shows that even smaller players can
win almost all the time if they choose carefully and do not ask
[Vol. 2:1
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for too much.49
On the other side, one finds that complaints filed by the Eu-
ropean Community had the highest percentage of negative out-
comes in both periods. The percentage of negative outcomes are
quite high - 27% of all EC complaints over the full forty-two
year period, and 33% of all EC complaints during the 1980s
alone. Slightly below the rate of negative outcomes for EC com-
plaints were complaints filed by "Other" and by Canada; their
rates of negative outcomes were significantly above the average
for all complaints, ranging from 20% to 32% for both periods.
The rate of negative outcomes for developing country com-
plaints, 18% overall and 27% in the 1980s, fell into the same gen-
eral category.
The explanations suggested in earlier parts of this analysis
seem just as valid here. The intensity of the United States' dis-
49. The nine Australian complaints were United States: Hawaiian Regula-
tions Affecting Imported Eggs, GATT Doc. L/411 (Sept. 28, 1955) (complaint by
Australia) (Case #36) [hereinafter United States: Hawaiian Eggs]; France:
Assistance to Exports of Wheat Flour, BISD 7th Supp. 22 (1959) (GATT panel
report) (Case #50) [hereinafter France: Assistance to Exports of Wheat Flour];
Italy: Assistance to Exports of Flour, GATT Doc. L/853 (Sept. 12, 1958) (com-
plaint by Australia) (Case #51) [hereinafter Italy: Assistance to Exports of
Flour]; Japan: Restrictions on Imports of Beef and Veal, GATT Doc. L/4117
(Nov. 26, 1974) (complaint by Australia) (Case #74); European Community:
Production Subsidies on Canned Fruit, GATT Doc. C/M/148 (June 11, 1981)
(complaint by Australia) (Case #101) [hereinafter European Community. Sub-
sidies on Canned Fruit]; European Community: Operation of Beef and Veal
Regime, GATT Doc. L/5715 (Oct. 26, 1984) (complaint by Australia) (Case
#135); Korea: Restrictions on Imports of Beef, BISD, 36th Supp. 202 (1990)
(GATT panel report) (Case #174) [hereinafter Korea: Restrictions on Bee]];
Japan: Restrictions on Imports of Beef, GAIT Doc. C/M/219 (Apr. 8, 1988)
(GATT panel report) (Case #177) [hereinafter Japan:" Restrictions on Bee]];
and United States: Import Restrictions on Sugar, GATT Doc. L/6514 (June 9,
1989) (GATT panel report) (Case #187). Three of these cases were "me-too"
complaints attached to successful U.S. complaints: European Community: Sub-
sidies on Canned Fruit (Case #101), supra; Korea: Restriction on Beef (Case
#174), supra; and Japan: Restrictions on Beef (Case #177), supra. Another
case, United States: Hawaiian Eggs (Case #36), supra, was attached to a suc-
cessful lawsuit in the U.S. courts. Most of the others involved settlements
where Australia was satisfied with protecting its established export markets.
Many observers would argue that the GATT legal system failed Australia
in its largest and most important complaint ever, a 1978 complaint charging that
the EC's export subsidy on sugar violated GATT Article XVI:3. See European
Community: Refunds on Exports of Sugar I (Case #86), supra note 19. The
complaint was widely regarded as having merit. In the face of a vigorous -
some might say GAT-threatening - defense by the EC, however, the panel
concluded that it could not reach a conclusion. This failure is not recorded as a
legal failure in this study, because the study accepts panel rulings as determina-
tive, and so the case must be counted as one not involving a valid claim.
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pute settlement efforts makes maximum use of its size and
power, so with even moderately careful selection of legal claims,
the result should be a very high level of success. The Commu-
nity legal policy has never had this intensity. It began by not
even wanting to win - just to counterpunch a little. Later,
when the Community was playing to win, Community officials
never felt the intense need to win, as did U.S. officials under the
scrutiny of the U.S. Congress.
Although the rates of failure for other complainants are
mixed and do not line up in order of relative power, the datum
that stands out most vividly is that the smaller countries in the
"Other" group suffered seven legal failures, the largest absolute
number of legal defeats by any group of complainants. That
seven out of sixteen failures occurred in complaints by the group
of least powerful countries is a very telling datum by itself.
Once again, it is worth mentioning that the influence of
power on legal outcomes is not a final assessment of GATT law.
It is merely a statement about the GATT's present position on
the trajectory of legal development.
E. AGRICULTURE
One of the most common assertions about GATT law is that
trade in agricultural products is not really covered by GATT
legal obligations. Although the GATT agreement does apply to
agricultural trade, special rules for agriculture permit substan-
tial deviations from basic GATT policy, and even these permis-
sive rules have been flouted by most members from the outset.
Because of these legal failings, most observers would expect to
find agricultural trade problems at the heart of the GATT legal
failures described so far. This section of the chapter examines
that hypothesis. It asks whether the data reveal any difference
in outcomes between complaints involving agricultural trade
and complaints about other kinds of trade.
The 207 cases in the database were divided into two parts,
"agricultural" and "non-agricultural." Cases were identified as
"agricultural" if the main product or products involved in the
case were products of farms. Cases involving processed agricul-
tural products were considered agricultural only where the re-
striction in question was related to an underlying agricultural
support program.5°
50. For example, cases involving processed dairy products were invariably
agricultural, because processed dairy products are the principal vehicle of inter-
national trade in dairy products, and thus are invariably protected by support
[Vol. 2:1
GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The following analysis examines several aspects of GATT
litigation over agricultural trade issues. It begins by tracing the
number of agriculture cases over time. It then identifies the ex-
tent to which individual countries have acted as complainants or
defendants in complaints involving agriculture. Finally, it ad-
dresses the main issue: the relative levels of compliance in agri-
culture and non-agriculture cases involving a valid legal claim.
To the authors' surprise, the data reveal that the outcomes in
agriculture cases are in no way any less successful than those in
non-agriculture cases.
1. THE VOLUME OF AGRICULTURE CASES, DECADE BY DECADE
The following table presents the decade-by-decade break-
down of cases involving agriculture.
TABLE Ag I
BREAKDOWN OF COMPLAINTS BY PRODUCT (Total and by Denade)
Total 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s
IAg 'calture I 89 1 43% 1 12 1 23% I 6 1 86% 7 17 53% 54 1 47%
Non-Ag & Gen. 118 57% 41 77% 1I 14% 15I 47% 61 53%
Total 207 53 7 32 115
The percentage of agriculture cases has increased over time.
In the 1950s, only 23% of all complaints involved agriculture.
After 1959, the percentage more than doubled. For the period
1960-1989, exactly one half of the dispute settlement complaints
in GATT involved agricultural trade measures.5' The most
likely reason for the lower percentage in the 1950s was that most
GATT countries were employing quotas to deal with their post-
war balance-of-payments condition, quotas that also provided ef-
fective protection to local farmers. As long as the balance-of-
payments justification for quotas lasted, little could be gained
from trying to apply GATT rules to agricultural trade measures.
For most developed countries in GATT, the balance-of-pay-
ments justification ended between the late 1950s and the mid-
1960s. After the removal of balance-of-payments legal cover, the
absence of legal protection for these still very restrictive agricul-
programs. Cases involving cigarettes, on the other hand, usually turn out to be
"non-agricultural" cases, because the barriers in question usually turn out to be
instruments of ordinary protection for a domestic manufacturing industry, with
little or no connection to tobacco support programs.
51. There were 77 agriculture cases in the period 1960-1989, out of 154 total
cases.
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tural trade regimes made it more worthwhile to sue when
problems arose.
2. INDrviDuAL COMPLAINANTS AND DEFENDANTS
The following tables present a breakdown of GATT com-
plaints according to the agriculture/non-agriculture nature of
the product involved. In the first table, complaints are sorted by
complainant government - the leading individual complainants
and "Other." The table covers both the entire forty-two year
period and the 1980s.
TABLE Ag 2
COMPLAINTS BY INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS (Total and by Product)
42 eay I
Country Total Complaints Agriculture Nn-Ag/ra
U.S. 73 36 49% 37 51%
EC & Members 63 16 25% 47 75%
EC 30 11 37% 19 63%
EC Members 33 5 15% 28 85%
Canada 18 7 39% 11 61%
Australia 13 13 100% 0 0%
SubTotal 167 72 43% 95 57%
Other 62 26 42% 36 58
TOTAL 229 98 43% 131 57%
Note: Sample consists of 229 complaints, rather than 207, because each complainant in
cases with multiple complainants is counted separately. Cases with multiple
complainants: See App:endix numbers 5, 14, 15, 21, 22, 25, 34, 49, 59, 110, 152, 153.
1980so I
Country Total Complaints A"icultur- - Non-Ag/General
U.S. 39 23 59% 16 41%
EC & Members 27 10 37% 17 63%
EC 26 10 38% 16 62%
EC Members 1 0 0% 1 100%
Canada 16 6 38% 10 63%
Australia 6 6 100%, 0 0%
SubTotal 88 45 51% 43 49%
Other 39 171 44% 22 56%
TOTAL 127 62 49% 65 1%
The data on complainants show, not surprisingly, that 100%
of Australia's dispute settlement complaints have been about ag-
riculture. For the other major groups of complainants, the data
for the full forty-two year period does not show a concentration
of agricultural complaints by a particular country. The United
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States is the leading agriculture complainant among the others,
with 49% of its complaints directed to agricultural trade barri-
ers. "Other," Canada and the EC follow with 42%, 39% and 37%
respectively. For the 1980s alone, the United States did stand a
bit further apart, with 59% of its complaints directed to agricul-
tural trade problems, as opposed to 44% for "Other," and 38%
for both Canada and the EC.
Next, we turn to the same breakdown of agriculture/non-
agriculture complaints by defendant.
TABLE Ag 3
COMPLAINTS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS (Total and by Product)
42 ears
Country Total comlaints, Agrutur Non-Ag/G a
EC & Member 98 51 52% 47 48%
EC 57 39 68% 18 32%
EC Members 41 12 29% 29 71%
U.S. 52 20 38% 32 62%
Canada 15 7 47% 8 53%
Japan 20 7 35% 13 65%
SubTotal 185 85 46%1 100 54%
Other 38 18 47% 20 53%
TOTAL 223 103 46% 120 54%
Note 1: Sample consists of 223 complaints, rather than 207, because each defendant in
case with multiple defndants is counted as the object of a separate complaint.
Complaints with multiple defendants: See Appendix numbers 54 and 112.
Note 2: All complaints against individual EC countries after their accession to the Community
are considered as complaints against the EC. See Appendix numbers 56, 57, 60, 67, 70,
71,72.
1980 I
Country Total Complaints Agriculture Non-Ag/General
EC & Membes 36 22 61% 14 39%
EC 34 21 62% 13 38%
EC Members 2 1 50% 1 50%
U.S. 38 13 34% 25 66%
Japan 14 4 29% 10 71%
Canada 11 4 36%. 7 64%
SubTotal 99 43 43%1 56 57%
Other 18 11 61%1 7 39%
TOTAL 1171 54 46%1 63 54%
Over the forty-two year period, the EC has been the most
frequently sued about its agricultural policies, with 68% of the
complaints against it involving that sector.52 For Canada and
52. While it sometimes seems that complaints against the Community's ag-
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"Other," 47% of the complaints against them involve their agri-
cultural trade policies, while the percentages for the United
States and Japan are 38% and 35% respectively. The reason for
the EC's prominence was undoubtedly its Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) which began in the 1960s. The CAP was highly
protectionist and because it was new, it caused many exporters
to lose existing markets.
In the 1980s, agricultural interests in complaining countries
began to broaden their aim. While agriculture still accounted
for 62% of the complaints against the EC, 61% of the complaints
against the "Other" countries in the 1980s also involved agricul-
tural trade measures. The increase in agricultural complaints
against "Other" in the 1980s was largely due to U.S. complaints
against Japan, Korea and the Scandinavian countries.
Viewed as a whole, the data on complainants and defend-
ants confirm the widely held perception that the United States
has been the chief complainant about agriculture and that the
EC Common Agricultural Policy has been its main target. The
data indicate, however, that the agriculture problem has really
been much broader than the U.S.-EC litigation. Many GATT
countries have been sued over their agricultural trade policies,
and many countries did the suing.
3. PROCEDURAL OUTCOMES IN AGRICULTURE CASES
The table below presents the procedural outcomes for agri-
culture and non-agriculture cases, for both the entire forty-two
year period and for the 1980s.
ricultural policy dominate GATT dispute settlement business, the actual shares
are 38% of all agriculture complaints, and 18% of all complaints.
[Vol. 2:1
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TABLE AS 4
PROCEDURAL OUTCOhMs (B Product
I42 YearI
Total Rulina Settled-Conceded by Def. Withdmwn or Abandoned
Complaints Number % of total Number % of total Number % of tl
'Aculture 89 37 42% 30 34% 22125%
Non-A /Gen 118 51 43% 34 29% 33 28t
Total 207 88 43% 64 31% 55 27%
S 1980,
Total Rulinxs Settled-Conceded by Def. Withdrwn or Abandoned
Complaints Number I of total Number % of total Number % of total
lAgriculture 54 22 4196 17 31% 15 28%
Non-Ag/Gen 61 25 41% 11 18% 25 41%
Total 115 47 41% 28 24% 40 35%1
For the entire forty-two year period, there is virtually no
difference in the procedural outcomes of agriculture complaints
as opposed to non-agriculture complaints. Both types of com-
plaints produce almost identical percentages of rulings, settle-
ments or concessions, and withdrawn complaints. For the 1980s,
there is a fairly significant difference in the last two categories:
non-agriculture complaints were withdrawn or abandoned in
13% more cases, whereas 13% more agriculture complaints re-
sulted in settlements. Thus, it appears to have been marginally
easier to achieve positive results in agriculture complaints dur-
ing the 1980s.
4. SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES IN AGRICULTURE CASES
0 Introduction. One of the most surprising results of this
study is that complaints against restrictions on agricultural trade
do not, on the whole, produce worse results than complaints
against other types of trade restrictions. Most GATT observers
would find this result misleading, and would argue that, for
whatever reason, the dispute settlement data gathered here sim-
ply do not capture the true condition of GATT law on agricul-
tural restrictions. The authors would agree.
The main problem is that most of the key restrictions that
distort agricultural trade are either outside the rules altogether,
or are not effectively regulated by them. The two main sources
on GATT-inconsistent practice are exempted from the rules al-
together. The United States has a 1955 waiver for all agriculture
restrictions mandated by section 22 of the Agricultural Adjust-
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ment Act,5 3 and the European Community has found a gap in
GATT law which allows it to use the "variable levy" as a highly
effective means of quantitative protection. Neither of these two
trade-control programs can be attacked directly, and because of
that, attacks on other agricultural trade-control programs in
countries were also rare until the late 1980s. Most of the actual
GATT litigation on agriculture, therefore, has involved periph-
eral restrictions at the edge of the core control programs, meas-
ures which can be negotiated or litigated. This is certainly true
for much of the United States litigation against the EC, where
the core variable levy programs of the Common Agricultural
Policy have been left all but untouched. Toward the end of the
1980s, the United States had some success attacking agricultural
support programs in Japan, Korea and the Scandinavian coun-
tries, but these attacks were also addressed mainly to peripheral
products, and some were handled by partial settlements that did
not alter the underlying program. GATT has scored enough suc-
cesses - or failure-avoiding settlements - in the peripheral
cases to achieve a respectable level of positive outcomes.
A second factor which has helped to protect agricultural
trade policy from GATT legal challenge is that GATT law con-
cerning agricultural trade restrictions tends to be vague and in-
effective. The main problem here is the set of rules that attempt
to regulate export subsidies, the GATT rule of Article XVI:3 and
the parallel rules of the GATT Subsidies Code. Both have
proved too vague to enforce - too vague, at least, when a super-
power defendant like the EC mounts a kill-all-the-prisoners de-
fense.54 Prior to 1987, GATT panels also had difficulty reaching
a sufficiently rigorous interpretation of the Article XI:2(c) ex-
ception for agricultural quota restrictions.5
As we shall see, the consequence of the vagaries in these
key rules has not been an abnormally large number of no-viola-
tion rulings; agriculture complaints actually have a higher per-
53. 49 Stat. 773, amended by 7 U.S.C. 624 (1988).
54. The three key cases on this issue were the Australian and Brazilian
complaints about the EC sugar subsidy, and the U.S. complaint against the EC
wheat flour subsidy. European Community: Refunds on Ectpor of Sugar I
(Case #86), supra note 19; European Community: Refunds on Exports of
Sugar II (Case #87), supra note 19; European Community: Wheat Flour (Case
#103), supra note 26.
55. Examples could be found in the Canadian Egg Quota case, Canada Im-
port Quotas on Eggs (Case #75), supra note 46, and in parts of the MIPs case,
European Community: Programme of Minimum Import Prices (MIPS)
Licenses Etc. for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables, BISD 25th Supp. 68
(1979) (panel report) (Case #76).
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centage of violation rulings than non-agriculture complaints.
Rather, the effect has been that a few key no-violation rulings
under these rules have discouraged further legal challenges to
the type of agriculture restriction in question.
In sum, the GATT's relative success in dispute settlement
cases involving agriculture does not mean all is well with
GATT's legal regulation of agricultural trade, but quite the con-
trary. It actually means that the main problems in agriculture
are not yet within the reach of the legal system at all.
* Cases with Rulings. The following tables present the sub-
stantive outcomes in agriculture and non-agriculture cases
where the panel made a ruling. The first deals with the distribu-
tion of violation and no-violation rulings in agriculture and non-
agriculture cases.
TA $ A S
SUSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: RUUNGS - VIOLATION v. NO-VIOLATION (By Product)
I42 Ye, I
Total Toal A %of &ll No Asofal As% ofall
Con ib RuII comphunta Violton Violaton Cn s omp *
A riculmum 89 37 42% 6 31 I 84 1 35%
Non-AlOon 118 W1 43% 14 37 73% 31%
TOtal 207 88 43% 1 20 68 77% 33%
S 1980a
Total Total A % of all No AMofaUl Amofall
Complaints Ruling -oplains ViMlation Violation lings complaints
IAfiultum 54 22 41% 2 20 1 91% 37%
Non-A/oGen 61 25 41% 0 20 8 % 33%
Total 115 47 41% 7 40 85% 35%
Table Ag 5 shows that in cases that go all the way to a ruling,
agriculture cases yield a higher percentage of guilty verdicts
than non-agriculture cases - 84% to 73% over the full forty-two
year period, and 91% to 80% in the 1980s alone. This is some-
what contrary to the result that one might expect to see, given
the fact mentioned above that the key GATT rules applicable to
agricultural trade are generally less precise and harder to apply
than the more common GATT rules applicable to most non-agri-
cultural restrictions. To achieve such a high violation rate, the
agriculture complainants have obviously learned to select cases
carefully in order to avoid the various "black holes" in GATT
agriculture law.
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Table Ag 6 presents a breakdown of the substantive out-
comes in those cases in which a ruling of violation was made.
TABLE A
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: RULJNGS - RESULTS OF VIOLATION RULINGS (B Product)
I 42Year, I
Total i Result Full Satisfaction Pr Sati. Negative Outcome
ViolationUknow 6.2.3 6.2.4 Total I% 62.2 % 6.2.1 6.2.5 Total
lAgriculture 231 1 19 61% 9 29% 2 1 3 10%
Non-A /Gon 37 1 25 1 2 69 6 17 1 4 11
Total 68 1 37 8 45 67% 15 22% 5 2 7 10%
I 19s0e
Total Result Full Satisfation Part Satis. Nenative Outcome
Violation U lt Fl 6.2.3 6.2.4 Total % 6.2.2 % 6.2.1 6.2.5 Total %
Agnculture 20 0 6 11 55% 6 30% 2 1 3 15%
Non-A /Oo 20 0 13 0 13 65% 3 15% 3 1 4 20%
Total 40 0 19 5 24 60% 9 23% 5 2 7 18%
Not An percentages am computed using known results.
6.2.3: Ruling or claim fully satisfied.
6.2.4: Ruling or claim fully satisfied due to internal legal decision or expiration of mea .m
6.2.2: Ruling or claim partly stisfied.
6.2.1: No action take.
6.2.5: Claim fully satisfied after complainant acceded to bilateral demands.
We find only modest differences between the outcomes in
agriculture and non-agriculture cases, and the differences tend
to cancel each other out. The comparison of negative outcome
ratios makes the non-agriculture complaints appear slightly less
successful. Comparing the ratios of full satisfaction results leans
in the other direction. Closer examination reveals that rates of
full satisfaction for agriculture cases are not as positive as they
first appear. Over one-third of full satisfaction outcomes in agri-
culture cases were achieved simply because, for internal reasons,
the defendant withdrew the measure which was in violation or
the measure expired. This commonly happens in agriculture
cases because many restrictions are put in place for just one
growing season.
9 Cases Settled or Conceded. We noted earlier that the overall
percentage of cases was about the same for both product sectors,
except that agriculture cases had a higher percentage of settle-
ment in the 1980s. The following tables report the actual results
in cases that were settled or conceded.
[Vol. 2:1
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TABLE As?
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: COMPLAINTS SETTLED OR CONCEDED (By Product)
I42 Yearn
Total Settled Result Full Satisfhction Partial Safisfction
or Conceded Unknown 6.2.3 1 6.2.41 Total % 1 6.2.2 I %
30 0 18 1 19 6% 11 V 37
Non-Ag1Gen 34 1 19 0 19 58% 14 42%
Total 64 1 37 1 38 601 25 40%
[ 1980a
Totl Settled Result Full Satisfaction Partial Satisfaction
or Cnceded Unknown 6.2.3 6.2.4 Total % 6.2.2
Airicultre17 0 1l 1 112 71% 5 29
Non-Ag/Gen 11 0 7 0 7 64% 4 366
Total 28 0 18 1 19 68% 9 32%
Notew All percemtages am computed using known results.
6.2.3: Ruling or claim fully satisfied.
6.2.4: Ruling or claim fully satisfied due to intra legal decision or expirtion of meIuane.
6.2.2: Ruling or claim paly satisfied.
The differences between actual outcomes in the two types of
cases is also negligible. Settled cases produce almost exactly the
same percentage of full satisfaction outcomes for agriculture and
non-agriculture cases.
; Cases Withdrawn or Abandoned. The following table re-
ports the distribution of outcomes for agriculture and non-agri-
culture cases in those complaints that were withdrawn or
abandoned.
TABLE Ag 8
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: COMPLAINTS wITHDRAWN OR ABANDONED (By Product)
42Yarn i ,Neutra: W/lf Negative: Withdrawnuttipsse o pan
Un=o adequate ream~ wooeded to bilatera demands
Tol Valid Total w/d Tol Total Total As %ofall olitpoalvld
Compl. Centel. or 8a-d'd Number Number Numbe complaints Nub M f 9id¢ =!an
Aricultre 89 62 22 2 12 8 9% 1 2%
Nsn-AJIGen 118 77 33 6 8 19 166 8 lOB
total 207 139 55 8 20 27 13% 9 6S
1980a Raubt Nntal: WId fo Negative Withdrsnw after mp e oromplm
Unnowa adequat reson accded to bilaera de~mds
Total Valid Total wld Total Total Total As S of all Complait = ;ab),valid,Cornel. Cornel. or al-d'd Nunibe Number Number complaints Num 1% ovldo~anu
Wriculture 54 138 is 0 8 7 1 1 3
Non-Ag/Gen 61 37 25 3 6 16 26i 6 16%
Total 115 75 40 3 14 23 20% 7 9%
It is interesting to note that of all withdrawn or abandoned
cases where the result is known, 60% of the agriculture cases are
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withdrawn or abandoned for neutral reasons, as compared to
only 30% of the non-agriculture cases.56 The reason for the
higher incidence of "neutral" withdrawals in agriculture cases is
probably the higher incidence of complaints against short-term
restrictions imposed for just one harvest season when local pro-
duction is in excess. GATT complaints against such restrictions
are usually withdrawn once the seasonal restriction has expired.
The "neutral" classification of these cases can be questioned be-
cause the GATT's inability to act quickly on these short-term
restrictions is a legal failing of sorts. Thus it is probably mislead-
ing to place too much emphasis on relative rates of negative
withdrawals.
There would seem to be nothing misleading about the distri-
bution of the nine legal failures that are found in the negative
withdrawal category. All but one are non-agricultural cases.
However, given that GATT legal discipline over agricultural re-
strictions is not in fact better than discipline over non-agricul-
tural restrictions, we must again look for explanations as to why
this particular element of dispute settlement data contains so
many fewer legal failures for agriculture cases.
One relevant factor is that four of the nine legal failures in
this category are cases in which the defendant government has
imposed arm-twisting trade restrictions to force the complainant
to accept a VER.57 Most governments already have a rather
tight network of agricultural trade restrictions in place, and so
they do not need to twist arms to obtain VERs or any other kind
of added protection for agricultural products.
The other noteworthy fact about these legal failures is that
four of the remaining five cases are also arm-twisting restric-
tions, three demanding market access and one demanding a
change in environmental policy.58 Only one of these four is an
agricultural case. While this data might suggest that countries
do not use muscular diplomacy as often on agricultural trade
matters, that is not so. Several other U.S.-EC disputes over agri-
56. Of the 20 agriculture cases in which the result is known, 12, or 60o%,
were withdrawn or abandoned for neutral reasons. For non-agriculture cases,
27 had a known result of which eight, or 30%, were withdrawn or abandoned for
neutral reasons.
57. European Community. TMs from Korea (Cases #83), supra note 16;
Poitiers Customs House (Case #119), supra note 16; United States: Steel Pipe
from EC (Case #138), supra note 16; United Statesx Cotton Pillowcases (Case
#144), supra note 16.
58. European Community: Seal Skins (Case #145), supra note 16; Semi-
conductor Retaliation (Case #161), supra note 16; Pharmaceutical Retaliation
(Case #189), supra note 16; Hormones Retaliation (Case #193), supra note 16.
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culture have produced retaliatory actions. The real difference
seems to be that victims of such retaliation do not file complaints
against them, possibly because their own actions are equally
tainted.59
* Combined Results. The following tables give the combined
results for all agriculture and non-agriculture cases, first over
the entire forty-two year period, and then for the 1980s.
TAB= AS 9
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: COMBINED DATA (By Product)
(Includes onl cmes with known results)
42 Years
Cases where of violai settled, conceded valid or withdrawn and probably valid
Total Full Satisfaction Part Satisfaction Ne "ative Outcome
complai Number Number 9 Number %
Ag6iculture 62 38 61% 20 32% 4 6%
Non-A/Im, 77 45 58% 20 26% 12 16%
Tota 139 83 60% 40 29% 16 12%
S 1980s
Cases where uling of violation, settled, ownceded valid, or withdrawn and probably valid
Total Full Satisfaction Part Satisfaction Negative Outcome
Comiplaint- Number S Number % Number %
Agriculture 6338 23 61 11 29% 4 11%
Non-A /Gen 37 20 54% 7 19% 10 27%
Total 75 43 57% 18 24% 14 1 9%
If one were looking at the data alone, the combined results
make complaints against agricultural trade measures appear to
succeed much more often than complaints against non-agricul-
tural trade measures. Non-agriculture cases produced approxi-
mately three times the number of legal failures over the forty-
two year period. The differences in the numbers, however, are
in the end not very meaningful. As stated before, dispute settle-
ment data do not give us an accurate picture of the GATT's per-
formance with regard to agricultural trade restrictions. The
true significance of the data is in its demonstration that GATT
law has not yet been able to engage agricultural trade policy in a
significant way.
59. The United States retaliated once following deadlocks in the Citrus
Products and Pasta Products cases, European Community: Citrus Products
(Case #113), supra note 26; European Community: Pasta Products (Case
#105), supra note 26. It also retaliated in a dispute over the agricultural provi-
sions of Spain and Portugal's accession agreements to the EC. Rather than file
a complaint, the EC counter-retaliated in each case.
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F. TRADE MEASURES
Each of the 207 cases in the database has been classified ac-
cording to the type of trade measure that the complaint targeted.
For this study, the data was broken down into five classifica-
tions: tariff, non-tariff barrier (NTB), subsidy, anti-dumping/
countervailing duty (AD/CVD) and "cannot classify." The di-
viding line between one category of measures and another is
usually clear. The only one that may require explanation con-
cerns the treatment of money charges under the Tariff/NTB dis-
tinction. "Tariffs" include all charges levied at the border,
including, for example, things like service fees. Trade barriers
involving internal money charges, such as discriminatory inter-
nal taxes, are classified as NTBs.
Two of the 207 cases involve complaints that are so diffuse
that they are impossible to classify. The data in this chapter con-
cern the other 205 cases. A fair number of these 205 cases in-
volve more than one type of measure, but in all instances it has
been possible to identify a single measure at the core.
The following analysis is divided into three parts. First, we
examine the relative frequency with which each type of measure
has been the subject of GATT litigation, and how that distribu-
tion has changed from decade to decade. Second, we examine
the experience of individual countries in this regard, looking at
which particular measures they have complained about when
they sued, and about which measures they have been sued. Fi-
nally, we examine whether the procedural or substantive out-
comes of GATT litigation differ from one type of measure to
another, and if so, why.
1. MEASURE-BY-MEASURE BREAKDowN OF GATT LITIGATION
The following table presents a breakdown of the measures
involved in each of the 207 cases, including the two that cannot
be classified. The data are presented both for the full forty-two
year period and for each of the four decades.
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TABLE Meas I
BREAKDOWN OF COMPLAINTS BY MEASURE (Total and by Decade)
% of As % of As % of As % of As % of
Measure Total All 1950s all 1950 1960s all 1960 1970s all 1970 1980s all 1980
AD/CVD 20 10% 1 2% 1 14% 2 6% 16 14%
All NTBs 108 52% 23 43% 2 29% 18 56% 65 57%
NTBs 82 40% 16 30% 2 29% II 34% 53 46%
D.NTBs 26 13% 7 13% 0 0% 7 22% 12 10%
All Tariffs 44 21% 20 38% 3 43% 5 16% 16 14%
O sa _ _ 2.7 13% 15 28% I 14% 3 9% 8 7%
D.Tariff 17 8% 5 9% 2 29% 2 6% 8 7%
Suhsides 33 16% 9 17% 0 0% 7 22% 17 15%
N/C 2 1% 0 0% I 14% 0 0% I I%
Total 207 53 7 32 115
Note: The letter D preceding NTBs and Tariffs indicates discriminatory measures.
Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are most frequently the subject
of complaints. For the entire forty-two year period, NTBs were
the subject of 52% of all complaints. The next closest is Tariffs,
with 21%, followed by Subsidies with 16% and AD/CVD meas-
ures with 10%. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this dis-
tribution is the combined total of Subsidies and AD/CVD
measures, at 26%. It is striking that over one-quarter of GATT
litigation should concern "unfair" trade practices or the meas-
ures taken to offset them.
A number of interesting trends appear when the data is bro-
ken down decade-by-decade. Almost every writer observes that
tariffs have declined in importance over the four decades of
GATT history, as they were negotiated downward. The stan-
dard observation continues that as tariffs went down NTBs be-
came more important, just as rocks appear when the tide goes
down. Sure enough, the data reveals a steady downward trend
of litigation about tariffs, and a corresponding increase in litiga-
tion about NTBs. Tariffs and NTBs occupied close to the same
shares of GATT legal complaints during the 1950s, with tariffs at
38% and NTBs at 43%. The proportions had changed sharply by
the 1970s and 1980s, when complaints about tariffs accounted for
only 16% and 14% of GATT's caseload respectively, whereas
complaints about NTBs had risen to 56% and 57%.
The second noticeable trend is that the share of complaints
concerned with AD/CVDs has risen sharply. For the first three
decades of GATT litigation there were only four AD/CVD com-
plaints, 4% of the total number of complaints over the period. In
the 1980s, there were sixteen AD/CVD complaints, or 14% of
the total caseload in that period. The growing importance of
AD/CVD measures is also a logical corollary of lower tariffs, for
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as tariff protection disappears, and laws dealing with "unfair"
trade tend to flourish.
Somewhat surprisingly, unlike AD/CVDs, the percentage of
litigation aimed at subsidies has not grown over the decades. We
find that 17% of the complaints filed in the 1950s dealt with sub-
sidies, slightly more than the 14% share in the 1980s. Part of the
explanation for this is that subsidies have been a more tradi-
tional tool of trade protection than AD/CVDs or NTBs. This is
due largely to the agricultural sector, where subsidies have com-
prised a long-standing part of agricultural price support pro-
grams. The experience of the 1950s reflects this fact. Five of the
nine subsidies complaints in the 1950s involved agricultural
price support programs, ° even though on the whole, less than
25% of complaints in the 1950s involved agriculture.
2. MEASURE-BY-MEASURE BREAKDOWN OF COMPLAINTS, BY
DEFENDANT
The following tables present a breakdown of complaints by
defendant, according to the trade measures complained about.
The table reports both the entire forty-two year period and the
1980s for the leading individual defendants and "Other."
60. The five agricultural cases were Australia: Subsidy on Ammonium
Sulfate, 2 BISD 188 (1952) (GATTr Working Party report) (Case #8); United
States: Export Subsidy on Poultry, GATT Doc. L/586 (Nov. 12,1956) (complaint
by Denmark) (Case #43); United Kingdo" Export of Subsidized Eggs, GATT
Doc. L/627 (Apr. 24, 1957) (complaint by Denmark) (Case #45); France: Assist-
ance to Exports of Wheat Flour (Case #50), supra note 49; and Italy: Assistance
to Exports of Flour (Case #51), supra note 49.
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TABLE Meas 2
COMPLAINTS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS (Total and by Measure)
42 years
Country Complaints AD/CVD All NTBs All Tariffs Subsidy
EC & Members 92 2 2% 43 47% 20 22% 27 29%
EC 52 2 4% 24 46% 6 12% 20 38%
EC Members 40 0 0% 19 48% 14 35% 7 18%
U.S. 51 t0 20% 23 45% 14 27% 4 8%
Canada 14 5 36% 8 57% I 7% 0 0%
Japan 18 0 0% 17 94% I 6% 0 0%,
SubTatal 175 17 10% 91 52% 36 21% 31 18%
Other 32 3 9% 19 59% 8 25% 2 6%
TOTAL 207 20 10% 110 53% 44 21% 33 16%
Note I: Sample contains 207 complaints -- the 223 complaints when individual defendants are counted
eparately, less cases 54 (15 detfendants) and 124 (one defendant) because the trade measures
involved in those disputes cannot be classified. See Appendix.
Note 2: All complaints against individual EC countries after their accession to the Community
are considered as complaints against the EC. See Appendix numbers 56, 57, 60, 67, 70, 71, 72.
1980s -
Country Complaints AD/CVD All NTBs All Tariffs Subsidy
EC& Meivhei 36 2 6% 16 44% 4 11% 14 39%
EC 34 2 6% 15 44% 3 9% 14 41%
EC Members 2 0 0% I 50% I 50% 0 0%
U.S. 38 8 21% 19 50% 9 24% 2 5%
Jap.n 13 0 0% 12 92% I 8% 0 0%
Canada It 4 36% 7 64% 0 0% 0 0%
SubTotal 98 14 14% 54 55% 14 14% 16 16%
Other 18 2 11% 13 72% 2 11% I 6%
TOTAL 116 16 14% 67 58% 16 14% ] 17 15%
Note: Case 124 is escluded from analysis because the trade measures involved in that dispute
cannot be classified. See Appendix number 124.
As might be expected, the data for each of the four major
defendants presents a profile of that country's commercial pol-
icy tendencies - the things it does that cause problems for other
governments. These profiles are much the same for the full
forty-two year period and for the 1980s alone.
The European Community profile shows an exceptional
number of complaints about EC subsidies. Complaints about
subsidies account for 38% of all GATT litigation against the
Community during the full forty-two year period, as opposed to
only 8% for all other GATT defendants. In the 1980s, 41% of all
complaints against the EC related to subsidies as opposed to only
4% of complaints against other countries. The EC's agricultural
programs were the main cause of these complaints, with agricul-
tural subsidies accounting for fourteen of the twenty subsidy
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complaints against the EC.6 1
The United States' preoccupation with "unfair" trade prac-
tices shows up very sharply in the unusually high percentage of
complaints against the AD/CVD measures. Over the forty-two
year period, 20% of the GATT lawsuits filed against the United
States involved complaints about AD/CVD actions, as opposed
to only 6% for all other GATT defendants. The gap began to
close in the 1980s. While the United States suffered the same
high percentage of GATT complaints against its AD/CVD ac-
tions (21%), complainants also began to target the AD/CVD
practices of Canada, the EC and "Other," causing the overall
percentage of AD/CVD complaints against all other govern-
ments to increase to 10%.
Although fewer in absolute numbers, the five complaints
against Canada's AD/CVD measures over the forty-two year pe-
riod amounted to 36% of the complaints against it, an even
higher percentage than that for the United States. Canada was
the earliest user of AD/CVD remedies, and has made them an
important part of its overall customs administration.
Another distinctive element of U.S. trade policy appears in
the higher percentage of complaints concerning tariffs, particu-
larly in the 1980s. The difference is mainly due to the somewhat
distinctive U.S. preference for using tariff increases in two types
of emergency situations - safeguards and arm-twisting retalia-
tion. Of the fourteen complaints that were brought against U.S.
tariff measures over the entire forty-two years, three complaints
involved U.S. safeguard measures62 and six involved actual or
threatened retaliatory tariffs.63
61. The six non-agricultural subsidies are the three DISC cases, France:
Income Tax Practices (Case #70), supra note 4; Belgium: Income Tax Practices
(Case #71), supra note 4; and Netherlands: Income Tax Practices (Case #72),
supra note 4, the two Airbus cases, European Community: Government Fi-
nancing of Airbus Industries I (Aircraft Code, all documents restricted) (Case
#158); and European Community: Government Financing of Airbus Indus-
tries II, GAf Doc. SCM/92 (Apr. 3, 1989) (U.S. complaint) (Case #196) [here-
inafter European Community: Airbus H], and a short-lived complaint against
Greek export subsidies, European Community: Export Subsidies Maintained
by Greece (Subsidies Code, all documents restricted) (Case #99).
62. United States: Withdrawal of a Tariff Concession Under Article XIX
(Case #13), supra note 19; United States: Article XIX Action on Dried Figs,
GATT Doc. L/40 (Oct. 4, 1952) (complaint by Greece and Turkey) (Case #21);
and United States: Article XIX Action on Spring Clothespins, GAT Doc. L/758
(Nov. 28, 1957) (complaint by Denmark and Sweden) (Case #49).
63. United States: Action Under Article XXVIII, GATTr Doc. L/2088 (Nov.
21, 1963) (parties acceptance of GATT panel report) reprinted in 3 I.L.M. 116
(1964) (Case #59); United States: Suspension of Most Favored Nation Treat-
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Japan's profile is perhaps the most interesting of all. The
conventional image of Japan's trade policy is one in which trade
protection tends to be accomplished through informal, behind-
the-scenes arrangements that rely more on cooperation than on
formal law. Japan has the lowest tariffs among the major GATT
members, it is said, because Japan does not need to rely on any-
thing so crude as a tariff to protect its industries. Nor, of course,
would Japan ever rely on anything as adversarial as AD/CVD
laws. The GATT lawsuits filed against Japan are quite consis-
tent with this image. No complaints about AD/CVD, no com-
plaints about subsidies, and only one complaint about tariffs
(where incidentally, Japan's actions were ruled GATT-legal).64
The remaining seventeen of the eighteen complaints against Ja-
pan were complaints about NTBs. Many of the seventeen NTBs
in question were simple quotas, but an equal number were more
sophisticated measures involving state monopolies, safety tests,
and the like.
3. MEASURE-BY-MEASURE BREAKDOWN OF COMPLAINTS, BY
COMPLAINANT
The following tables present a breakdown of complaints, by
complainant, according to the trade measures involved. Again,
the breakdown is for the leading individual complainants and
"Other."
ment, GAT Doc. C/W/401 (Nov. 1, 1982) (complaint by Poland) (Case #118)
[hereinafter United States: Suspension of Most Favored Nation Treatment];
Semiconductor Retaliation (Case #161), supra note 16; United States: Tariff
Increase and Import Prohibition on Brazilian Products, GATT Doc. L/6274
(Nov. 27, 1987) (complaint by Brazil) (Case #170) [hereinafter Informatics Re-
taliation]; Pharmaceutical Retaliation (Case #189), supra note 16; and Hor-
mones Retaliation (Case #193), supra note 16.
64. Japan: Imports of Spruce-Pine-Fir (SPF) Dimension Lumber, BISD,
36th Supp. 167 (1990) (GATT panel report).
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TABI Mm 3
COMPLAINTS BY IKDIDUAL GOVERNMET (otal and b Measure)
42 yrs
country Complais AD/CVD All NTBa All Tariffs Subsid
U.S. 73 2 3% 47 64% 11 15% 13 18%
EC& Menber, 62 6 10% 29 47% 20 32% 7 11%
EC 29 5 17% 14 48% 8 28% 2 7%
EC Members 33 1 3% 15 45% 12 36% 5 15%
Canada 18 3 17% 9 50% 4 22% 2 11%
Australia 13 0 0% -7 54% 0 0% 6 46%
SubTotal 166 11 7% 92 55%1 35 21% 28 17%
Other 61 9 15% 23 38%1 15 25% 141 23%
TOTAL 227 20 9% 115 51% 50 22% 421 19%
JNote: Sample consaista of 227 complaints - the 229 complaints when counting individual complainants.
lea two casm, 124 and 54, which are excluded from this analysis because the trade measures
involved in those disputes cannot be classified.
1980s -
Country Comlainat AD/CVD All NTBs All Tariffs Subsidy
U.S. 39 1 3% 27 69% 1 3% 10 26%
EC & Members 26 4 15% 15 58% 6 23% 1 4%
EC 25 4 16% 14 56% 6 24% 1 4%
EC Members 1 0 0% 1 100% 0 0% 0 0%
Canada 16 3 19% 8 50% 3 19% 2 13%
Australia 6 0 0% 3 50% 0 0% 3 50%
SubTotal 87 8 9% 53 61% 10 11% 16 18%
Other 39 8 21% 14 36% 7 18% 10 26%
TOTAL 126 16 13% 67 53% 17 13% 261 21%
Note: Case 124 is excluded from analysis because the trade measures involved in that dispute
cannot be classified. See Appendix number 124.
For both periods, the trade measures that individual coun-
tries complain about to other governments are typically the ex-
act opposites of the trade measures that other governments
complain about to them. For example, the United States re-
ceives many complaints about its AD/CVD law, but it almost
never complains about the AD/CVD laws of others. Conversely,
there are almost no complaints about United States subsidies,
but the United States is the leading complainant about subsidies
in other countries. 65 The obvious explanation is that govern-
ments tend to use their own policies as models of right and
65. The table shows that "Other" actually has a higher ratio of subsidy
complaints, 23% as compared to 18% for the United States. However, 10 of the
14 subsidy complaints in the "Other" column were from one complaint by 10
smaller countries against the EC's export subsidy on sugar.
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wrong. Governments do, it seems, follow the old maxim about
not throwing stones at houses like the ones they live in.
The same observation can be made about the trade meas-
ures complained about by the European Community. The Com-
munity receives an abnormally large number of complaints
about its subsidies, but makes almost no complaints about subsi-
dies granted by other governments. Having received few com-
plaints against its own use of AD/CVD measures, the
Community has made more complaints than any other GATT
member about the AD/CVD measures employed by others.
Oddly enough, the pattern even applies with regard to com-
plaints about tariffs. More complaints are leveled at the United
States over tariff measures than at any other single country, yet
the United States makes relatively few tariff complaints. The
Community and Canada are among the countries with the few-
est tariff complaints against themselves, and they are among the
most frequent complainers about tariffs in other countries.
Canada provides one exception to this pattern. Canada re-
ceives a higher percentage of complaints about its AD/CVD
measures than any other major participant, and yet Canada is
also tied for the lead in the ratio of AD/CVD complaints against
others. Perhaps one of the reasons Canada has such a high rate
of negative outcomes, both as complainant and as defendant, is
that Canada does not follow the old maxim about throwing
stones.
4. MEASURE-BY MEASURE BREAKDOWN OF PROCEDURAL
OUTCOMES
The following table presents a breakdown of the procedural
outcomes for cases involving each of the main types of trade
measure. In this table and the ones following, the sample con-
sists of the 205 complaints that can be classified.
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TABI Mess 4
PROCEDURAL OUTCOMES (B Measure)
Total Ruling Settled-CaIceded by Def. Withdrmw or Abandoned
Complaint Number % of total Number I of total Number % oftotal
AD/CVD 20 11 55% 3 15% 6 30
NT~s 108 42 39% 42 39% 24 22
Tariffs 44 20 45% 10 23% 14 32%$
Subsidies 33 14 42% 9 27% 10 30%
Total 205 87 42 64 31% 54 26%
r 1980a-
Total Ruling Settled-Conceded by Def. Withdrawn or Abandoned
Complaints Number % of total Number % of total Number % of total
AD/CVD 16 8 50% 2 13% 6 38%
NTBs 65 28 43% 20 31% 17 26%
Tariffs 16 6 38% 1 6% 9 56%
Subsidies 17 $ 29% 5 29% 7 41%
Total 114 47 41% 28 25% 39 34%
For the entire forty-two year period, the most significant
difference in procedural outcome is the somewhat higher per-
centage of AD/CVD cases that receive a formal legal ruling as
compared to the other measures. For complaints against AD/
CVDs, 55% were carried all the way to a legal ruling, as com-
pared to a range of 39% to 45% for the other types of trade meas-
ures. Essentially the same pattern occurred in the 1980s, when
50% of all AD/CVD cases proceeded to a legal ruling, as com-
pared to a range of 29% to 43% for other types of trade
measures.
The high percentage of rulings in AD/CVD cases appears to
be the result of the defendants' unwillingness to settle such
cases informally. Over the entire forty-two year period defend-
ants settled or otherwise conceded in only 15% of AD/CVD
cases, as compared to a range of 23% to 39% for the three other
types of trade measures. The same relationship is present in the
1980s, except for an unusually low ratio of settlements in the
tariffs category.
The reason for the apparent tenacity of the defense in AD/
CVD cases probably lies in the rigidities of domestic AD/CVD
law. In both the United States and Canada, the two defendants
against whom 75% of all AD/CVD cases were brought,M an AD/
CVD measure is the result of a highly judicialized administra-
tive proceeding in which the remedy, once issued, becomes
66. See TABLE Meas 2, supra p. 281.
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legally binding on executive officials as a matter of national law.
Consequently, governments usually have little room to negoti-
ate, even when the AD/CVD measure violates GATT
obligations.
The one other procedural outcome datum deserving com-
ment is the rather sharp increase in the percentage of tariff com-
plaints withdrawn or abandoned in the 1980s, rising from 32% in
the first three decades to 56% in the 1980s. The increase is
matched by a corresponding decline in the percentage of tariff
complaints settled or conceded. The data seem to suggest that
defendants in certain tariff cases began to defend more stub-
bornly, and possibly more forcefully, in the 1980s. An examina-
tion of the actual cases confirms this hypothesis. The 56%
withdrawn-abandoned rate is based on the outcome in nine of
the sixteen tariff complaints in the 1980s. Of those nine com-
plaints, five are arm-twisting tariff increases or threats of in-
crease by the United States - part of the new and more
bellicose policy the United States adopted in the 1980S.67
5. MEASURE-BY-MEASURE BREAKDOWN OF SUBSTANTIVE
OUTCOMES
* Cases with Rulings. The following table presents a break-
down of the violation and no-violation rulings made, according
to the type of trade measure involved.
67. The five cases were United States: Suspension of Most Favored Nation
Treatment (Case #118), supra note 63; Semiconductor Retaliation (Case
#161), supra note 16; United States: Infonrmatics Retailiation (Case #170),
supra note 63; Pharmaceutical Retaliation (Case #189), supra note 16; and
Hormones Retaliation (Case #193), supra note 16.
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TAKE Mes
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: RULINGS - VIOLATION v. NO-VIOLATION (B Measure)
Total Total As S ofall No Asofall Asof&U
Complints Rulings complaint Violatio Violatim rulings complaints
AD/CVD 20 11 55% 1 10 91% 50%
NTBs 108 42 39% 7 35 83% 32%
Tariffs 44 20 45% 6 14 70% 32%
Subsidies 33 14 42% 6 8 57% 24%
Total 205 87 42% 20 67 77% 33%
TOvv W Total As of all No As ofall As ofall
Comalaintn Rulings complaints Violatihe Violation rulings o laints
DCVD 16 
8 50 
1 7 
88 44NTa 65 28 43% 3 25 9 39%
varias 16 6 38% 2 4 c l a 25%
absidies 17 29r g 1 cases 24
Total 114 47 41 0 8 35%
For the entire forty-two year period, the percentage of viola-
tion rulings seems to vary quite a bit depending on the measure
involved. We fn oppot e rfindings about AD/CVD measures
are rulings of violation. At the other extreme, rulings on subsi-
dies end up as rulings of violation ony 57% of the time. The
variances even out during the 1980s, chiefly because the percent-
age of violation rulings in subsidy casgoeais up during thatdecade.
The most plausible reason for a higher-than-average rate of
GATT violations in AD/CVD cases is that AD/CVD decisions
contain so many opportunities for findings of "error." The legal
basis of an AD/CVD proceeding i tandads examination of
price/cost information or government benefits to determine if
there has been "abnormal" business or government conduct.Analysis of "material injury" involves a myriad of similar
choices about the relevant industry, market, time period, data
and so forth. Each case involves hundreds of these issues. When
AD/CVD measures are imposed in a judicialized procedural set-
ting, the answers to all these questions are highly transparent.Given the arbitrary nature of AD/CVD standards and concepts
to begin with, there is always something to disagree with in the
way that any answer has been derived. This is particularly so
where administrators adopt rules-of-thumb to keep from being
submerged in detail. Rules of thumb usually err on the side of
being too restrictive, and without a standard of review explicitly
protecting such rules of thumb, they are particularly difficult to
defend internationally. Needless to say, the fact that AD/CVD
complaints tend to experience a high rate of adverse legal rul-
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ings creates a high probability of legal failure, given the limited
ability to revise AD/CVD actions once taken.
At the other extreme, the relatively low rate of violation
rulings for subsidy complaints does lend some support to an ob-
servation frequently made about GATT law on subsidies,
namely, that the law is not very clear and thus is very difficult to
apply. Governments do countless things that advantage one
group of producers or another, but neither GATT nor any other
legal system has succeeded in defining which advantages are
"subsidies" and which are just normal functions of government.
The cases behind the low violation rate do show a connection to
weak subsidy rules. The low violation rate for subsidy com-
plaints is based on six rulings of no-violation. Three rulings in-
volved unsuccessful attempts to apply the GATT rules on export
subsidies to primary agricultural products.68 The other three
were the three DISC counterclaims against the territorial tax
systems of France, Belgium and the Netherlands, 9 another good
example of the inadequacies in GATT subsidy law.
We turn now to the actual substantive outcomes of cases in
which legal rulings of violation were made. The following table
presents a measure-by-measure breakdown of those substantive
outcomes:
68. European Community: Refunds on Exports of Sugar I (Case #86),
supra note 19; European Community: Refunds on Exports of Sugar II (Case
#87), supra note 19; and European Community: Subsidies on Export of Wheat
Flour (Case #103), supra note 26.
69. France: Income Tax Practices (Case #70), supra note 4; Belgium In-
come Tax Practices (Case #71), supra note 4; and Netherlands: Income Tax
Practices (Case #72), supra note 4.
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TABLE MIs 6
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: RULINGS - RESULTS OF VIOLATION RULINGS (By Measure)
[42 Yeas
Total Result Full Sftion Part . Ne ,tve Outcome
Violation Unknown 6.2.3 6.2.4 Total I 6.2.2 S 6.2.1 6.2.5 Total %
AD/CVD 10 0 3 4 7 70% 0 0% 3 0 3 30
NTBs 35 0 20 4 24 69% 7 20% 2 2 4 II%
Tariffs 14 1 10 0 110 177% 3 23%I 0 0 0 01
Subsidies 8 0 4 0 4 10% 4 50% 0 0 0 0%
Total 67 1 37 5 45 68% 15 23% 2 7 11%
S 1980s
Total Result Full Satisfaction Part Satis. Negative Outcome
Violation Unknown 6.2.3 6.2.4 1 Total % 6.2.2 % 16.2.1. 6.2.5 Total %
AD/CVD 7 0 1 3 4 57% 0 0% 3 0 3 43%
NTBs 25 0 13 2 15 60% 6 24% 2 2 4 16%
Tariffs 4 0 3 0 3 75% 1 25% 0 0 0 0%
Subsidies 4 0 2 0 2 50% 2 50% 0 0 0 0%
Total 40 0 19 5 24 60% 9 23% 5 2 7 18%
Note.: All percetages sm computed using known results.
6.2.3: Ruling or claim fully satisfied.
6.2.4: Ruling or claim fully satisfied due to internal legal decision or expiration of measure.
6.2.2: Ruling or claim partly satisfied.
6.2.1: No action tak-
6.2.5: Claim fully satisfied after complaiant a aeded to bilateral demands.
The substantive outcomes vary considerably according to
the type of trade measure involved. Over the entire forty-two
year period, adverse legal rulings pertaining to AD/CVD meas-
ures had by far the greatest percentage of legal failures, with
three of ten cases (30%) producing negative outcomes. Adverse
rulings pertaining to NTBs were next, with four negative out-
comes in thirty-five cases (11%). All seven of the negative out-
comes occurred in the 1980s, making the percentage of negative
outcomes for that ten-year period even higher - 43% of all AD/
CVD rulings in the 1980s, and 16% of all NTB rulings in that
decade. Legal rulings involving tariffs and subsidies encoun-
tered no negative outcomes at all.
As discussed above, the probable reason for the high failure
rate in AD/CVD rulings lies in two factors - the high
probability of violation rulings and the difficulty of reversing
AD/CVD actions. The three rulings that ended in negative out-
comes all involved AD/CVD orders in particular proceedings
that the defendant government refused to modify.7 0
70. Two of the violation rulings concerned the issue of whether the com-
plainants were proper parties, while the third involved the mechanics of a new
"anti-circumvention" rule. In one case the defendant and others argued that
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Interestingly, the defendants in the three AD/CVD cases
were the three countries with the worst compliance records -
the United States, Canada, and the European Community. It is
probably also worth noting that AD/CVD complaints were the
one type of complaint to increase significantly in the 1980s, the
decade in which most legal failures occurred. One can wonder
whether increasing use of AD/CVD measures may not be corre-
lated somehow with an increase in noncompliance, even if not
the major cause of it.
The four specific NTB measures involved in the four nega-
tive outcomes in the NTB category do not appear to share any
characteristic that might attribute the legal failure to the type of
measure involved. One case involved the special U.S. procedure
for dealing with intellectual property claims against imports,
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.71 Another involved Cana-
dian agricultural quotas. The two others involved arm-twisting
quotas imposed by the United States, both ultimately successful
in securing a policy change demanded by the United States, even
though ruled GATT-illegal. 72 The critical fact behind the legal
failure in each case would appear to be the degree of govern-
ment "attachment" to the particular measure. Except for gar-
den-variety tariffs with no revenue function, where attachment
is commonly very slight, attachment does not have much to do
with the type of measure involved.
As we suggested earlier, part of the reason for the absence
of negative outcomes in subsidy rulings may be that GATT rules
on subsidies are simply not very strong, the result being that
many highly distortive subsidies are never ruled in violation to
begin with. Even so, there were eight rulings of violation (or
nullification), and all of these rulings did produce positive re-
sults. Examined more closely, however, these eight cases are
found to contain an extraordinary amount of tension, uncer-
tainty and resistance to the dispute settlement process. Five of
the panel decision was simply wrong, Canada: Boneless Beef (Case #149),
supra note 11, in another the defendant refused to accept a conclusion that the
proceeding was void and had to be done all over again, United States: Stainless
Pipes from Sweden (Case #191), supra note 11, and in the third the defendant
government did not block adoption of the report but declined to implement the
ruling until the Uruguay Round negotiations on antidumping had come to a
conclusion, Screwdriver Assembly (Case #188), supra note 11.
71. Tariff Act of 1930, § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1983 & Supp. 1992).
72. The four cases were, respectively, United States: Section 337 (Case
#162), supra note 11; Canadav Ice Cream and Yoghurt (Case #195), supra note
11; United States: Tuna from Canada (Case #93), supra note 11; and United
States: Sugar from Nicaragua (Case #125), supra note 11.
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the eight cases produced major confrontations; their shorthand
names - DISC, Pasta, Canned Fruit, Oilseeds and Airbus -
have all become landmarks in GATT legal history.73 In Pasta,
Canned Fruit, and Airbus, the legal rulings themselves were
never adopted by the plenary body. The DISC case and the Oil-
seeds case dragged on for years before being settled. While
GATT did well to accomplish a positive settlement in each of
these five cases, the difficult history does not bode well for the
future of GATT litigation over subsidies.
The fact that rulings against tariffs have the best record -
no negative outcomes, better than 75% full satisfaction - is not
unexpected. Tariffs are more amenable to legal regulation than
other types of trade barriers. Tariffs usually have the precision
of numbers and thus offer very little room to hide non-con-
forming behavior. In addition, except in very small countries
where they are sometimes a revenue source, tariffs are typically
the easiest policy instruments to change. This presumes, of
course, that one is speaking of ordinary tariffs, used as instru-
ments of ordinary commercial policy. As we shall see, the 1980s
produced another kind of GATT-illegal tariff measure - arm-
twisting retaliatory tariffs - that are among the least amenable
to regulation.
The data on rates of full and partial satisfaction in cases
with rulings shows some interesting differences which tend to
confirm some of the observations just made. Removing the neg-
ative outcome cases, AD/CVD cases achieve 100% full satisfac-
tion, although in four of the seven cases the measure was
removed for internal reasons - that is, not changed as the result
of the GATT ruling. Subsidies, on the other hand, have by far
the lowest rate of full satisfaction, only 50%, suggesting that
even rulings of violation are not all that firmly grounded when it
comes to enforcement. NTBs and tariffs have roughly the same
rates of full satisfaction if negative outcome cases are removed.
e Cases Settled or Validity Otherwise Conceded. The follow-
ing table presents a measure-by-measure breakdown of the sub-
stantive outcomes in cases settled or otherwise conceded.
73. United States: DISC Legislation (Case #69), supra note 18; European
Community: Pasta Products (Case #105), supra note 26; European Commu-
nity: Canned Fruit (Case #107), supra note 26; European Community: Oil-
seeds (Case #179), supra note 7; and European Community: Airbus II (Case
#196), supra note 61.
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TABLE Mes 7
I SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: COMPLAINTS SETILED OR CONCEDED (By Measure)
S42 Years
Total Settled Result Full Satisfaction Partial Satisfaction
or Conceded Unknown 6.2.3 6.2.4 1 Total % 6.2.2 %
AD/CVD 3 0 2- 0 2 67% 1 33%
NTBs 42 0 22 1 23 55% 19 45%
iTariffs 10 1 8 0 8 89%1 1 11%
Subsidies 9 0 5 0 S 56% 4 44%
Total 64 1 37 l 38 60% 25 40%
I 19s I
Total Sealed Result Full Satisfaction Partial Satisfaction
or Conceded Unknown 6.2.3 6.2.4 Total % 6.2.2 %
AD/CVD 2 0 1 0 1 50% 1 50%
INTBs 20 0 15 1 16 80% 4 20%
Tariffs 1 0 1 0 I 100% 0 0%
Subsidies 5 0 1 0 1 20% 4 80%
ITotal 28 0 18 1 19 68% 9 32%
Note: All percentagea are computed using known results.
6.2.3: Ruling or claim fully satisfied.
6.2.4: Ruling or claim fully satisfied due to internal legal decision or expiration of measure.
6.2.2: Ruling or claim partly satisfied.
We have already observed that the total number of com-
plaints settled or conceded does vary somewhat according to the
measure involved. We observed that complaints against AD/
CVD measures have an unusually low rate of settlement. We
have already intimated that the possible reason for that varia-
tion is the legal rigidity of AD/CVD actions.
The low rate for subsidy cases again suggests the possible
weakness of legal rules in this area. The high rate for tariffs is
consistent with the fact that tariffs are the easiest measures to
change. AD/CVD settlements are too few to be representative.
So are the 1980s data as a whole.
; Withdrawn or Abandoned Cases. The following table
presents a measure-by-measure breakdown of the substantive
results in cases withdrawn or abandoned before a ruling was
made.
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TABLE Me.s 8
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: COMPLAINTS WITHDRAWN OR ABANDONED (By Measure)
42Year, Remlt Neutral: w/d for Negative: Withdraw after impasse or complain at
Unk: own adqua reso acceded to bilateral demands
Total Valid Total w/d Total Total Total As % of all Complaint probably valid
Compl. Conl. oraband'd Number Number Number complaints Number % of valid complaints
AD/CVD 20 13 6 2 2 2 10% 0 0%
NTBs 108 83 24 3 8 13 12% 6 7%
Tariffs 44 25 14 1 $ 18% 3 12%
Subdies 332 5 3 9% 0 0%
Total 205 137 54 8 20 1 26 13% 9 7%
1910, [Result Neutral: w/d for Negative: Withdrawn after impasse or complainan,
Unkno adequate reass acceded to bilateral demands
Total Valid Total w/d Total Total Total As % of all Complaint probably valid
ComI. CompI, or aband'd Number Number Number complaints Number % of valid complaints
ADICVD 16 9 6 2 2 2 13% 0 0%
NTBa 65 49 17 1 5 11 1 17% 4 8%
i 16 8 9 0 3 6 38% 3 38%
Subdiea 17 9 7 0 4 3 18% 0 0%
Total 114 75 39 3 14 22 19% 7 9%
There are twenty-six cases in the forty-two year period in
which the withdrawal of the complaint cannot be explained by
some neutral reason. The distribution of these "negative" with-
drawals, as a percentage of total complaints, does not reveal any
particular propensity toward defendant resistance with respect
to different types of trade measures. Complaints against tariffs
and NTBs have the highest percentages of negative withdrawals,
but about half of the negative withdrawals in each case are com-
plaints against arm-twisting measures. The pressures exerted
by defendants would appear to depend more on the purpose of
the measure than upon its particular type.
Turning to the nine legal failures that can be identified in
the withdrawn-abandoned category, we find that the distribu-
tion breaks down to six NTB and three Tariff.74 Once again,
however, the reason for the legal failure involved in these cases
does not seem to depend on the type of trade measure involved.
In eight of the nine cases - five NTB and three Tariff75 - the
GATT-illegal measure was an arm-twisting trade restriction
designed to induce the complainant to make a policy change -
74. The six NTB cases are France: Auto Taxes (Case #40), supra note 16;
European Community: TVs from Korea (Case #83), supra note 16; Poitiers
Customs House (Case #119), supra note 16; United States: Steel Pipe from EC
(Case #138), supra note 16; United States: Cotton Pillowcases (Case #144),
supra note 16; and European Community: Seal Skins (Case #145), supra note
16. The three Tariff cases are Semiconductor Retaliation (Case #161), supra
note 16; Pharmaceutical Retaliation (Case #189), supra note 16; and Hormones
Retaliation (Case #193), supra note 16.
75. The only NTB case that did not involve an arm-twisting measure is
France: Auto Taxes (Case #40), supra note 16.
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accepting a VER in four cases,76 opening a particular market in
three cases,77 and stopping the killing of baby seals in the
other.78 In six of the eight cases the complainant felt compelled
to give up the complaint and satisfy the demand in order to es-
cape further economic harm.79 The other two ended in im-
passe.80 In short, the key ingredient here is not the trade
measure, but the defendant's power and determination. That
five of the GATT-illegal measures were imposed by the United
States and three by the EC better explains the legal failure than
does the nature of the trade measure employed.8 1
* Combined Results of All Cases with Legally Valid Com-
plaints. The following table presents the measure-by-measure
breakdown of results for all cases with legally valid complaints.
We consider data for the entire forty-two year period and for the
1980s alone.
76. The four cases in which the complainant accepted a VER are European
Community: TVs from Korea (Case #83), supra note 16; Poitiers Customs
House (Case #119), supra note 16; United States: Steel Pipe from EC (Case
#138), supra note 16; and United States: Cotton Pillowcases (Case #144), supra
note 16.
77. The three cases in which the arm-twisting was designed to gain market
access are Semiconductor Retaliation (Case #161), supra note 16; Pharmaceu-
tical Retaliation (Case #189), supra note 16; and Hormones Retaliation (Case
193), supra note 16.
78. The baby seal case is European Community: Seal Skins (Case #145),
supra note 16.
79. The six cases are European Community: TVs from Korea (Case #83),
supra note 16; Poitiers Customs House (Case #119), supra note 16; United
States: Steel Pipe from EC (Case #138), supra note 16; United States: Cotton
Pillowcases (Case #144), supra note 16; Semiconductor Retaliation (Case
#161), supra note 16; and Pharmaceutical Retaliation (Case #189), supra note
16.
80. The two cases are European Community: Seal Skins (Case #145),
supra note 16, and Hormones Retaliation (Case #193), supra note 16.
81. See supra note 74.
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TABLE Mess 9
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES: COMBINED DATA (By Measure)
(Includes only cam with known results)
S42 Years
Cases where ruling of violation. settled, conceded valid, or withdrawn and probably valid
ToWd Full Satisfaction Part Satisfaction Negative Outcome
Complaints Number % Number % Number %
AD/CVD 13 9 69% 1 8% 3 23%
NTBs 83 47 57% 26 31% 10 12%
Tariffs 25 18 72% 4 16% 3 12%
Subsidies 16 8 50% 8 50% 0 0%
Total 137 82 60% 39 28% 16 12%
[ 1980s
Cases where ruling of violation, settled, conceded valid, or withdrawn and probably valid
Total Full Satisfaction Part Satisfaction Negative Outcome
Complaints Number % Number % Number %
AD/CVD 9 5 56% 1 11% 3 33%
NTBs 49 31 63% 10 20% 8 16%
riffs 8 4 50% 1 13% 3 38%
Sub 9 3 33% 6 67% 0 0%
75 43 57% 18 24% 14 19%
When negative outcomes in all categories are added to-
gether, negative outcomes in AD/CVD cases are still the most
frequent, at 23%. Valid complaints against both NTBs and tar-
iffs experience the same 12% rate of negative outcomes. Again
no subsidy cases end in legal failure, but they have by far the
highest rate of partial satisfaction. The data for the 1980s yields
a somewhat different order, due to the emergence of arm-twist-
ing tariff increases as a policy instrument in the 1980s.
In the end, we must conclude that each type of trade mea-
sure poses some kind of enforcement problem for GATT law.
The problems are not the same for each type, however. The
main difficulty in enforcing legal claims against AD/CVD meas-
ures is their susceptibility to findings of error, coupled with their
rigidity in domestic law. The main problem in enforcing claims
against subsidy measures is the inadequacy of GATT legal norms
in this area. Between tariffs and NTBs, tariffs are probably
more amenable to legal regulation as an initial matter because
they are both easier to identify and easier to change. Both tar-
iffs and NTBs, however, can become intractable when they are
used as instruments of arm-twisting commercial diplomacy.
The enforcement problems with AD/CVD measures and
subsidies could be addressed by specific legal reforms.8 2 The
82. To improve enforcement in the AD/CVD sector, for example, one
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problems with tariffs and NTBs can be addressed only by im-
proving the overall climate of legal compliance enough to dis-
courage governments from taking the law into their own hands.
G. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The data presented in this study provide a quantitative out-
line of the main chapters in the history of GATT dispute settle-
ment. The GATT dispute settlement process came into
operation rather quickly, was reasonably successful during the
first decade, fell into disuse and then recovered, and finally blos-
somed in the 1980s with a substantial increase in activity and
ambition. Greater ambitions in the 1980s produced many im-
pressive successes, but they were accompanied by a growing
number of quite troubling legal failures.
By providing a quantitative measure of these developments,
this study has helped to clarify the following important points:
1. Problems notwithstanding, the GATT dispute settle-
ment procedure has been a successful international legal institu-
tion. The overall success rate of slightly more than 88%, or even
the 1980s success rate of slightly more than 81%, means that at
least four out of five valid complaints are being dealt with suc-
cessfully. There is legal substance to this enterprise. Its accom-
plishments to this point, if not unique, are at least rare in the
history of international legal institutions. Those accomplish-
ments have laid down a strong base upon which to build.
2. The quantitative analysis of individual country perform-
ance makes it quite clear that the GATT dispute settlement sys-
tem is somewhat more responsive to the interests of the strong
than to the interests of the weak. The evidence for this hypothe-
sis occurs in all phases of performance - in the rates of success
as complainants, in the rates of noncompliance as defendants, in
the quality of outcomes achieved, and in the extent to which
complainants are able to carry complaints forward to a decision.
Perhaps the most important finding in this regard is the
substantial difference in rates of withdrawal before a ruling is
made, suggesting that the weaker countries tend to encounter
significantly greater barriers at the outset of the process. An im-
portant part of making the dispute settlement process stronger
might consider adopting the sort of international appellate review found in
Chapter 19 of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, which is made binding as
a matter of domestic law. On the subsidy side, the main area of potential re-
form is the writing of clearer rules defining subsidies.
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in the future will be to ease the burdens that weaker countries
face in moving complaints forward.
3. The findings that the strong do better than the weak in
GATT dispute settlement is neither unexpected, nor disabling.
Every legal system ever created has begun with formative years
in which the strong do better than the weak. While it is true
that legal systems are created for the purpose of reducing power
inequalities, they never accomplish this goal overnight (nor,
alas, completely). Greater equality of treatment only comes as
the legal system matures and strengthens over time. The GATT
legal system is still relatively young, and it operates in a society
of nations which is still very primitive. It is stronger today than
it was in the 1950s, and if the positive developments in the 1980s
prevail over the negative, it will be yet stronger in the future.
4. The data do not tell us definitively which factors make
GATT law work better or worse, but they do provide some very
useful directions about where to look for answers. The decade-
by-decade data tell us when a dramatic increase in noncompli-
ance occurred (the 1980s), and the study of individual country
records tells us who made the noncompliance happen (the
United States, the European Community and Canada). We
know that one of the most striking changes to occur during the
1980s was the sharp increase in the volume of GATT legal com-
plaints; it seems reasonable to hypothesize from that fact that
the GATT had entered a new and more ambitious period of legal
activity when more demanding complaints would be filed, more
objective answers given, and thus more failure-producing con-
frontations would occur. But even if greater ambitions made
legal failures more likely, that fact would not explain the con-
centration of legal failures among three of the most powerful
members, nor the preponderance of legal failures caused by the
United States.
It seems reasonable to hypothesize that power had some-
thing to do with the concentrations of problems in cases against
the United States, the European Community and Canada - that
when a legal system starts pressing harder, the first to resist will
be those who are most accustomed to having their own way. As
for the distinctive noncompliance record of the United States in
the 1980s, anyone familiar with trade policy developments in
that decade cannot avoid zeroing in on the major change in the
domestic politics of U.S foreign trade policy that occurred during
that decade. In the 1980s, the U.S. Congress demanded and re-
ceived a decidedly more bellicose trade policy, based on a claim
[Vol. 2:1
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that foreign governments were not providing fair quid pro quo
for the relative openness of the U.S. market.
5. As for the significance of other factors in determining
the success or failure of the GATT dispute settlement proce-
dure, the most surprising conclusion of the entire study is that
complaints involving agricultural trade were in no way less suc-
cessful than complaints involving non-agricultural trade. As we
hasten to point out, this does not mean that GATT is success-
fully regulating agricultural trade. To the contrary, it means
that GATT law regulates the more serious trade barriers in agri-
cultural trade policy so poorly that agricultural trade barriers
have been mostly outside the reach of the GATT dispute settle-
ment process altogether.
6. The final section of the study asked whether the nature
of the trade policy measure involved made a difference. That
data revealed several variations that suggested an affirmative
answer, albeit of modest dimensions. The high percentage of
legal failures in AD/CVD cases, their low rate of settlement, and
their sharp increase in volume during the 1980s all invite inquiry
as to whether AD/CVD measures might not have a greater pro-
pensity for legal failure than other trade measures. We sug-
gested that the typical arbitrariness of AD/CVD criteria and the
legal rigidity of the measures once taken might indeed have
given them a greater than average chance of failure. We also
wondered, somewhat timidly, whether the ascension of AD/
CVD measures to a place of importance in national trade policy
might not somehow be a sign of other, deeper tendencies toward
noncompliant behavior.
The data also gave slight confirmation to a few other modest
observations about other types of trade measures: (1) Ordinary
tariffs are the most easy to regulate because violations are usu-
ally clear and they are usually easier to change; (2) effective reg-
ulation of subsidies is difficult because the GATT rules on
subsidies are inadequate; and (3) there are many NTBs, and it is
hard to generalize about them.
7. Stepping back from the individual findings, it is clear
that the most important finding in this study is the dispropor-
tionate level of noncompliant behavior by the United States. If
there is one moving force in the evolution of GATT dispute set-
tlement law today, it is this fact. Just as the United States
played the leading role in building the GATT dispute settlement
procedure to its present state of effectiveness, so the United
States has played the leading role in placing those accomplish-
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ments in jeopardy today. Even though there are, as always,
problems in the behavior of the EC, Japan and other countries,
it seems clear that no resolution of the current malaise in GATT
legal affairs will be possible without a change in basic U.S. legal
policy - some kind of reconciliation between the current U.S.
preoccupation with obtaining a fair deal and the recognition of
an obligation to use legal means to secure one.
The Uruguay Round trade negotiations are, in one dimen-
sion, an effort to effect such a reconciliation. The package de-
fined in December 199183 would satisfy the major public
justifications that the U.S. government has given for the legal
violence it has practiced in the recent past. That is, it provides
significant new economic opportunities for the United States -
in services trade, intellectual property protection, investment
protection and possibly agriculture - that would meet U.S. com-
plaints that the balance of economic advantage in the present
GATT agreement is tilted strongly against it. The package also
addresses U.S. complaints that GATT law is too slow and too
easily blocked; its dispute settlement reforms define a process
almost as rapid as that required by U.S. Section 301 law, and
which cannot be blocked. If the public justification for noncom-
plying behavior is the real justification, the Uruguay Round
package could well do the trick. If not - if the public justifica-
tions are just window-dressing for a simple refusal to submit to
international legal discipline - GATT law is in for a long
winter.
83. Drft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations, GAT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (20 December 1991)
(the so-called "Dunkel text," prepared by the GATT Secretariat as its evalua-
tion of what a final package would have to look like).
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APPENDIX II
TABLE OF GATT LEGAL COMPLAINTS
The following is a complete chronological list of GATT complaints invoked
between 1948 and 1989. A double asterisk indicates a complaint in which a legal
ruling was issued by a GATT adjudicatory body, regardless of whether the rul-
ing was adopted. A single asterisk indicates a complaint in which a panel or
other third-party tribunal was appointed, but the complaint was withdrawn or
settled before a public ruling was made.
1948:
001"* Netherlands v. Cuba: Consular Taxes
002** Pakistan v. India: Tax Rebates on Exports
003 United States v. Cuba: Restrictions on Textile Imports [I]
1949:
004** France v. Brazil: Internal Taxes
005* United States v. Cuba. Restrictions on Textile Imports [II]
006** Czechoslovakia v. United States: Export Restrictions
007** Cuba v. United States: Margins of Tariff Preferences to Cuba
008** Chile v. Australia: Subsidy on Ammonium Sulfate
1950:
009 United States v. France: Export Restrictions on Hides and Skins
010 Belgium v. France: Quantitative Restrictions
011 Belgium v. United Kingdom: Quantitative Restrictions
012 Netherlands v. United Kingdom: Purchase Tax Exemptions
013** Czechoslovakia v. United States: Withdrawal of a Tariff Conces-
sion Under Article XIX ("Fur Felt Hat Bodies"]
1951:
014"* Norway & Denmark v. Belgium: Family Allowances
015** Netherlands & Denmark v. United States: Import Restrictions
on Dairy Products
016 United States v. Belgium: Restrictions on Dollar Imports
1952:
017* United Kingdom v. Greece: Increase of Import Duties
018* Norway v. Germany: Treatment of Imports of Sardines
019"* France v. Greece: Special Import Taxes
020 India v. Pakistan: Export Fees on Jute
021 Greece & Turkey v. United States: Article XIX Action on Dried
Figs
022** United States v. Netherlands: Action Under Article XXIII:2
023 United States v. France: Statistical Tax on Imports and Exports
1953:
024 Turkey v. United States: Import Restrictions on Filberts
025 United States & United Kingdom v. Brazil: Compensatory
Concessions
1954:
026** Italy v. France: Special Temporary Compensation Tax on
Imports
027** Italy v. Sweden: Anti-Dumping Duties
028* Italy v. Turkey: Import Taxes and Export Bonuses
029 Czechoslovakia v. Peru: Embargo on Imports from Czechoslova-
kia
030 Italy v. Greece: Luxury Tax on Imports
031 United States v. Germany: Import Restrictions on Coal
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032 United States v. France: Customs Stamp on Imports, Increase to
2 Percent
033 United States v. Belgium: Import Restrictions on Coal
034** Benelux v. Germany: Import Duties on Starch and Potato Flour
1955:
035** United States v. France: Customs Stamp Tax on Imports,
Increase to 3 Percent
036 Australia v. United States: Hawaiian Regulations Affecting
Imported Eggs
037 United Kingdom v. Italy: Turnover Tax on Pharmaceutical
Products
038 Denmark v. Italy: Import Duties on Cheese
039 Greece v. Italy: Duties on Cotton
1956:
040 United States v. France: Auto Taxes
041 Netherlands v. Germany: Turnover Tax on Printing
042** Germany v. Greece: Increase in Bound Duties on LP Phono-
graph Records
043 Denmark v. United States: Export Subsidy on Poultry
044 United States v. Chile: Auto Taxes
1957:
045* Denmark v. United Kingdom: Export of Subsidized Eggs
046** United Kingdom v. Italy: Discrimination Against Imported
Agricultural Machinery
047 Germany v. Greece: Discrimination in Credit Facilities for
Imported Goods
048 United Kingdom v. France: Discrimination Against Imported
Agricultural Machinery
049 Denmark & Sweden v. United States: Article XIX Action on
Spring Clothespins
1958:
050** Australia v. France: Assistance to Exports of Wheat and Wheat
Flour
051* Australia v. Italy: Assistance to Exports of Flour
052 Austria v. Italy: Measures in Favor of Domestic Production of
Ships Plates
1959:
053** Germany v. United Kingdom: Increase in Margin of Preference
of Ornamental Pottery
1961:
054** Uruguay v. 15 Developed Countries: Uruguayan Recourse to
Article XXIII
055** Brazil v. United Kingdom: Increase in Margin of Preferences on
Bananas
1962:
056** United States v. France: Import Restrictions [I]
057 United States v. Italy: Import Restrictions
058** United States v. Canada. "Value for Duty" on Imports of
Potatoes
1963:
059** EC v. United States: Action Under Article XXVIII ["Chicken
War"]
1969:
060 United States v. Italy: Administrative and Statistical Fees
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1970:
061 United States v. Greece: Preferential Tariff Quotas to the USSR
062 Australia v. EC: Emergency Action on Table Apples
063 United States v. Denmark: Import Restrictions on Grains
064** United States v. Jamaica: Margins of Preference
1972:
065 United States v. EC: Compensatory Taxes on Imports
066* Israel v. United Kingdom: Import Restrictions on Cotton Tex-
tiles
067 United States v. France: Import Restrictions [II]
068* United States v. United Kingdom: Dollar Area Quotas
1973:
069** EC v. United States: Income Tax Legislation [DISC]
070** United States v. France: Income Tax Practices
071** United States v. Belgium: Income Tax Practices
072** United States v. Netherlands: Income Tax Practices
1974:
073* Canada v. EC: Adequacy of Compensation in Article XXIV:6
Negotiations
074 Australia v. Japan: Restrictions on Imports of Beef and Veal
1975:
075** United States v. Canada: Import Quotas on Eggs
1976:
076** United States v. EC: Programme of Minimum Import Prices
(MIPS), Licenses Etc. for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegeta-
bles
077 Australia v. EC: Licenses and Surety Deposits on Canned
Peaches and Pears
078** United States v. EC: Measures on Animal Feed Proteins
079** EC v. Canada: Withdrawal of Tariff Concessions Under Article
XXVIII:3
1977:
080** Japan v. United States: Suspension of Customs Liquidation
[Zenith Case]
081* United States v. Japan: Measures on Imports of Thrown Silk
Yarn
082 Chile v. EC: Export Refunds on Malted Barley
1978:
083 Korea v. EC: Article XIX Action on Imports into the UK of
Television Sets from Korea
084** Hong Kong v. Norway: Restrictions on Imports of Certain
Textile Products
085* United States v. Japan: Measures on Imports of Leather [I]
086** Australia v. EC: Refunds on Exports of Sugar
087** Brazil v. EC: Refunds on Exports of Sugar
088 EC v. United States: Application of Countervailing Duties
1979:
089** Chile v. EC: Restriction on Imports of Apples From Chile
090* Canada v. Japan: Measures on Imports of Leather
091** United States v. Spain: Measures Concerning Domestic Sale of
Soyabean Oil
092* United States v. Japan: Restraints on Imports of Manufactured
Tobacco
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1980:
093** Canada v. United States: Prohibition on Imports of Tuna and
Tuna Products from Canada
094"* Brazil v. Spain: Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee
095** Canada v. EC: Imports of Beef from Canada
096 India v. Japan: Measures on Imports of Leather
097* United States v. EC: "Spin-Chill" Requirements on Imports of
Poultry
098* India v. United States: Imposition of Countervailing Duty
Without Injury Criterion
1981:
099 United States v. EC: Export Subsidies Maintained by Greece
100"* EC v. United States: Import Duty on Vitamin B12
101 Australia v. EC: Production Subsidies on Canned Fruit
102** Canada v. United States: Imports of Certain Automotive Spring
Assemblies [Section 337]
103** United States v. EC: Subsidies on Export of Wheat Flour
104"* Hong Kong v. EC: Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of
Certain Products from Hong Kong
1982:
105** United States v. EC: Subsidies on Exports of Pasta Products
106 United States v. EC: Subsidies on the Export and Production of
Poultry
107"* United States v. EC: Production Aids on Canned Peaches,
Canned Pears, Canned Fruit Cocktail and Dried Grapes
108** United States v. Canada. Administration of the Foreign Invest-
ment Review Act [FIRA]
109 United States v. EC: Export Subsidies on Sugar
110 10 Sugar-Producing Countries v. EC: Sugar Regime
111 India v. United States: Countervailing Duty Procedures
112 Argentina v. EC, Canada, Australia: Trade Restrictions Applied
for Non-Economic Reasons ["Falklands War" Embargo]
113** United States v. EC: Tariff Treatment of Citrus Products from
Certain Mediterranean Countries
114** United States v. EC: Value-Added Tax (VAT) and Threshold
115 United States v. Japan: Certification Procedures for Metal
Softball Bats
116* EC v. Finland: Internal Regulations Having an Effect on Imports
of Certain Parts of Footwear
117 EC v. Switzerland: Imports of Table Grapes
118 Poland v. United States: Suspension of Most-Favored Nation
Treatment
119 Japan v. EC: Import Restrictive Measures on Video Tape
Recorders [Poitiers Customs House]
1983:
120"* United States v. Japan: Measures on Imports of Leather [II]
121 Canada v. United States: Countervailing Duty Investigation on
Softwood Lumber [I]
122** EC v. United States: "Manufacturing Clause" in US Copyright
Legislation
123* EC v. United States: Export Subsidy on Sales of Wheat Flour to
Egypt
124 EC v. Japan: Nullification and Impairment of Benefits
125** Nicaragua v. United States: Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua
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126 United States v. Brazil: Subsidies on the Export and Production
of Poultry
127 EC v. United States: Tariff Reclassification of Machine-Threshed
Tobacco
128 EC v. Canada. Antidumping Investigation Concerning Hydro-
Electric Generators from Italy
1984:
129** Canada v. EC: Imports of Newsprint from Canada
130"* EC v. Spain: Homologation Requirements for Heating Radiators
and Electrical Medical Equipment
131 EC v. Chile: Import Measures on Certain Dairy Products
132** South Africa v. Canad. Discriminatory Application of Retail
Sales Tax on Gold Coins
133* Finland v. New Zealand: Imports of Electrical Transformers
from Finland
134 Canada v. EC: Export Subsidy on Boneless Manufacturing Beef
135 Australia v. EC: Operation of Beef and Veal Regime
136 United States v. Japan: Single Tendering Procedures
137* EC v. United States: Definition of "Industry" Concerning Wine
and Grape Products
138 EC v. United States: Ban on Imports of Steel Pipe and Tube
from the European Community
1985:
139** EC v. Canada: Import, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks
by Provincial Marketing Authorities
140* Canada v. United States: Restrictions on Imports of Certain
Sugar-Containing Products
141* United States v. Japan: Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of
Leather Footwear
142 United States v. EC: Purchase of Computers Under French
"Computer Literacy Program"
143"* Nicaragua v. United States: Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua
144 Portugal v. United States: Restrictions on Imports of Cotton
Pillowcases and Bedsheets
145 Canada v. EC: Ban on Importation of Skins of Certain Seal Pups
and Related Products
146 Brazil v. United States: Measures on Imports of Non-Beverage
Ethyl Alcohol
1986:
147* Canada v. United States: Countervailing Duty on Imports of
Softwood Lumber from Canada [III
148** United States v. Japan: Restrictions on Certain Agricultural
Products
149** EC v. Canada. Countervailing Duty on Boneless Manufacturing
Beef
150 United States v. Japan: Restrictions on Imports of Herring,
Pollock and Surimi
151 EC v. Canada: Countervailing Duty on Pasta
152** Mexico, Canada & EC v. United States: Taxes on Petroleum and
Certain Imported Substances ["Superfund" Taxes]
153** EC & Canada v. United States: Customs User Fee
154"* EC v. Japan: Restrictions on Alcoholic Beverages
155 United States v. Canada Restrictions on Exports of Uranium
1987:
156* EC v. Japan: Restrictions on Semiconductors
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157** United States v. Canada: Restrictions on Exports of Unprocessed
Salmon and Herring
158 United States v. European Community: Government Financing
of Airbus Industries
159 United States v. European Community: Animal Hormones
Directive
160 EC v. United States: Tax Reform Legislation for Passenger
Aircraft
161 Japan v. United States: Unilateral Measures on Imports of
Certain Japanese Products ["Semiconductor" Retaliation]
162** EC v. United States: Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
["Aramid Fibres" Case]
163* United States v. India: Import Restrictions on Almonds
164* United States v. India: Import Licenses on Almonds
165 EC v. United States: Procurement of Machine tools by the
Department of Defense
166 Argentina v. EC: Enlargement of EEC - Accession of Spain and
Portugal
167 Canada v. United States: Section 337 Action on Cellular Mobile
Telephones
168* United States v. EC: Directive on Third-County Meat Imports
169** Canada v. Japan: Imports of Spruce-Pine-Fir (SPF) Dimension
Lumber
170 Brazil v. United States: Tariff Increase and Import Prohibition
on Brazilian Products [Informatics Retaliation]
1988:
171** United States v. Norway: Restrictions on Imports of Apples and
Pears
172 United States v. Sweden: Restrictions on Imports of Apples and
Pears
173** United States v. Korea: Restrictions on Imports of Beef
174** Australia v. Korea: Restrictions on Imports of Beef
175 United States v. EC: Greek Import Restrictions on Almonds
176* United States v. Japan: Restrictions on Imports of Beef and
Citrus Products
177* Australia v. Japan: Restrictions on Imports of Beef
178 Chile v. United States: Quality Standards for Grapes
179** United States v. EC: Payments and Subsidies on Oilseeds and
Animal-Feed Proteins
180** Chile v. EC: Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples
181** New Zealand v. Korea: Restrictions on Imports of Beef
182 New Zealand v. EC: Restrictions on Imports of Apples
183 New Zealand v. Japan: Import Restrictions on Beef
184* United States v. EC: Restrictions on Imports of Apples
185** Brazil v. United States: Collection of Countervailing Duty on
Non-Rubber Footwear
186** EC v. United States: Restrictions Under 1955 U.S. Waiver and
Under Headnote to U.S. Schedule XX
187** Australia v. United States: Import Restrictions on Sugar
188** Japan v. EC: Antidumping Regulation on Imports of Parts and
Components ["Screwdriver Assembly" Case]
189* Brazil v. United States: Import Restrictions on Certain Products
from Brazil ["Pharmaceuticals" Retaliation]
190 Brazil v. United States: Export Enhancement Program (EEP)
Subsidy
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191** Sweden v. United States: Antidumping Duties on Stainless Pipes
and Tubes from Sweden
192 Finland v. United States: Procurement of Antarctic Research
Vessel
193 EC v. United States: Increase in Rates of Duty on Certain
Products of the EC ["Hormones" Retaliation]
194 Canada v. United States: Import Prohibition on Ice Cream from
Canada
195* United States v. Canada. Restriction on Imports of Ice Cream
and Yoghurt
1989:
196"* United States v. EC: Government Financing of Airbus Industries
197* Finland v. Australia: Antidumping Duties on Power Transform-
ers
198* United States v. EC: Restraints on Exports of Copper Scrap
199 Hong Kong v. EC: Antidumping Duty on Video Cassettes
200 EC v. United States: Determination Under Sections 304 and 305
of the Trade Act of 1974 Relating to EC Oilseed Subsidies
201 Canada v. EC: Subsidies for Producers and Processors of
Oilseeds
202 United States v. Finland: Restriction on Imports of Apples and
Pears
203** Canada v. United States: CVD on Pork from Canada
204 United States v. Norway: Oslo Toll Ring Project
205** United States v. Canada: Injury Determination on Grain Corn
from the United States
206 United States v. Brazil: Restrictions on Imports of Certain
Agricultural and Manufactured Products
207 EC v. Chile: Internal Taxes on Spirits
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APPENDIX III
LEGAL FAILURES
The following is a brief description of the cases categorized as legal failures
("negative outcomes") in the present study.
As is always true when establishing a category like this one, sharp lines
must be drawn between outcomes that are not that sharply different from each
other. Nonetheless, some line is necessary for a statistical study like this one,
and all other lines tested (there were many) proved less satisfactory.
It should be noted that some of the legal failures in more recent cases
might eventually be reversed if compliance were to occur after a Uruguay
Round agreement is reached. In the authors' judgment, however, excluding
such cases from the study would have presented a distorted picture of the pres-
ent state of GATT's record on legal compliance
A. Cases with Rulings
093 United States: Prohibition on Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from
Canada. The United States imposed a GAlT-illegal import prohibition in
response to the seizure of U.S. fishing vessels by Canada. The prohibition
was removed only after Canada had acceded to U.S. demands for a new
agreement defining the disputed fishing rights. The import prohibition
was subsequently ruled GATT-illegal; the U.S. legislation mandating the
prohibition remains in force.
125 United States: Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua. The United States im-
posed a GATT-illegal discriminatory quota, and refused to change it after
a ruling of violation. The discrimination was eventually removed after
Nicaragua met U.S. political demands by holding democratic elections.
149 Canada: Countervailing Duty on Boneless Manufacturing Beef. Canada's
CVD was ruled GATT-illegal by the panel. Canada blocked adoption of
the panel ruling, and continued to maintain the CVD.
162 United States: Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. A January 1989 panel
report ruled many aspects of the Section 337 procedure GATT-illegal; the
ruling was adopted by the GATT Council. The United States undertook to
correct the procedure only if and when a satisfactory agreement on intel-
lectual property was agreed to in the Uruguay Round.
188 European Community: Antidumping Regulation on Imports of Parts and
Components. A March 1990 panel report ruled a new EC antidumping
regulation GATT-illegal; the ruling was approved by the GATT Council.
The EC undertook to correct the regulation if, when, and to the extent
that it would be prohibited by the revision of the MTN Antidumping Code
then under negotiation in the Uruguay Round. Meanwhile it continued to
apply the regulation.
191 United States: Antidumping Duties on Stainless Pipes and Tubes from
Sweden. A September 1990 panel report ruled that a U.S. antidumping
duty had not been legally imposed, and recommended a refund. The
United States objected to the refund order and blocked adoption of report
on that ground.
195 Canada, Restriction on Imports of Ice Cream and Yoghurt. A September
1989 panel report ruled Canadian restrictions GATT-illegal; the ruling
was adopted by Council. Canada postponed corrective action until the
Uruguay Round agreement on agriculture was completed.
1993]
112 MNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE [Vol. 2:1
A SPECIAL CASE: In tables recording each appearance by an individual de-
fendant as a separate event, an eighth legal failure following a legal ruling is
counted. Norway, one of the fifteen defendants in complaint # 54: 15 Devel-
oped Countries: Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, admitted to a legal vio-
lation and did not correct it during the proceedings following a panel ruling to
that effect.
B. Cases Withdrawn or Abandoned
048 France: Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery.
France had an internal tax for automobiles based on an administrative
criterion called "fiscal horsepower" which was constructed to impose sub-
stantially higher taxes on most foreign autos. France refused to recognize
the U.S. complaint. The measure was subsequently ruled illegal under the
provisions of the Treaty of Rome.
083 European Community: Article XIX Action on Imports into the UK of Tel-
evision Sets from Korea. United Kingdom imposed a discriminatory
Quantitative Restriction (QR) in violation of GATT. The QR was with-
drawn after Korea agreed to a VER.
119 European Community: Import Restrictive Measures on Video Tape Re-
corders. France required all VCRs from Japan to clear customs through
the tiny customs house at Poitiers, a discriminatory border requirement in
violation of Article I. The restriction was removed when Japan agreed to
a VER.
138 United States: Ban on Imports of Steel Pipe and Tube from the European
Community. The United States imposed a discriminatory QR on EC steel;
no Article XIX or other justification was claimed. The QR was removed
when EC agreed to a VER.
144 United States: Restrictions on Imports of Cotton Pillowcases and Bed-
sheets. The United States imposed a discriminatory QR, claiming the tex-
tile imports were causing disturbance of the U.S. industry, but the United
States had no MFA relationship with Portugal and did not comply with
Article XIX. Restrictions were removed when Portugal agreed to a VER.
145 European Community: Ban on Importation of Skins of Certain Seal Pups
and Related Products. The EC ban was admittedly for the purpose of de-
terring commercial seal hunting practices of Canada and Norway; the
legal violation was the same as in the 1991 Tuna decision. The ban is still
in force.
161 United States: Unilateral Measures on Imports of Certain Japanese Prod-
ucts. The United States imposed a GATT-illegal discriminatory tariff in-
crease in retaliation for breach of a bilateral agreement on semiconductor
trade practices. The breach gave no excuse for GATT-illegal measures.
The measure was partially withdrawn when Japan partially complied
with U.S. demands; the remainder remained in force until a new bilateral
agreement five years later.
189 United States: Import Restrictions on Certain Products from Brazil. The
United States imposed a GATT-illegal discriminatory tariff increase in re-
taliation for Brazil's failure to provide adequate intellectual property pro-
tection for U.S. pharmaceuticals. Intellectual property treatment cannot
justify GATT-illegal measures. The tariff increase was removed when
Brazil agreed to U.S. demands.
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193 United States: Increase In Rates of Duty on Certain Products of the EC.
The United States imposed a GATT-illegal discriminatory tariff increase
in retaliation against an EC regulation barring sale of hormone-fed beef.
The legality of the EC measure was never tested in GATT; the United
States rejected EC offer to litigate GATT jurisdiction over the hormone
ban. The measure was partially removed after partial limitation of the EC
ban, but the remainder is still in force.

